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Introduction: 
Water and Development 
Life on Earth is dependent on water.  As living organisms – humans or other- 
water is central to the daily cycle of sustaining life.  On the Great Serengeti, the watering 
holes left after seasonal rains become a case study of social hierarchies and relationships.  
Wildebeests, gazelles, zebras, and buffalos migrate from one available water sources to 
the next.  These creatures often find themselves in an uncomfortable truce with traditional 
predators such as a lions, cheetahs, and canine species as all seek to consume the vital 
liquid.  All species seeks to secure access to the resource.1  Humans have followed a 
similar path to securing access to this resource.  Empires rise, wars are fought, and 
societies collapse with water playing a pivotal role in these events. 
Despite this important role of water in society and developing worldview 
synthesis of the importance of water in the formation and life cycle of societies illustrated 
to this point, the American historiography is largely void of a cohesive contribution to the 
larger water-in-society metanarrative to date.  Even with more recent scholarship on the 
social dynamics of natural water systems, these studies provide little to enhance our 
understanding of the influence water has on societal decision-making.  Instead, such 
scholarship focuses on hydrology, morphology, and the riparian ecosystem.2  Because few 
historians, environmental and other, explore the topic of water, a synthesized narrative 
has yet to emerge.  Indeed, a general lack of attention to the centrality of water resources 
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 For a general overview of the ecosystem of the Serengeti, see:  A. R. E. Sinclair and M. Norton-
Griffiths, Serengeti: Dynamics of an Ecosystem (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).   
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 For a general overview of the physical dynamics of water in relation to river hydrology and 
morphology, see: Luna B. Leopold, A View of the River (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).  
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management and subsequent social, economic, and political effects has no doubt hindered 
the creation of the greater metanarrative.  Additionally, one of the ongoing debates in the 
historical profession focusing on the loss nuance by lumping studies together informing a 
coherent narrative no doubt reaches to the analysis of American water management.  
However, despite the lack of such a narrative emerging and the loss of nuance in 
developing a coherent narrative, a review of American water historiography does point to 
the possibility of synthesizing several key points in the historiography of American water 
management while suggesting new directions for further research.   
Much of the current scholarship in environmental history addresses three major 
themes in the discussion of water.  These themes include the traditional narrative of 
humans versus the environment, while also introducing greater intellectual depth with 
examinations of human attempts at altering the environment for society’s use, and the 
role of the environment in pitting humans against each other.  As such, an overview of the 
current state of the historiography illustrates areas of research that lend themselves to the 
creation of a coherent narrative while also presenting some of the major areas that 
currently defy synthesis. 
One of the significant contributions to understanding the centrality of water in 
society is Richard White and The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia 
River.  Delving headlong into the discussion of the conquest of man over nature and 
harnessing a resource, White set out to understand how society converted the Columbia 
River into a machine for human gain.  Mainly focused on the Grand Coulee Dam and the 
stoppage of salmon runs, White traced agricultural and developing urban areas’ 
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dependence on energy derived from the river.  While indigenous people fished salmon 
from the river, later habitants harnessed the Columbia River’s current by damming the 
river to create turbine energy.  White’s interpretation hinges on the contention that the 
power of water transcends any specific society.3   
 Borrowing a framework from the material sciences, White linked the 
transformative powers of water to its energy capital and potential.  White renders the 
premise of water’s transformative power as a simple transfer of energy and focuses on the 
interaction between river and life as an ecosystem.  Although this scholarship offers a 
non-declensionist historical interpretation reflecting the scientific canon of kinetic energy, 
it limits understanding of the transformative powers of water by serving as a platform for 
decision-making.   
Engaging the previously mentioned historiographical question of conquest of man 
over nature, Mark Fiege in Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in 
the American West restored some, albeit, small agency to society.4  Focusing on the Snake 
River Valley in Idaho, Fiege contended that there is a critical break point where humans 
strike a compromise between extremes in dealing with the environment.  This comes 
about as humans learn by working the limits of what they can take from ecosystems.  
Specifically, irrigation on the Snake River is a constant give and take between a manmade 
agricultural ecosystem based on irrigation and the environment that continues to persist.  
As a result, humans must be cognizant of their actions that lead to overextending the 
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 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1995). 
4
 Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999). 
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abilities of the irrigated ecosystem.  In essence, Feige is engaging the traditional humans 
versus the environment inquiry.  However, Feige infuses the human ability to make 
decisions into the metanarrative of water and society.5 
Contributing to the theme of man versus the environment, Theodore Steinberg 
explored the central importance of waterways in New England in Nature Incorporated: 
Industrialization and the Waters of New England.  Specifically, Steinberg examined the 
transformative nature that the struggle over “taming” the New England waters of the 
Charles and Merrimack River Valleys provided.  Steinberg contended New England 
society faced numerous challenges resulting from the attempts to harness the power 
potential of the waterways.  While harnessing waterpower required overcoming 
technological hurdles, the cost of this investment also resulted in challenges to the legal 
and social status quo.6   
Introducing two other major themes, Steinberg stated that a transformation, 
resulting from efforts at industrialization, forced the creation of new relationships 
between various individuals and between the environment and the people inhabiting and 
utilizing the land.  From early colonization of America to the present day, acquisition of 
                                                          
5
 Also entering the discussion on the conquest of man over nature and arguing an equilibrium 
approach is Mart Stewart.  In “What Nature Suffers to Groe,” Life, Labor and Landscape on the Georgia 
Coast, 1680-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), Stewart focused on the question of whom or 
what dictates the interplay between humans and the environment.  Stewart contended that the landscape of 
the eastern Georgia coastal region dictated the manner in which human interaction with the environment 
would be successful or not between 1680 and 1920.  In other words, Stewart argued that the natural 
environment contained the conditions in which it would render itself to successful human activities.  
Therefore, if human inhabitants did not fully recognize and conform or adjust to the environment they 
would not achieve their goals.  Stewart contended that coastal Georgians’ misunderstandings as to the 
minimum and maximum extremes of interacting with the environment forced the reevaluation of inputs to 
render human demands.   
6
 Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the Waters of New England 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991).  
5 
 
water and access rights has been an issue of much legislation and as such as the demand 
for access to water resources increased, Americans faced new challenges.  At the 
foundation of Steinberg’s argument was the transformation of the legal understanding of 
water rights, shifting from a common law tradition of ownership and usage rights to a 
legal understanding of water as a separate and distinct form of property.7  Under common 
law tradition, individuals who owned land adjacent to waterways reserved the right to 
utilize the water as they saw fit.  However, as industries such as mills moved into the 
New England region the need to secure access to water for production needs pitted the 
interests of industries, farmers, and cities against each other in their efforts to secure 
needed water resources.  The implementation of new laws dictated usage rights and 
provided a means to secure access to the resource.  The result was what Steinberg referred 
to as the commodification of water.8   
The idea of commodification of water highlights the larger historical theme 
pointing toward the role of the environment in pitting humans against each other.  
Specifically, Steinberg’s work shows that through the harnessing of waterpower and 
limiting the access of others to the resource competing interests transform their 
understanding of water.  The transformation results in converting the natural resource into 
economically measurable units.  Through the assigning of economic value to water, 
access to water is limited.  Commodification of water effectively renders waterpower as a 
tool of economic gain and limits the equal utilization of the resource by the whole of 
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  Steinberg is undoubtedly building upon Morton J. Horwitz’s scholarship of the transformation of 
a distinct American legal body in, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1977).  For Horwitz’s specific discussion of water rights transformation under the law see 
pages 34-42. 
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society.  In other words, individuals with more capital have access to more water power-
based economic opportunities, while those of limited economic means have less.     
Contributing to the scholarship focusing on the historical theme pointing toward 
the role of the environment in pitting humans against each other, Donald Worster and 
Donald Pisani explore water rights and irrigation district development in the American 
West.  Donald Worster asserted, in Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of 
the American West (1985), that the need to secure water for irrigation in the American 
West set the stage for the rise of a social, political, and economic hierarchy based on 
securing access to water.  At the center of the hierarchical power system - Worster calls it 
a hydraulic society - is the technological and wealthy elite.  Because of their ability to 
create large, complex, and expensive dams, these individuals were able to ultimately gain 
power and exert their influence over others in the region.  The result, Worster contended, 
was that the powered elite took away small landholders’ and farmers’ agency and 
centralized their authority.9   
Historian Donald Pisani examined much of the same territory as covered by 
Donald Worster in To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-
1902 (1992).  In analyzing the era surrounding the Reclamation (Newlands) Act of 1902, 
Pisani argued that western water law was more under the influence of the decentralizing 
rather than the centralizing forces prevalent in American history.  In essence, Pisani 
challenged that Worster’s analysis of a concerted effort by technological and wealthy elite 
to gain and maintain control over the resource was incorrect.  Instead, Pisani illustrated 
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 Steinberg, Nature Incorporated, 13-14, 25-26, 49, 85-8.   
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that diversity and individuality of persons and communities stymied small-scale farmers 
and landholders’ ability to centralize authority as each fought to establish their own 
control over the resource.  Furthermore, the 1902 Newlands Act was not a sharp 
departure from nineteenth-century land policies, which emphasized individualism and 
self-reliance.  The Act resulted in a variety of regions with loose development rather that 
one strong centralized plan for the region, thus illustrating the effectiveness of the 
decentralizers.  Although Pisani and Worster disagree on the origins of organization and 
ultimate power, they both point to the theme of struggle to gain and maintain control over 
the resource.10   
Additionally, although Steinberg introduced the term to water resources, one can 
look back to Worster’s Rivers of Empire and Pisani’s To Reclaim a Divided West and the 
struggle to control the resource for further support for the commodification idea.  As in 
Steinberg’s New England, quantification by use of units becomes central in managing the 
resource.  Worster and Pisani addressed this idea as part of the Reclamation Act’s 
oversight.  Although primarily intended to create and manage irrigation districts, the 
Reclamation Bureau also tracked and managed the resource quantitatively.  As a result, in 
attempting to synthesize the history of American water policy, one must also include a 
discussion of the transformation and harnessing of the resource into a marketable item,  
and through it the role of governmental response. 
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 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1985).  
10
 Donald Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992). 
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While a general lack of attention to the centrality of water resources management 
has no doubt hindered the creation of a metanarrative, some general synthesizing can and 
has occurred.  Historians who have explored the area have contributed issues such as the 
conquest of nature by man and the transfer of energy from the natural environment to 
humans.  Although much work on other topics, such as the struggle for authority and the 
evolution of the economic quantification of the resource have been explored, more case 
studies of these topics in relation to water are still needed in understanding the 
transformative powers of this environmental resource.  Environmental interaction with 
nature, in the form of water, served as a foundational apparatus in forming social, 
political, and economic relationships.  However, to date, the focus of the historiography 
has been more about understanding how humans negotiate with environmental elements 
rather than how humans utilize the resources to transform themselves and their social and 
political relations.  Therefore, this formative mechanism remains largely underdeveloped 
in the American historiography.  In this dissertation, I seek to contribute to filling this 
void with an exploration of the role of water resources and implementation of such water-
based technological adaptation such as canals and river improvements as mechanisms of 
state formation in the nineteenth-century American Midwest.   
As the early years of the nineteenth century opened in the United States, the whole 
of society faced with numerous issues.  With the Revolution still fresh within their minds, 
the people of the new nation struggled with establishing the very cornerstone of their 
society.  The diversity of people and their interests in the Early Republic produced a 
plethora of viewpoints and goals that manifested themselves through social, political, 
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legal, and economic avenues.  These issues highlight the relationship between the 
nation’s populace and its government that held great importance to all.  Consequently, 
these social, political, legal, and economic choices made by people in nineteenth-century 
America and their decision-making processes are vital to examining the underdeveloped 
portion of the historiography.  On its own, the study of state formation provides greater 
insight into the fundamental ways in which moments of change influenced the 
development of society.   
Additionally, the study of state formation also provides a clearer understanding of 
how and why such changes influenced societal development and subsequently the 
formation of the state.  Due to the vital importance of water to individuals within a 
society, the resource itself more often than not became an item of contention between 
competing interests.  However, as society developed, ways to access and consume water 
diversified.  Ultimately, this diversity led to government overseeing the contentious issue.  
This, of course, relies heavily upon a positivist view of the role of government.  
Foundational in establishing this historical view of government’ role was John Locke.  In 
discussing Lockean thought of the role of government, William F. Carpenter wrote, 
“Locke grasped the idea that political power exists and is exercised only for the public 
good.  The basis of government is consent… on the conditions of the nature of a trust.”11  
This positive view of government forms at least a portion of the polity’s mindset 
governing nineteenth-century American water improvement efforts and will be discussed 
in Chapter One.  As a result, arbitrating the outcomes and establishing protocol for such 
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 Ernest Rhys, Editor.  Of Civil Government, Two Treatises by John Locke  (London: J. M. Dent 
and Sons, 1924), vii.   
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issues provides both an opportunity for positive government to expand its reach and 
legitimize its governance. 
Methodologically, this study draws strongly, although not exclusively, from 
American Political Development, due to the centrality of government within the 
formation of the state.  Traditionally, the American historiography points to significant 
eras by one measure or another.  At least on the surface, these scholarly-created eras – the 
American Revolution, Early Republic, Antebellum, etc. – imply separation, distinction, 
independence, and even possibly defiance when it comes to comparison and ultimately 
greater understanding of the transcending themes of history, all the while progressively 
marching toward the modern state in a linear and chronological manner.  In other words, 
although the demarcations created by eras assist the historian in analyzing and presenting 
the past, they may very well create intellectual barriers that limit the view of even greater 
historical understanding.  It is in an effort to counter this compartmentalization into eras 
and aversion to comparison across eras that I turn, in part, to American political 
development.   
Before going on, I must explain and define American political development as it 
exists currently and the manner in which I employ it throughout this dissertation.  As a 
field, drawing both political scientists and political historians to the table, the very 
definition evokes facets of both scholarly endeavors.  Hoping to see through the 
limitation of eras based historical inquiries, American political development looks to 
provide a concept that guides inquires based upon governance.  Karren Orren and Stephen 
Skowronek briefly define political development as, “a durable shift in governing 
11 
 
authority.”12  Like the era-based analysis, this definition points to shifts as indicators of 
change.  However, Orren and Skowronek indicate that a shift is “a change in locus or 
direction of control, resulting in a new distribution of authority among persons or 
organizations within the polity at large or between then and their counterparts outside.”13  
Although some eras may fit the definition of a shift, others may not.  Also of importance, 
keeping state formation in mind, the definition utilized for governing authority is, “the 
exercise of control over persons or things that is designated and enforceable by the 
state.”14  Together, these two aspects of the definition provide insight into how authority 
is built and how it is distributed.  However, the insertion of the term durable into the 
definition becomes of key importance as it indicates developing and sustained authority. 
Specifically accounting for the possible limits presented by the era approach, the 
political development definition absorbs the more recent trend back toward contingency-
based historical analysis.  Attempting to identify durable shifts in governing authority 
must acknowledge that authority is not fixed and that the possibility of a different 
outcome existed at the time.  In this sense, this study incorporates contingency as an 
effort to remove the limitation of era, theme, or topic – driven narratives and inquiry.  
One of the leading Civil War historians of the current generation, James McPherson’s 
scholarship relies heavily upon the contingency of history.  In discussing the importance 
of contingency-based history McPherson wrote, “A topical or thematic approach could 
not do justice to this dynamism, this complex relationship of cause and effect, this 
intensity of experience.”  While specifically discussing the war years in stating that the 
                                                          
12
 Karren Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, 123. 
13
 Ibid. 
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“developments in several spheres occurred almost simultaneously and impinged on each 
other so powerfully,” the same easily applies to the rapidly changing nineteenth-century 
American society as a whole.15   
As a result, the durability of the shift, resulting from choice, and points toward 
more significant and lasting institutions of authority that are responsive to a path that was 
not predestined but instead resulted from changes in controlling instruments that have 
lasting results.  As indicated by Orren and Skowronek, as a whole, the definition 
promotes generalizations about society and governance, is applicable regardless of time 
and place, is pointed enough for comparison, may engage any amount of the populace, 
while also asking when, where, how, and why shifts in authority occur, and what the 
consequences are of the shifts.  Additionally, authority is reliant upon influence from 
controlling instruments.  As Orren and Skowronek state, “authority cannot accomplish its 
purposes simply by formal declarations of intent,” and is only formalized when the 
institutionalization of the authority is approved of by the governed.16  In other words, the 
people must consent to this authority to provide it with legitimacy.    
 Consider the definition of political development illustrated in figure 1.  In figure 
1, governance, or governing authority, is located along the horizontal arrow.  The 
horizontal arrow represents the linear and chronological movement of time.  As time 
passes, constant forces confront governance, also called the controlling instruments, 
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 Ibid. 
15
 For more discussion on contingency-based history see: James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of 
Freedom: The Civil War Era.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. vii-xi, 857-858.  For more 
general review of historical trends also see: Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History.  New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1999. 
16
 Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, 125-127. 
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which present the opportunity for shift.  However, despite this presence of change, 
governance remains a constant presence, albeit not necessarily in a static capacity.  In 
fact, the strength of the controlling instrument and the frequency of intercepting 
controlling instruments with the governance line cause corresponding responses from 
governance.17   
  
 
Figure 1.  Political development factors. 
 
With examination of Figure 1, one quickly realizes the versatility of the definition 
to factor in any number of fields of historical inquiry.  For the sake of illustration, 
consider an overview of major influences in the slavery crisis and the American Civil 
War.  In this scenario, governance represents the antebellum national government and 
controlling instruments pertaining to the slavery issue.  Controlling instruments include 
such facets as anti-slavery/abolitionist movements, cotton and tobacco interests, Free-
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 Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, 117-119. 
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Soilers, Southern states secession, among many more.  Each controlling instrument may 
occur independently or in conjunction with other controlling interests.  Others may occur 
at the same time but have differing intensities.  In the broadest sense, the two major 
controlling instruments of the antebellum era were the antithesis of each other; slavery 
and abolitionism.  While the traditional era approach suggests that the mere practice of 
slavery in the antebellum would indicate a victory of its controlling influence on 
government, the examination of the durability of slavery provides another view.  
Examined through this lens, the eventual abolishment of slavery, by the government, 
points to the antislavery and abolition movements as greater controlling instruments that 
contribute a more durable shift in governance. 
 
 
Figure 2. The controlling instruments in the path of government in the Antebellum. 
 
      The versatility of this approach allows for the examination of shifts in 
relationships between individuals, corporations, and governments and roles of local, state, 
15 
 
and national governments.  While at times serving as opposing controlling instruments, 
changing interests realigned influences and creating in strengthened cohorts or the 
opposite rendering a controlling instrument powerless.  Nevertheless, the realignments of 
controlling instruments and introduction of new ones provide the basis for shifts in 
authority.  As a result, utilization of the concepts and frameworks from American 
Political Development provide the methodological base I employ for exploring the 
influence that water resources, in the form of water internal improvements in nineteenth-
century American Midwest, had on state formation. 
   Examination of changes in relations and authority structure through the 
mechanism of river and canal internal improvements in the nineteenth-century American 
Midwest provide case studies highlighting the themes of contingency, authority, political 
development, and state formation.  While, undoubtedly there are other mechanisms that 
contribute to state formation and political development, the ideas of improvement of both 
person and nature permeated nineteenth-century America.  Although internal 
improvements served to connect markets and aid the development of a national economy, 
the projects presented new obstacles for individuals, challenged previous business 
practices, and helped redefine the roles of state and federal governments.  Such projects 
also provided cases that challenged English common law traditions and aided in the 
emergence of a distinct American legal system.  While not all of the internal 
improvement projects were completed and operational, the efforts themselves provided 
the mechanism of change and development.  In fact, ongoing negotiations over  control 
highlights the role of local, state, and regional internal improvement projects in defining 
16 
 
the relationships between individuals, corporations, and governments in nineteenth-
century America.  These changes are highlighted through relations and authority between 
states or territories and the national government, the states and their citizens, the national 
government and it citizens, between states, within the same levels of government, and 
public and private matters.   
 In highlighting the role of the natural resources, specifically water and its relation 
with society, this dissertation will first examine the intellectual origins of improvement, 
the integration of improvement into empowering a positive government, and the 
formative role of water-based transportation in the development of nineteenth-century 
America.  For a more acute examination of the transformative role that harnessing water 
for transportation served in the formation of nineteenth century America, I turn to three 
water-based improvement projects, The Louisville and Portland Canal, The Illinois and 
Michigan Canal, and the Des Moines River Improvement Project.  Each case provided an 
environment of political, economic, and social negotiations that resulted in the 
institutionalization of positive government, economic development, and societal 
development.  
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Chapter One: 
Water, Improvement, and Society 
 
Water, a simple chemical compound on the molecular, level consisting of two 
hydrogen and one oxygen, serves as one of the most basic and vital elements to sustain 
life on the Earth.  Most commonly found in its liquid state, water performs an integral 
role of sustaining the planet and is in relative abundance.  Combined with its other 
chemical states, solid state - ice, gaseous state - steam or water vapor, water covers 
approximately seventy-one percent of the earth’s surface.  Within the natural 
environment, water moves continuously through a cyclical pattern of evaporation, 
precipitation, runoff, or absorption, returning to evaporation and a repeating of the cycle.  
The cumulative hydrosphere resulting from this lifecycle equates to approximately 
1,360,000,000 cubic kilometers.  While the majority of water is located within saltwater 
oceans, ninety-seven percent, and approximately two and one half percent in frozen state 
is located within glaciers and polar icecaps, less than one percent consists of fresh water 
sources such as lakes, ponds, and inland rivers.  Although the saltwater environment, 
comprising most oceans and seas, receives the most credit for providing much of the 
habitat necessary for biological life on Earth, human consumption relies largely upon 
fresh water, or potable sources.18  In turn, water assisted humans in the rise of empires, 
the organization of societies and nations, and contributed to their collapse.  The efforts of 
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 For a more in depth discussion of the hydrological cycles of water, see: Luna B. Leopold, Water, 
Rivers, and Creeks (Sausalito: University Science Books, 1979).   
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individuals and societies in controlling access to water and converting water into a tool of 
development define the pivotal and transformative role of the natural resource.  The 
process of converting water into a transformative tool of occurred neither abruptly nor 
smoothly.  Instead, each society learned from it predecessor.  As new societies emerged, 
they applied the lessons learned through the experimentation of converting water into a 
tool of development. 
The study of human anatomy and physiology suggests that a significant portion of 
human body weight is comprised of water.  Humans average as much as seventy pints of 
water in the adult body.  This total body water consists of water found within skin, 
muscle, bone, and cellular tissue.  While blood can contain as much as ninety percent 
water, lean muscle tissue may contain seventy-five percent or more water.  Without 
predictable sustainable access to water, the individual human dies of massive organ 
failure due to severe dehydration.  Human necessity for water to maintain homeostasis 
leads to an internalized auto response to seek out usable water sources and secure access 
to them at all times.19   
 In the civilizations of antiquity, the Fertile Crescent best illustrates the importance 
of water as a basic building block of society.  The societies of Mesopotamia, the Cradle 
of Civilization, emerged from harnessing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.  
Covering more than four hundred thousand square kilometers, the broad fertile alluvial 
land basin watered by the two rivers comprises much of what today is the Middle East.  
This geographic region combined with the presence of water provided an ideal situation 
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 Steve Parker, The Human Body Book: An Illustrated Guide to Its Structure, Function, and 
Disorders (New York: DK Publishing, 2007), 21-22. 
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to lure in wildlife, assist establishment of plant life, and aid nomadic humans’ search for 
basic sustenance of life.  In turn, this environment also provided the necessary means by 
which domestication of flora and fauna gradually occurred.20 
While on one hand, water provided fertility and the breeding ground for 
domestication of animal and plant life, the basis for agriculture, it also provided for the 
establishment of larger and more complex societies by providing a means for trade and 
transportation.  Perhaps no stronger example exists in antiquity than that of Egypt and the 
Nile River.  The Nile itself formed an ecosystem that provided sustenance to not only 
existing life but also the continued expansion of life in the region.  Although the Nile 
River held much potential in its natural state, the emerging complexity of society in Egypt 
signaled a shift from usage of the natural environment to manipulating the natural 
environment to achieve specific outcomes.  Natural environmental flooding of the Nile 
replenished the soils of the delta and surrounding lands, aided in seed dispersal, and 
provided needed moisture for agricultural production in the flood basin.21 
 This seasonal flooding combined with constant water flow provided a basis by 
which a society relied more intensely upon a specific geographic location for all of its 
basic needs.  However, as populations grew the Nile came to represent more than just a 
waterway offering seasonal flooding and renewal of soil fertility.  In fact, the Nile rose to 
become a symbol of Egyptian society.  In hopes of keeping the gods happy, the people of 
the Nile valley presented to the Pharaoh and other religious entities offerings representing 
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 Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien.  Civilization in the West (New York: 
Longman, 2003), 8-18, 24-25; Brian Levack, Edward Muir, Meredith Veldman, and Michael Maas.  The 
West: Encounters and Transformations (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 13-20.   
20 
 
the bountiful harvests rendered from the fertile Nile valley soils.  In exchange, they 
believed that the gods used the Nile to provide the yearly renewal of soil fertility by 
which agricultural crops were grown and livestock watered.22  
The Nile also provided Egypt with the opportunity to become a regional power as 
the society transported food and conducted communication and commerce throughout the 
region.  Utilizing the fertile agricultural lands along the Nile to produce such grains as 
wheat and flax, and the waterway to transport the agricultural goods, Egypt found itself at 
the center of a large trading network that assisted in developing diplomatic relations 
throughout the region.  While the Nile aided the development of an economic system 
based on agriculture, it also proved to be a strategic resource that many others wished to 
hold.  The need to defend this vital resource laid the groundwork for the development of 
Egyptian armies.  The armies found themselves greatly aided in their deployment and 
protective objectives by transportation on the centrally located waterway.  At the height of 
the Egyptian empire, the Nile provided the impetus for both sustaining daily life and the 
basis for creating evermore-complex societal structures.23 
 Water also served an integral role in the development of other societies and 
represented the increasingly complex means of harnessing the resource.  One such 
country with overlapping trading and commerce influence rose to become synonymous 
with trading via waterways.  The Phoenicians became a major trading power of the 
Mediterranean of antiquity.  Mastery and navigation of the waterways in and around the 
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Mediterranean region brought the Phoenicians into contact with other powers such as 
Egypt and Greece.  While the Phoenicians used their mastery of water navigation in 
developing a dominant trading network and economy, other societies utilized water as a 
means of conquer and control.24 
 Linking three continents, - Europe, Asia, and Africa - the Mediterranean Sea and 
adjoining waters provided an environment that encouraged societal development built 
upon the successful utilization of water resources.  The surrounding Mediterranean Sea 
served as the backdrop for a worldview that saw its inhabitants living at the center of the 
world.  The peoples who inhabited this region, while diverse in culture, formed societies 
that incorporated water into their social structure.  Taking advantage of the world of 
water, iconic ports and cities such as Venice, Rome, Florence, Seville, and Lisbon 
emerged throughout the Mediterranean world, bringing with them increasingly complex 
societies and influencing transformation within their world and beyond.25  
  In many of the same ways that water helped to establish and expand the 
Mediterranean world, water served as one of the most important vectors in European 
exploration.  Although the Age of Exploration resulted in the arrival of Europeans to the 
African, and North and South American continents, initial efforts at exploration sought 
agreeable water routes to offset less than favorable overland trade routes and associated 
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costs.26  Poised on the western reaches of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, 
Portugal, Spain and other nations of the Mediterranean world became hotbeds of new 
navigation efforts.  Combining a culture of maritime navigation, a desire for economic 
expansion, and key technological innovations in shipbuilding, European nations 
embarked upon an era of exploration reliant upon mastery of water transportation.27  
 European exploration of the Americas brought about a new economic world order 
in which countries sought to use oceanic transportation trade to increase wealth.  While 
some countries sought mineral wealth, such as silver and gold, other countries sought out 
and implemented colonization strategies aimed at realizing profits from the land 
resources of the Americas.  These international ventures spurred the development of 
transatlantic businesses in shipbuilding, travel, and colonizing supplies.  Additionally, the 
ventures provided new occasions for governance as competing nations sought to control 
the ventures in the Americas and realize the greatest economic gains.28   
 Despite this well-documented history in which water played a central role in the 
formation and maintenance of political states, the history of the United Stated has placed 
the role of water resources to the side.  Rather, since Frederick Jackson Turner, the story 
of American expansion has been one with land as the central mechanism.  Admittedly, a 
body of scholarship focused on the centrality of water in the settlement of the arid and 
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semi-arid Far West has emerged, but no one has yet to situate water fully at the heart of 
the story of societal development, specifically settling the nineteenth-century American 
Midwest.  This study seeks to do just that.   
While the North American colonies eventually became synonymous with the 
English Empire’s expansionist ideas, water continued to be an important facet of 
development and governance.  The English Empire required extensive networks of water 
transportation in order to conduct trade, communicate with its colonies, and govern from 
afar.  In fact, while there are many nuanced and scholarly-debated interpretations for the 
reasons for the American Revolution, complications arising from the struggle 
undoubtedly include water navigation.  The distance of oceanic travel between Britain 
and the North American colonies and the time required to traverse that distance rendered 
parliament and the monarchy constantly behind in their reactions to events in the 
colonies.  Despite the complications of the distance from the colonies and the limits of 
technology existing within water navigation of the era, trade utilizing water routes greatly 
contributed to the transatlantic economic world.  Through and after the American 
Revolution, water continued its pivotal role as a new nation emerged.29 
By the second half of the eighteenth century, relations between British North 
American colonists and the British Empire suffered.  Colonists contended that the 
Monarchy and Parliament grew more distant and detached from matters in the colonies.  
Beginning in 1763 with the Royal Proclamation that limited colonial expansion west of 
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the Appalachians, Parliament renewed its interest in colonial matters with the passage of 
legislation seeking to recover the Empire’s expenditures in colonial maintenance.  
Parliament viewed its renewed interest as little more than the simple administration of its 
legislative control over the British Empire.  Colonists perceived the heightened interest 
from the Crown and Parliament as usurpation of their constitutional and natural rights and 
gave rise to calls of “no taxation without representation” and the declaration of the acts as 
coercive and intolerable.30 
  The Enlightenment discussion of civil government and the castigation of divine 
rule and monarchies that consumed the minds of the leaders of the American Revolution 
and Early Republic provides insight into how improvement came to embody the era of 
river and canal public works construction.  No matter the side of historical interpretation 
that scholars accept while seeking better understanding of the causes and effects of the 
American Revolution, one continuous contribution, and perhaps the most significant, is 
the Enlightenment scholars.  While the Enlightenment intellectuals entered into a 
discussion amongst themselves, themes such as freedom, democracy, reason, civil 
government, religion, and the responsibilities and consequences of authority filled their 
volumes.31   
                                                          
30
 George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative History (New York: W. W. 
Norton And Company, 2007), 107-122. 
31
 For more discussion on the intellectual influences shaping the American Revolution see: Joyce 
Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York 
University Press, 1984); Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics  (New York: Vintage Books,1965); 
Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1978); Lance Banning,  The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal 
Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in 
the Making of the Constitution (New York: Vintage Books,1996); James Sharp,  American Politics in the 
Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Gordon Wood,  The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). 
25 
 
Although scholars still argue over the legacy of the Enlightenment, the idea of 
improvement over the current state in which individuals found themselves became a basis 
of reason and lex naturalis, or law of nature.  Scholars such as John Locke wove together 
the law of nature and religious beliefs that, as Locke contended, gave rise to social 
contracts and the role and responsibilities of civil government.32   
By 1774, conditions deteriorated to a level unacceptable to colonists.  In response 
to the worsening conditions, representatives from the British North American colonies 
met in Philadelphia seeking to give common voice to the colonial concerns.  Despite the 
meeting, chances of conciliation diminished.  In early 1776, Thomas Paine’s Common 
Sense pointed blame in the direction of the Crown.  Paine held King George III 
responsible for worsening affairs that left colonists little choice but to sever relations with 
England.  Building upon the notion of an irreparable relationship between the colonists 
and the Empire, the Continental Congress appointed a committee to explain the colonial 
position and make a case for independence.33     
Penned by Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence drew heavily upon 
the ideas of Natural Law, and Locke’s social contract and positive government theory and 
highlighted their role in the foundational principles of the emerging nation and its call for 
independence.  In the wake of the Revolution, leaders drew upon the ideas of the law of 
nature, positive government, and their experience of writing the Declaration of 
Independence, among others, in forming a new nation.  Ultimately, the new nation 
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embarked upon a great experiment in republicanism with the formulation of a new 
constitution.  Concerns of balancing the fears of a tyrannical government with those of a 
weak government unable to stave off anarchy formed the heart of the constitutional 
debate.34   
Further, in 1791, the states of the new nation ratified the inclusion of the Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution, forming the first amendments.  Proponents of the Bill of 
Rights contended that the Constitution focused too heavily upon the balance of 
governmental authority and process while placing too little upon protecting the basic 
principles of human liberty and natural rights.  In essence, although man might seek the 
path that was most beneficial to all, man was not perfect and hence is open to corruption.  
Therefore, the Bill of Rights’ proponents contended that its inclusion protected the 
natural rights of all against violations by a few.35  Altogether, the events of the American 
Revolution and the founding of the new nation, guided by its constitution based upon 
consent of the governed, drew upon the Enlightenment philosophies and provided an 
ideological platform for the young society to improve the land for its own benefit.  In 
turn, the social contract between society and its government imposed upon and 
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empowered government with the directive of assisting those it governed with the 
conversion of nature into property.  Guided by divine providence and the Law of Nature, 
enabled by a positive government, a society organized upon the conversion of nature into 
property emerged.36 
Seizing upon the empowering spirit of improvement, George Washington 
epitomized the young nation’s focus on physically improving the landscape and creating a 
water-based transportation route that linked the East with the West via the Potomac 
River.  Through his vision of converting the Potomac River into a viable transportation 
route, Washington stood ready to benefit economically and politically.  Economically, 
Washington, a landholder along the Potomac River’s shores, gained financially with the 
construction of the canal that linked the resources of the Ohio Valley with the East and 
spurred development, agricultural production, markets, and consumers.  More importantly 
for the nation, the successful construction of a canal offered Washington, the nation’s 
leader, an opportunity to put government to work for its citizens by assisting the 
conversion of nature into property.  Washington contended that the successful completion 
of the work on the Potomac River stood to fulfill the potential of the nation by linking the 
vast resources of the interior with the populations of the East, via water-based 
transportation system.  Washington’s vision illustrated the vital role of the environmental 
resource of water with the effort of improvement as a factor in the formation of the young 
nation.  While Washington died before seeing his vision become a reality, the vision is 
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symbolic of the role of positive government utilizing water as a means of improving upon 
Nature to benefit society.37   
As the new nation entered the nineteenth century, the ideas of improvement, of 
more than just water, empowered by a positive government came to capture the minds 
and embody the actions of the young nation.  By 1828, nineteenth-century American 
dictionaries offered an interpretation of how members of that society perceived the term 
improve.  Noah Webster’s An American Dictionary of the English Language, published 
in 1828, provides several definitions of the root word improve that highlights much of the 
previous discussion over Enlightenment conceptions of improvement and indicate the 
adoption of the concepts into nineteenth century America.  Webster defined the term in 
six manners.  While associated in a physical sense with both investing monetarily in 
something and rendering land suitable for agricultural purposes, the term improve was 
also associated with advancement of society and individuals in a philosophical manner.  
In a context applying to humans, the term improve takes on a description of advancing the 
human condition from one state to a better one.  It is within this context that nineteenth-
century Americans viewed internal improvements.  The physical internal improvement 
embodied the monetary investment of society, the physical reshaping of the land, water, 
and natural resources to better suit the needs of society, and the promise of moving 
society closer to a perfect moral creation.38  
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Citizens of the young nation embraced the concept of improvement, converted it 
into action, and channeled their activities toward what they saw as positively reforming 
the world around them.  Before them lay Nature’s abundance of resources for them to fill 
the great blank canvass of the North American continent.  The positive spirit of individual 
improvement provided the basis for numerous social reform movements.  All embodied 
the premise that individuals held within their labor the potential to cause positive change 
for their benefit and that of the whole of society.  A wave of religious and moral revival, 
the Second Great Awakening, swept through the young nation as people sought Christian 
perfection.  Religious reformers rallied against such perceived evils as liquor, war, 
slavery, and even corruption in government.  The renewed focus on the religious and 
moral character of the nation highlighted the idea of introspection and the ability of the 
individual to influence positive change and thereby improve the condition of society.  
Stalwarts of religious reform efforts, social movements involving slavery, temperance, 
immigration, education, and women’s rights moved beyond the Second Great Awakening 
and became symbols of social improvement in the antebellum.39   
 With the concept of improvement and reform shaping their worldview, 
nineteenth-century Americans envisioned a more perfect society emerging on the 
untapped landscape before them.  Capturing this spirit of religious morality, democracy, 
and the untapped potential of the western lands, the editor of the New York Times and the 
Democratic Review, John O’Sullivan, in 1845, wrote, “it was the nation’s manifest 
destiny to overspread and possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given 
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us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self government 
entrusted to us.”40  As the population increased and settlement expanded westward in 
nineteenth century America, the need for internal improvements became more important.  
Although internal improvements played a part in the discussion of national development 
from the beginning, the stress of increasing populations in the federal territories brought 
the issue onto the national stage.  Blessed with an abundance of waterways, the expanding 
nation turned to the construction of transportation routes based largely on waterways.  
While some individuals claimed the need for more comprehensive and reliable 
infrastructural developments, others fought against them.  Despite the increasing 
population and expanding nation, internal improvements became a contentious topic in 
American politics.   
Historian Carter Goodrich claimed that a “spirit of improvement” permeated the 
nineteenth century.41  An increasing population, industrialization, western migration and 
expansion, and the rise of economic markets created a need for transportation networks.  
Even though the Early Republic supported economic aids such as plank roads and bridges 
with public funding, the fervor only increased throughout the nineteenth century, 
especially after the Louisiana Purchase brought new lands and control over the vital port 
of New Orleans within the expanding Republic, with discussions increasingly focused 
upon water transportation routes.  The spirit of improvement echoed throughout the 
country.  Goodrich stated that, “to improve the country’s natural advantage by 
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developments in transportation was…a duty incumbent both on governments and on 
individual citizens.”42  Further, he stated, “when canal and railroad companies were 
organized, individuals were often urged to buy stock not only for the dividends they 
would receive, but also for the satisfaction of bearing an honorable part in a great state or 
national work.”43  The spirit imbued private companies also.  Not only did private 
capitalists invest in internal improvements to strengthen connections with their markets, 
but also state and national governments facilitated the improvement movement.  Through 
the issuance of land grants, state and national governments aided the construction of a 
national transportation network.44 
Ideas of internal improvement and expansion spread throughout the United States, 
testing prior notions of the status quo.  Prior federal government involvement in 
constructing internal improvements was minimal.  However, the nineteenth century 
brought about change in federal policy.  While the status quo involved state, local, and 
private funding of improvement projects, westward expansion strained the traditional 
mechanisms for such projects.  In response, the national government assisted efforts to 
construct transportation systems that met national objectives.45  Internal improvements 
provided the expanding nation a defensive transportation infrastructure through which to 
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ship military personnel and supplies, opened frontier regions for settlement, and 
facilitated connections between consumers, suppliers, and their markets.   
Goodrich suggested that federal support of internal improvements arose from two 
factors.  He argued that regional wealth and population contributed to the decision 
making process of the national government in awarding land grants to the states.  
Congress awarded land grants based on a perceived need by a region, territory, or state.  
He contended that following the westward expansion of the United States, the national 
government offered economic assistance in developing a transportation infrastructure to 
facilitate the shifting population.  However, in applying a second criterion, the national 
government did not extend the offer of economic assistance, such as the land grants, if the 
region or state possessed enough private capital to fund the projects.46  In support of 
Goodrich, historian Charles Holt stated that federal government involvement in 
facilitating economic development, by way of internal improvements, did not begin at the 
state level.  He argued that the federal government acted in response to state support and 
activism; if the state did not actively support internal improvements then the federal 
government did not offer economic assistance.  Holt stated that, “from the beginning of 
the record [1800] to the late 1830s, state government expenditure policy increasingly 
emphasized transportation.”47  Holt further suggested that, “such a system, coupled with a 
money-market financed a program of internal improvements, must have had the effect, if 
not the intent, of fostering a rapid pace of economic advance.”48     
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Throughout the antebellum period, internal improvements, largely built upon the 
utilization of the young nation’s waterways, represented one of many issues of debate in 
the expanding country.  Nationalists such as John C. Calhoun petitioned for nationally 
funded improvement programs such as a network of canals and roadways.  In an address 
to the House of Representatives in 1817, Calhoun called for the federal government to 
pursue a vigorous policy of a “perfect system” of canals and roadways by which to bind 
the country together.  Though Calhoun was a Nationalist, he argued that federally funded 
improvement projects needed to be limited to those that were truly of national interest and 
to the benefit of all states, such as collective national defense.  Sectionalists, in contrast, 
focused on the economic aspects of the infrastructure projects.  If a particular project did 
not equally benefit each state, they believed local and private resources should support the 
project exclusively.  While they were not directly arguing against the benefits of internal 
improvements, Sectionalists contended that no state should expend its resources, 
economic or otherwise, to support a project in another state if it did not enhance both 
states.49  For sectionalists, this view cohered within an emerging states’ rights platform 
argued by Southern states and contributed to the struggle over federal authority.50 
Like many national debates during the antebellum period, the basis for both 
petitions on internal improvements focused on constitutional authority.  The argument did 
not center around a constitutionally enumerated power to create a national transportation 
infrastructure to aid economic development, but rather focused on the vague ability to 
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raise money to pay for the general defense and welfare of the country.  William Freehling 
in Prelude to Civil War described broad constructionists as those who believed “that the 
enigmatic elastic clauses could be stretched to give Congress additional authority to meet 
new problems.”51  Strict constructionists, however, held that federal power was limited to 
only the explicitly expressed powers; thus they argued that the government did not have 
the power to pursue a policy of planning and funding internal improvement.  Sectionalists 
believed that if the federal government obtained authority to expand enigmatic clauses 
that the outcome would lead eventually to compromising the rights of the individual 
states.      
Despite these disparate interpretations of the Constitution, Congress demonstrated 
a commitment to the nation’s internal improvements and passed the General Survey Act 
in 1824.  The act authorized the President of the United States to order surveys aiding the 
establishment of roadways and canals that were “of national importance, in commercial 
or military point of view, or necessary for the transportation of public mail.”52  
Subsequent acts of Congress added provisions for the improvement and maintenance of 
the nation’s waterways.  The General Survey Act of 1824 captured the social idea of 
progress and internal improvement.  While the passage of the act embodied the political 
realm of internal improvements in nineteenth-century America, internal improvements 
also evinced physical manifestations of an emerging distinct social identity in the North.  
An emerging sectional identity in the northern United States characterized improvement 
and progress as a social good that included moral reforms, city sanitation and public 
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works reform, governmental intervention in expanding economic markets, emergence of 
manufacturing industries, and related work reforms.  Historian Carol Sheriff suggested, 
“For them [nineteenth-century Northerners] progress meant, in large part, that men and 
women were taking an active role in realizing a divinely sanctioned movement toward the 
perfectibility of the natural and human worlds.”53  The diverging social identities of the 
North and South would add to the sectional crisis, contributing to the Civil War. 
The contention that public good and private gains were not incompatible 
permeated the Northern progressive ideology and laid the groundwork for practical 
republicanism.  Supporters of the ideology of practical republicanism “believed that the 
nation’s common good depended on prosperity, individual opportunity, and an equal 
emphasis on rural and urban growth.”54  Governmental intervention in the markets, in the 
manner of tariffs and improvements, would guide the economic development of the 
nation.  To lead the government, practical republicans believed the country needed to 
look towards individuals with financial success in the markets and a commitment to good 
works.  The successful navigation of market intervention by the government, run by 
successful and virtuous individuals, would ensure a prosperous, virtuous, and strong 
nation. 
 
Putting the Public Domain to the Work of Improvement 
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In an effort to assist western expansion and migration, the federal government 
developed national policies concerning the disposal of lands from the public domain.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, lands became part of the public domain of the country 
through various means such as the Louisiana Purchase, the Oregon Compromise, and the 
cessions of lands from Mexico.55  The acquisition of millions of acres of land, and the 
migration of settlers created the need for a national policy governing the lands of the 
public domain.  By 1840, the federal government had developed policies to assist settlers 
migrating westward.  During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the federal 
government established a General Land Office that assisted registration of lands and 
attempted to control settlement.  Historian Paul Wallace Gates noted that “In 1812 the 
administrative organization for the public lands was brought to the form it would keep 
until the twentieth century: the General Land Office was created and the duties previously 
handled by the Secretary of the Treasury were delegated to a Commissioner who was to 
be head of the new office.”56  In addition to the establishment of the General Land Office, 
the federal government established a method of credit-based disposal of the public lands.  
While Congress experimented with specifics of interest rates, land value, and repayment 
terms during the period, speculators and settlers exploited the situation and attempted to 
acquire as much land as their credit allowed.  The crash of 1819 placed further strains on 
                                                          
55
 Benjamin H. Hibbard, History of the Public Land Policies (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1924), 7-3; Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D.C.: Arno 
Press, 1979), 75-86. 
56
 Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, 127. 
37 
 
speculators and settlers.  By 1820, Congress found itself in the position of creditor rather 
than land seller and subsequently abandoned the credit-based system.57 
With the credit-based system abandoned, the federal government instituted a 
policy of cash payment for lands.  The federal government allowed individuals the right 
to claim and purchase any lands remaining unsold after public auction at the rate of one 
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.  Attracting the attention of speculators, the 
government also removed minimum and maximum acre requirements thereby allowing 
speculators to purchase vast parcels of land.  In return, the speculators often resold the 
lands for a profit by extending credit and payment lengths to settlers.58   
Other organizations manipulating the government’s land disposal policies 
appeared between the 1820s and 1840s.  Claims associations formed as a means of 
securing titles and low prices on lands.  Both squatters and speculators formed groups and 
used methods such as intimidation to ensure their lands sold at the lowest possible market 
prices at auction or remained unsold.  The early years of settlement in Iowa, between the 
late 1830s and 1840s, highlight the rise of such claims associations working with eastern 
speculators.  Together, the groups undermined the government’s attempts at a balanced 
land disposal policy.59 
                                                          
57
 Hibbard, History of the Public Land Policies, 82-100; Gates, History of Public Land Law 
Development, 140-143.  Under the credit-based system, the federal government established land value at 
two dollars per acre.  Some reasoned that the relatively high price would discourage land speculation while 
still making land available to those wishing to farm or otherwise improve the land.  The policy met with 
mixed success as entrepreneurs still participated in land speculation. 
58
 Hibbard, History of the Public Land Policies, 198-208. 
59Ibid; James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 3-6; Allan G. Bogue, “The Iowa Claim Clubs: Symbol and Substance,” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 45 no. 2 (September, 1958): 231-253.  Gates also discussed the rise of claim 
associations with focus on claims association development in Iowa see: Gates, History of Public Land Law 
Development, 152-162. 
38 
 
With a federal land policy exploited by land speculators and claims associations, 
reform in land disposal policy again took center stage.  While the federal government 
previously offered other temporary acts of preemption, 1841 signaled the official 
government endorsement of the policy.  Preemption provided squatters a means of 
protecting their claims other than turning to claims associations and eastern capitalists.60  
Preemption allowed squatters the “preferential right” to buy a claim of land at the 
designated price.  The preferential right focused on the notion that the individual usually 
lived and made improvements on the land before official settlement.  Without the 
protection of preemption, many squatters found themselves without legal protection from 
evictions and no recourse for recovery of the improvements made upon the lands.  The 
passage of the 1841 Preemption Act attempted to remedy those concerns.61 
Further supporting western expansion and encouraging settlement, the federal 
government established the policy of conveying lands to states and territories.  Congress 
ceded lands to the States to fund the construction and establishment of schools and other 
public institutions, in addition to payment of service for members of the military.62 
In order to facilitate settlement and market development in the expanding western 
United States, the federal government also initiated a policy of granting lands for 
transportation such projects as canals, wagon roads, river improvements, and railroads 
that aided the general public good.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal 
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government conveyed just over one hundred land grants aiding transportation 
development.63  Undertaking such projects required capital that many territories and 
newly formed states lacked.  Granting lands from the public domain provided a source of 
capital to fund these projects.  While the century began with river and canal development 
by public entities, a transition to private railroad development assisted by federal support 
occurred by the century’s close.64  The lessons learned from canal and river improvement 
projects assisted the transition to a national transportation network based upon rail 
technologies.   
Behind the Numbers of Improvement 
 
Despite the most positive of ideas, government found itself without an established 
system of governance over such matters and experimented with the best means of 
walking the proverbial tightrope between the positive roles of governmental authority and 
letting private entities participate in the emerging markets.  To this end, governmental 
strategies of initiating and bringing to completion internal improvements changed 
dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century.  Statistical analysis highlighting 
this transition demonstrates the responsive shift of governance over nineteenth-century 
improvements. 
In 1908, by order of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the General 
Land Office compiled a data set listing land grants conveyed by Congress for the purpose 
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of aiding the construction of internal improvements throughout the nineteenth century.  
The completed data set contains entries pertaining to the date of the grant, purpose of the 
grant, size of the grant, projected and actual size of the finished project, the entity that 
received the grant, and the forfeiture status of the 110 land grants conveyed by the 
national government for internal improvements during the century.65   
The 110 grants conveyed by Congress contributed to the construction of four 
types of improvements - railroads, wagon roads, canals, and river improvements.  
Illustrated in Table 1, Congress conveyed eighty-seven grants for the purpose of 
constructing railroads, which comprised seventy-nine percent of the total improvement 
land grants conveyed in the entire nineteenth century, more than the other three types 
combined.  The next highest number of conveyed grants contributed to the construction 
of eleven canals.  River improvements and wagon roads combined account for the 
remaining twelve grants. 
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Table 1. Federal Improvement Grant percentages for 19th Century. 
 Railroad Canal River 
Improvement 
Wagon Roads 
Number of grants 87 11 3 9 
Percentage 79.1 10 2.7 8.2 
 
Although the data set shows the majority of internal improvement efforts in the 
nineteenth century focused on the establishment of a railroad transportation network, it 
offers little to suggest why.  A general assumption echoed in much of the nineteenth 
century literature is that of technological change.  Railroads offered the nation something 
that the other improvement types could not.  Because canal and river improvement 
projects were limited to construction on waterways or between water sources, they 
offered no advantage to states with limited waterways to connect or expand upon.  Wagon 
roads also offered only a limited improvement as seasonal weather easily rendered them 
impassable.  However, railroads offered a reliable transportation system despite the 
seasonal or geographic obstacles that impaired other transportation projects.  This data 
also points to a transition from one mode of transportation infrastructure to another.  As 
Table 2 indicates, some states, such as Wisconsin, embarked upon multiple types of 
improvement projects that allowed the best adaptation to the state’s specific geography. 
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Table 2.  Federally Funded Grant Types, By State. 
 Railroad Canal River 
Improvement 
Wagon Road Total Grants per 
State* 
Alabama 12 0 1 0 13 
Arkansas 4 0 0 0 4 
Florida 3 0 0 0 3 
Illinois 1 1 0 0 2 
Indiana 0 2 0 1 3 
Iowa 6 0 1 0 7 
Kansas 5 0 0 0 5 
Louisiana 4 0 0 0 4 
Michigan 9 3 0 1 13 
Minnesota 10 0 0 0 10 
Mississippi 5 0 0 0 5 
Missouri 4 0 0 0 4 
Ohio 0 3 0 1 4 
Oregon 0 0 0 5 5 
Wisconsin 5 2 1 1 9 
Total 68 11 3 9 91 
* Data does not include grants to private companies (19 grants) as their grants usually 
crossed state lines. 
 
Historian Charles Holt maintained that federal government involvement in 
facilitating economic development by way of internal improvements did not start at the 
state level.  Instead, he argued that the federal government acted in response to state 
support and activism; if the state did not actively support internal improvements then the 
federal government did not offer economic assistance.  “From the beginning of the record 
[1800] to the late 1830s, state government expenditure policy increasingly emphasized 
transportation.”  Holt further suggested that, “such a system, coupled with a money-
market financed a program of internal improvements, must have had the effect, if not the 
intent, of fostering a rapid pace of economic advance.”66   
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Historian Carter Goodrich contended, “to improve the country’s natural advantage 
by developments in transportation was, in the eyes of Washington and many others, a 
duty incumbent both on governments and on individual citizens.”  Further, he stated, 
“when canal and railroad companies were organized, individuals were often urged to buy 
stock not only for the dividends they would receive, but also for the satisfaction of 
bearing and honorable part in a great state or national work.”67  Table 2 supports the Holt 
and Goodrich theses, as the table presents the states that were most successful in 
supporting the development of internal improvements and attracting the economic 
assistance of the federal government.  Under their theses, states such as Michigan, with 
thirteen total grants, and Wisconsin, with grants for all four types of improvements, also 
exhibited the most active promotion from state governments and citizens, and served as a 
hotbed of improvement.   
Conversely, because Congress conveyed grants to only fifteen states, as Table 2 
illustrates, the data set allows for two other possibilities.  First, as Holt and Goodrich 
contended, the states without land grants did little to lobby or attract economic support in 
building transportation systems from the federal government.  Secondly, because the data 
set contained only data from the nineteenth century at the federal level, it lacks 
information on land grants or other economic aids for the construction of internal 
improvements initiated by states or private interests before the nineteenth century.   
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Figure 1.  Distribution of Internal Improvement Grants, By Type of Improvement. 
    
    
 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress utilized the conveyance of one 
hundred ten land grants across the United States for four types of internal improvements 
rather than outright monetary support.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of land grants 
and the type of projects they aided.  The most noticeable issue focuses on the heavy 
concentration of internal improvement land grants in the states that at one time comprised 
the region referred to as the Northwest Territory.  While historians such as Goodrich and 
Holt suggested that support for internal improvements originated at the state level, often 
in the form of boosterism, they also contended that economic conditions and population 
growth added to the decision of the federal government in conveying land grants for such 
projects.  If the scholars’ contentions holds true, then the illustration in Figure 1 
represents not only internal improvement grants but also population growth and economic 
status.     
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Four main types of improvements were visible in the Old Northwest region.  The 
region offered a varied topography that lent itself to the construction of numerous types of 
internal improvements.  Canal construction extended the reach of the Great Lakes into the 
surrounding states throughout the whole of the nineteenth century.  Three states - Iowa, 
Wisconsin, and Mississippi -attempted federally supported river improvements in order to 
connect regional farmers to markets and to expedite water transportation of commerce.  
Railroads and wagon roads offered the region alternative transportation methods where 
waterways and geography limited the utilization of canals and rivers. 
 
Table 3.  Land Grant Purpose by Region. 
 Railroad Canals Wagon 
Roads 
River 
Improvements 
Northern States 59 11 9 2 
Southern States 28 0 0 1 
Total* 87 11 9 3 
* Table includes grants conveyed to private companies. 
 
 
 Figure 1 also illustrated what appears to be a Northern bias toward internal 
improvements and supports the traditional literature of emerging opposing sections within 
the nation.  As shown in Table 3, no matter the type of improvement, the federal 
government aided the efforts more intensely in Northern states.68  Northern railroad 
grants constituted approximately sixty-eight percent of the total railroad grants conveyed 
by Congress.  The federal government conveyed all the canal and wagon road grants to 
Northern states while it split the three river improvement grants in favor of Northern 
states - two grants for the North and one grant for the South.  
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Table 4. Grants before and after 1861. 
Pre and Post Civil War Improvement 
Distribution 
Confederate State 
Grants 
Union State 
Grants 
Total 
Grants* 
Pre Civil War 26 38 64 
Post Civil War 6 40 46 
Total 32 78 110 
*Table includes grants (19) conveyed to private companies. 
 
The diverging societies interpretations, presented by Freeling and Roland, suggest 
that Southern states fell behind the Northern states in regard to internal improvements.  
As Table 4 illustrates, Congress conveyed sixty-four grants to all the states before the 
Civil War.  The Northern states, or the states that remained in the Union as of 1861, 
received twelve more land grants than the Southern states, accounting for approximately 
sixty percent of the pre-Civil War improvement land grants.  The thirty-two land grants 
conveyed to the Southern states comprised only twenty-nine percent of the total 
nineteenth century improvement land grants.  The data in Table 4 adds economic and 
legislative legitimacy to the premise that Northern society supported efforts to expand the 
economy through efforts such as internal improvements.   
If Holt’s contention of state interest directly contributing to the level of support by 
the national government holds, then the data in Table 4 also adds support.  The lesser 
number of grants conveyed prior to the Civil War, twenty-six, appears to suggest that the 
Southern states lacked support for internal improvements.  In other words, the actual lack 
of land grants in the Southern states quantified the successful rhetoric of the state’s rights 
platform and rejection of growing federal powers argued by many Southern states.  
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However, the arguments by Holt, Goodrich, Freeling, and Roland do not suggest 
why Southern states accepted the twenty-six land grants and constructed internal 
improvements, despite contradicting the state’s right platform.  The data set clearly 
indicated that the federal government conveyed twenty-six grants to Southern States 
before 1861, and an additional six after the Civil War ended.  This supports an argument 
that not all the Southern states were as deeply devoted to the state sovereignty platform as 
presented by Calhoun and others.  Although the acceptance of an internal improvement 
land grant undermined the state’s rights platform and state sovereignty, it might have 
more importantly served as an irresistible economic boost to states that further 
complicated thoughts of Southern secession.  Even though Southern states tended to be 
more agrarian, an advantage of more efficient transportation systems undoubtedly made 
acceptance of a grant economically advantageous and thus extremely tempting.  As 
internal improvement projects reached into different regions and facilitated the movement 
of goods, services, and people, it was difficult to contain the benefit of the project to the 
boundaries of one state.  Therefore, with larger agrarian areas and fewer urban areas 
separated by larger distances, the improvement projects may have influenced regional 
markets as much, and maybe more so, than those confined to states. 
The six grants awarded to the Southern states after the Civil War offer little 
support for the idea of Reconstruction in which the federal government promoted and 
aided the rebuilding of the Southern states’ infrastructure.  Rather, the lack of post-Civil 
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War grants may indicate a residual state’s rights ideology by the Southern states and a 
resulting reluctance to accept aid from the national government. 
 
Figure 2.  Internal Improvement Public Land Distribution, Pre and Post Civil War. 
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Internal improvement land grants for both Northern and Southern states fell 
dramatically after 1861.  Historian Charles Holt contended that by 1854, state expenditure 
policy shifted from internal improvements and transportation to education and echoed a 
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new area for improvement.69  Figure 2 appears to support Holt’s thesis in that 
Congressional land grants awarded to states after 1861 only reached twenty-seven, thirty-
seven less grants than in the sixty-one years prior.     
To explain, historian Carter Goodrich argued that federal support of internal 
improvements arose from two factors.  He argued that regional wealth and population 
contributed to the decision making process of the national government in awarding land 
grants to the states.  Congress awarded land grants based on perceived need by a region, 
territory, or state.  Goodrich argued that following the westward expansion of the United 
States, the national government offered economic assistance in developing a 
transportation infrastructure to facilitate the shifting population.  However, a second 
criterion emerged.  If the region or state possessed enough private capital to fund such 
projects, the national government did not extend the offer of economic assistance, such as 
land grants.70   
Goodrich’s thesis applied to Figure 2 helps make sense of the lack of 
improvement land grants in the eastern coastal states, or the original thirteen colonies.  
With the majority of the population still residing east of the Appalachian Mountains, the 
region contained the majority of the country’s wealth.  Therefore, because the region 
contained enough wealth and people to fund and construct any needed improvement 
project, the national government did not convey economic assistance in those states.  
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Furthermore, by the nineteenth century a transportation infrastructure already existed in 
the eastern states. 
Additionally, Carter Goodrich asserted that nineteenth century America 
underwent two phases of internal improvement development.  The first phase 
encompassed improvement projects that assisted in westward expansion over the 
Appalachian Mountains, through the Great Lakes region, and into the Mississippi River 
Valley corridor.  The data in Figure 2 for the years of 1861 and before supports this 
thesis.  The states that accepted Congressional land grants are almost exclusively 
contained within the region outlined by Goodrich.   
The second phase encompasses land grants awarded to internal improvement 
projects that facilitated movement past the Mississippi River corridor, across the Great 
Plains, and to the Rocky Mountains.  The data presented in Figure 2 for the years after 
1861 illustrate the concentration of improvement land grants conveyed to states along the 
Mississippi River corridor that would enable the movement of goods, services, and 
people to and from the lands west of the Mississippi River. 
In addition to Goodrich’s two-phase thesis, historians such as Alan Bogue, 
Dorothy Schwieder, Jack Larkin, and Glenda Riley maintained that the speed of 
settlement and migration westward also increased during the nineteenth century.  By the 
1830’s, increasingly more territory of the trans-Mississippi West opened for settlement 
and highlighted the transformation underway.  By horseback, wagon, rail, and steamboat 
settlers made the journey westward.  In large part, advancement of transportation 
technologies aided the prairie-bound settler.  The nineteenth century American traveler 
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was able to exploit those advancements.  Scholar Jack Larkin suggested that radical 
advancements in nineteenth century America in “speed, scale, and experience of traveling 
came with the application of newly emerging transportation technologies - the railroad, 
the steamboat, the building of canals - to American conditions.”71  Upon harnessing 
steam power, steamboat traffic on the Mississippi River increased and the river became a 
major thoroughfare for both the transportation of goods and the migrating population.72  
 
Table 5.  Number of Grants by Type, before and after 1861. 
 Railroads Wagon Roads Canals River Improvements 
Before 1861 51 4 6 3 
After 1861 36 7 3 0 
 
Earlier scholars argued that as westward expansion reached further into the 
western regions, the speed of transporting people and goods also increased.  As the 
narrative presented by Bogue, Larkin, and their colleagues suggested, traditional literature 
focused heavily on the technological innovations of the railroad adding the migration 
population.  However, the data set simply does not verify their contentions of increased 
railroad grants serving as a manifestation of the technological evolution.  Table 5 
illustrates intended purposes of the land grants during the nineteenth century.  The data 
set indicates that not only did the federal government convey fewer total grants in the 
second half of the century, but it also conveyed fifteen fewer railroad grants.  
Although the number of grants conveyed does not support the technology thesis, 
other information in the data set differs.  A comparison of the sizes of the various land 
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grants throughout the nineteenth century reveals a transition in the second half of the 
century.  As indicated in Table 5, the latter half of the century saw the federal government 
convey fewer land grants for internal improvements, however, data in Table 6 shows that 
Congress offered, on average, larger sections of land per grant.  After 1861, the average 
grant size increased by 1,492,643 acres, an increase greater than the average pre-1861 
grant size.  Further, the smallest grant conveyed after 1861 contained 41,496 acres more, 
almost forty-two times more, than the smallest pre-1861 grant. 
 
Table 6. Area of Improvement Land Grants throughout the 19th Century. 
All Grants Average Grant Size 
(AC) 
Largest Grant Size 
(AC) 
Smallest Grant Size 
(AC) 
Before 1861 606,421 3,249,181 1,115 
After 1861 2,099,064 30,427,439 42,611 
 
 The data indicates that grant sizes increased as the century passed, although 
during the same period, state governments received fewer federal land grants.  Further, if 
Holt’s thesis that states’ support waned after 1854 is correct, another entity supplanted the 
state role in internal improvement construction.73  Table 7 illustrated the century long 
transition of improvement land grants from state entities to private companies.  Although 
the federal government conveyed only seventeen percent of all nineteenth century 
improvement land grants to private companies, the transition in federal policy is very 
evident.  Before 1861, the federal government conveyed no improvement land grants to 
private companies.  However, after 1861, private companies received all nineteen of their 
improvement land grants conveyed by Congress during the nineteenth century.  
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Table 7.  Number of Improvement Land Grants, Private v. Public. 
 Private Public 
Before 1861 0 64 
After 1861 19 27 
Total Grants 19 91 
Percentage 17.3 82.7 
 
 Further evaluation of grant conveyance in the data set, illustrated in Table 8, adds 
to the validity of the traditional literature of Bogue and his colleagues.  The data set 
supports their contentions that technological advancement, in the form of railroads, 
expedited the cross-country journey of people, goods, and services as the century 
progressed.  While grants conveyed to states contributed to the construction of all types of 
improvement projects, the nineteen grants conveyed to private companies exclusively 
contributed to the advancement of a national railroad system. 
 
Table 8. Conveyance of Grant, Public v Private. 
 Railroad Wagon Road Canal River Improvement 
Public 68 11 9 3 
Private 19 0 0 0 
 
Statistical analysis showed a –0.349 correlation between the transition of public to 
private grants and the year in which Congress conveyed them.  The –0.349 correlation 
suggests that, while other factors influenced the change in federal policy, the data 
indicates that as federal land grant size increased, the number of grants awarded to states 
decreased.  Regression analysis showed that a relationship between a specific year of the 
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nineteenth century and the status of federal awarding policy only explained approximately 
twelve percent of the factors influencing the policy transition.   
In light of the disparity of grants conveyed to private and public entities, 
evaluation of the data set based on the criteria of private versus public offers validation 
for the thesis of Carter Goodrich as well.  As westward expansion reached past the 
Mississippi River corridor and towards the sparsely populated regions of the Great Plains 
and Rocky Mountains, the federal government aided economic development by 
conveying grants.  However, the data presented in Table 9 also addresses the disparity of 
land size per grant.  Not only did the federal government transition from exclusively 
awarding public entities to conveying to private companies in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, it also then conveyed grants of comparatively larger sizes to the 
private companies in the western regions of the country.  
 
Table 9.  Improvement Land Grant size, Public versus Private. 
 Public (AC) Private (AC) 
Before 1861 606,421 0 
After 1861 567,132 4,492,706 
Average 586,777 4,492,706 
 
Analysis showed a –0.428 correlation between land grant size and the transition 
from grants awarded to state to private companies.  That is to say, as the land grant size 
increased, the federal government awarded fewer grants to states.  However, regression 
analysis showed that the relationship only accounted for approximately fourteen percent 
of the total policy transition.  Although statistical analysis showed a reasonably strong 
negative correlation between the transition of public to private grant policy and grant size, 
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the data revealed a weaker, approximately fourteen percent, correlation between the 
change in grant size and the year conveyed.   
Holt argued that state support waned in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and created a problem for the federal government in issuing land grants to western states 
and territories.  The data supports the thesis that the federal government transitioned to a 
practice of hiring out the development of a national transportation infrastructure by 
conveying land grants to private companies.  The combination of the theses presented by 
scholars and the data set point toward a government that turned to the private companies 
to construct far reaching transportation networks across a sparsely populated, and often 
lacking the necessary economic resources to complete the projects, western United States.  
The question remains, “How did government and society actually go about achieving 
such goals?” 
Efforts of positive government to fulfill the needs and desires of its people to 
improve upon nature and build a more perfect society proved an enormous challenge.  
Despite the conveyance of lands for the purpose of improvement projects, the manner in 
which conveyance occurred and the problem of how best to meet the most needs 
presented new challenges for the national government, states, and territories.  They faced 
difficulties in developing effective administrative and financial hierarchies.  Legislatures 
experimented by trial and error in finding the best means of managing the diverse 
projects; and all the while the national government struggled with balancing public and 
private interests.   
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In an effort to oversee all the complex facets of the land grants and improvement 
projects, states and territories created land offices, sought out additional sources of 
financing, and explored various methods to supervise construction and a timely 
completion of the projects.  While some states turned the improvements into great state 
run projects, others turned to private entrepreneurs to provide further funding and oversee 
completion.  Privatization added to the complexity of improvement projects and pitted 
state and federal government’s agendas of serving the public good against those of 
economically driven private companies.   
Harnessing the nation’s waterways as a form of transportation and economic 
growth provided the government with some of its most important training grounds and 
formative avenues.  It is in those training grounds that government created lasting 
mechanisms of assisting the conversion of nature into a tool of societal development.  
While the process was neither easy nor simultaneous throughout the nation, the resulting 
legislative experimentation, litigation, political discussions, and economic investment in 
water-based transportation provided a learning experience and an atmosphere that 
highlighted the ongoing negotiations of the social contract that created a durable shift in 
the development of the United States.  Societal desires, economic difficulties, and 
political debate surrounding the successes and failures of water-based projects drove 
government to seek out avenues of assistance.  As the nineteenth century progressed, 
governmental strategies shifted from public works to enabling private development.  In 
direct response to the trials of canal and river improvements, national and state 
governments, private business, and citizens negotiated new directives in positive 
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government.  To provide a clearer understanding of the transformative dynamics that 
water resources provided in the nineteenth century, I turn the attention toward the 
narratives of three specific internal improvements cases on Midwestern waterways in 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four.   
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Chapter Two: 
From Fall Line to Cornerstone:  
Louisville and Portland Canal 
 
The completion and federal acquisition of the Louisville and Portland Canal in 
1874 fulfilled years of planning and struggles to provide the inhabitants of the Ohio 
Valley region with a safe, efficient, and effective passage around the Falls of the Ohio 
River.  Regional and special interests sought to secure the construction of a canal on their 
respective sides of the Falls.  Economic advantages created by securing the canal on their 
side of the Falls provided much of the impetus for the regional competition.  However, 
desire to secure the canal alone proved inadequate.  Technological limitations, 
insufficient capital and labor, special interests, and political ideology complicated the 
construction of a canal.  Until society addressed each of the limiting factors, an adequate 
passage around the Falls of the Ohio remained elusive.  Only then, did a durable shift in 
the development of society occur and provide the opportunity for the Louisville and 
Portland Canal to fulfill the needs of society.     
 
The Challenge of the Falls 
 
Meriwether Lewis set sail down the Ohio River from Pittsburgh, along with 
approximately eleven other men, destined for Clarksville in the Indiana Territory, 
opposite present-day Louisville, Kentucky, in early October of 1803.  The journey 
downriver from Pittsburgh- in a newly made keelboat- signaled a transition in the 
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landscape of both the Ohio Valley region and the nation.  Slowly, with each river bend, 
shallow sandbar, and river snag encountered, Lewis and his small group left behind more 
and more of the established world of the Early Republic.  At the same time, an increasing 
complexity of environmental barriers inhibited their westward progress.  Lewis was to 
meet up with William Clark in Clarksville.  Clarksville, named after William Clark’s 
older brother George Rogers Clark, holds the distinction of being the first town in the 
Northwest Territory and rested only a short distance downriver from the infamous Falls 
of the Ohio.74  While Lewis made his way downriver from Pittsburgh to Clarksville, 
Clark scoured the neighboring towns, including cross-river Louisville, and the 
countryside for the necessary resources for the journey that lay ahead. 
Commissioned to survey and catalog the vast interior of the North American 
continent by President Thomas Jefferson in the aftermath of Jefferson’s historic purchase 
of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon Bonaparte of France, Lewis and Clark 
captained the Corps of Discovery on tits epic overland journey.  Although St. Louis, 
Missouri often receives acknowledgement as the official departure site of Lewis and 
Clark’s Corps of Discovery into the significantly uncharted inland of the continent, 
Clarksville and Louisville served as both the strategic and a symbolic point of origin of 
the great American overland journey.  While Clark made his way downriver from 
Pittsburgh, Clark sought out able-bodied men from the edge of the frontier with skills that 
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suited the expedition.  Underscoring the necessary skills for the overland journey, 
scholars contended,  
The captains drew their men from three principal sources: Anglo-American 
frontiersmen from the Ohio Valley, U.S. Army enlisted men, and the French 
settlers of Illinois and Missouri.  In the letter offering Clark the chance to second 
him on the expedition, Lewis wrote that his friend should recruit some young men 
in Kentucky and Indiana.  Clark was instructed to pick backwoodsmen, skilled in 
hunting and outdoor life and used to hardship, rather than ‘young gentlemen.’75 
 
As a result, Clarksville, Louisville, and the adjoining area provided men battle tested by 
the variable frontier conditions, men with a history of combating the natural elements and 
paving the way for the society of the East to advance westward. 
 While the search for worthy frontiersmen for the expedition highlighted the state 
of society in the Ohio River region and the region’s place within a national context, the 
captains’ rendezvous just below the Falls of the Ohio drew attention to the state of 
modernity of the East juxtaposed against the natural state of the Western lands.  The Ohio 
River rises out of the convergence of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers at 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania with no less than thirteen rivers contributing to the total volume 
of water before reaching the Mississippi River.  Located between present day Louisville, 
Kentucky and Clarksville, Indiana, the Falls of the Ohio impeded the flow of traffic on 
the Ohio River.  Consisting of rock ledges stretching across the river, one of the greatest 
hindrances to water travel on the Ohio River, the Falls accounted for twenty-two feet of 
elevation change in approximately two miles.76  The Falls prohibited uninterrupted travel 
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on the Ohio River.  As a result, Louisville, Clarksville, and other neighboring 
communities emerged as important commercial centers offering valuable services 
oriented toward the portage of goods around the Falls.   
For the Lewis and Clark expedition, converging on Clarksville on the downriver 
side of the Falls undoubtedly made great logistical sense.  In 1803, the Falls of the Ohio 
largely represented the last point of settlement and the first great step into the interior of 
the continent.  The trip over or around the Falls proved cost prohibitive for the 
transportation of all necessary men and goods for the expedition and only further 
illustrated the limitations of settling the region, and converting the Ohio River into a 
regional and national transportation route.  The return trip east by the Lewis and Clark 
expedition traveled much of the same stretch of the Ohio River to the Falls.  Although 
almost three full years had passed since the expedition set out, the Falls of the Ohio again 
served as a transition back to the modernity of the Early Republic.  The Falls still 
remained an obstacle for the young nation as it spread into the Ohio Valley region.  While 
the natural barrier allowed Louisville and other communities of the immediate area to 
emerge as significant centers of commerce on the Ohio River, it also represented the 
environmental challenges facing expansionist ideas of early American life and the 
commercial development of the entire Ohio Valley region.   
 
Early Activity in the Ohio Region 
 
Although Americans of the Early Republic pushed westward across the 
Appalachians and into the Ohio River Valley, they were not the first to see the Ohio River 
as central to the region’s importance.  Indigenous peoples and French missionaries, fur 
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trappers, and explorers used the waterway as a hub of transportation for communication 
and goods.  Although indigenous populations utilized the Ohio River and its tributaries 
for generations before European contact, “the first significant waterborne travel and 
commerce… largely stemmed from [European] military activities.”  During the 
eighteenth century, the Royal Engineers of France extensively mapped the region’s 
waterways, undertook several basic river improvements, and initiated a chain of 
fortifications from Lake Erie to the Monongahela River, including Fort Duquesne [later 
Pittsburgh] at the headwaters of the Ohio.77  The collective French efforts in the Ohio 
Valley region and its waterways aided the development of the fur trade in the region and 
epitomized much of the French colonial venture in North America.       
British colonists ventured over the Appalachians and into the region by the middle 
of the eighteenth century as they sought to expand their foothold on the North American 
continent.  While the French presence in the Ohio Valley came mostly by way of water 
routes such as the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi River, British 
presence came from the eastern areas and across the Appalachians.  The rugged and often 
densely wooded mountainous trans-Appalachian foot, horse, and wagon routes often 
made the risks of waterway transportation hazards worth the risk to navigate.  The 
confluence of multiple empirical and indigenous interests in the region resulted in conflict 
over the region’s resources and ultimately culminated in outright violent conflict between 
the British, French, and indigenous cultures in the French and Indian War.78    
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The outcome of the French and Indian War and the suppression of Pontiac’s 
rebellion in 1763 left the Ohio River Valley under British control.  To ensure controlling 
interests, British expeditions embarked down the Ohio River in order to secure the former 
French outposts and forts in the region.  The British quickly realized that protection of the 
newly acquired region required proper surveys and subsequently dispatched surveyors to 
map the Ohio River and its major tributaries.79 
Despite the British investments to inventory and survey the Ohio River Valley, 
conflicting policies and diverging views on the status of the British North American 
Colonies lay on the horizon.  While British North American colonists argued with 
Parliament and the Crown over funding of troops to protect North American colonial and 
British interests, unauthorized colonists ventured past the Appalachians and into the Ohio 
region.  Despite colonists that lacked proper British authority to enter the region, larger 
matters remained more pressing as the relations between North American colonists and 
the British Empire deteriorated into war.80 
In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, Americans of the newly formed 
country resumed their pre-war push west of the Appalachians and into the Ohio River 
Valley.  By the turn of the century, former revolutionary war personnel sought out 
opportunities in the western lands with the help of military tract land grants.  William 
Clark’s brother, George Rogers Clark, came into possession of the land along the Ohio 
River below the Falls, and the subsequent location of Clarksville, Indiana Territory, in 
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just such a manner.  In explaining the procurement of the lands in exchange for military 
service debts, Historian Ross F. Lockridge wrote,  
An area which became known as Clark’s Grant was reserved by Virginia when 
she ceded to the Union her claims to the Northwest Territory.  This strip of 
149,000 acres on the north bank of the Ohio, comprising most of what is now 
Clark County and parts of Scott and Floyd counties in Southern Indiana.  Clark’s 
Grant was the formal fulfillment of the assurance that Jefferson, Madison, and 
Wythe had given him at the beginning of his campaign.81      
  
Others not fortunate enough to obtain land grants for military service or through other 
measures also made their way into the region.  To the region’s settlers in the Early 
Republic, the Ohio River became a lifeline fostering communication, settlement, and 
commerce throughout the region. 
 
Nature’s Abundance and a Blank Canvas 
 
The dawning of the nineteenth century ushered in a wave of immigrants, former 
Continental soldiers, and emigrants from the eastern side of the Appalachians into the 
Ohio River Valley, with more than one million settlers moving west of the Appalachians 
by 1810.82  The flood of new people to the region initiated the transformation of the 
region as the new arrivals put their labor to use rendering from nature homes, fields, 
burgeoning towns and cities, and commerce.  The newly arrived inhabitants brought with 
them remnants of their past.  Historian R. Douglas Hurt wrote, “Culturally, they drew 
upon their knowledge of the frontier past from their home regions.  The agricultural 
practices of the transappalachian frontier differed little from the older frontiers east of the 
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mountains.”83  Additionally, those that arrived in the region also exhibited a commercial 
mentality and an early desire to use the area’s natural resources to aid market 
development.  Illustrating the commercial mindset of the new arrivals, Hurt wrote, 
“Those who braved the wilderness and hostile Indians remained subsistence 
agriculturalists until they gained access to markets via flatboats along the Ohio River for 
the sale of commodities such as butter and cheese.”84   
Others of the region planted such crops as corn, tobacco, and hemp, and raised 
beef cattle and hogs.  By 1810, Ohio farmers had driven as many as 70,000 head of Ohio 
Valley-raised hogs back east to markets.  Of course, with the intensity of pork production 
within the region, packing centers such as Cincinnati rose up along the Ohio River by the 
1820’s as they converted the live hogs purchased from the region’s farmers into 
consumer-ready processed pork.  Highlighting the early development and significance of 
the region in pork production, R. Douglas Hurt wrote, “debts in Cincinnati could be paid 
for with barrels of farm packed pork.”85  In turn, the processed pork, cheese, and other 
agricultural goods made their way into the national and international market via routes 
east over the Appalachians and by water down the Ohio River to the Mississippi River 
and to the Port of New Orleans.86 
Despite the rather rapid emergence of the Ohio Valley region’s agricultural and 
commercial endeavors, their development remained initially rather isolated and lacked 
adequate transportation to eastern markets.  On the one hand, the Appalachian Mountain 
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range proved a formidable obstacle and rendered pack animal and wagons inefficient as 
modes of transportation.87  On the other hand, while the Ohio River and its tributaries 
offered a natural advantage for the development of the region, the condition of the 
waterways proved ill suited for the increasing volume of traffic, particularly for those 
travelling upriver and eastward. 
Although the presence of the Ohio River and its tributaries greatly aided the early 
settlement push into the region, it also limited further growth.  While early shallow 
keelboats traversed the waterways with relative ease, the increasing volume of traffic and 
its cargo of agricultural and manufactured goods pushed beyond the river’s capabilities 
and often resulted in disruption of the flow of commerce into and out of the region.  A 
National Waterways Study conducted in 1983 on the history of water navigation of the 
region contended, “Although early navigators with light-draft vessels opened the Ohio to 
transportation, later use with deeper draft craft often fell victim to rocks, snags, shifting 
sandbars, and shallow channels, as well as other hazards.”88  Seasonal changes with 
annual periods of high water shifted the locations of sand bars, river snags, and the main 
channel causing navigators to maintain a constant state of alert.  The 981-mile length of 
the river also provided a high level of variability, dropping 429 feet from its headwaters 
to its confluence with the Mississippi River.  These fluctuations stymied travel in shallow 
sections as the current slowed and caused great dangers in areas of dramatic slope change 
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with the resulting swift currents often carrying vessels over boulder strewn main 
channels.89  The variable and seasonal nature of the river’s water levels restricted heavy 
transportation to specific times of the year and left the region isolated and reliant upon 
natural providence.   
Communities on either side of the Falls grew into points of commerce.  Louisville 
on the Kentucky side and Shippingport on the Indiana side seized upon the needs of the 
waterway based commerce through developing businesses focusing on unloading ships on 
either side of the Falls, providing cargo storage, and portaging goods around the Falls.  
Consequently, as the burgeoning region invested more intensely in commercial market 
involvement, the people of the region sought out ways to reshape and improve the 
capabilities of the waterway for transportation.90 
 
The Entrepreneurial Landscape of Improvement 
 
While numerous project aimed at improving the continuous flow of commerce on 
the Ohio River and its tributaries occurred, the chief navigation obstacle centered around 
the Falls of the Ohio.  Although scholars point to legislation originating from the 
Kentucky legislature in 1825 as the official origin of plans to bypass the Falls of the Ohio, 
the earliest efforts at state sponsored calls for action originated with incorporation of the 
Ohio Canal Company.  In September 1805, The Ohio Canal Company’s nine managers, 
consisting of Thomas Prather, George Wilson, Jason Hunter, Alexander Parker, John 
Bradford, James Crawford, Nicholas Clark, Adam Steele, and Wingfield Bullock, met in 
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Louisville, Kentucky with the specific purpose of gathering information, physically 
examining the area around the Falls of the Ohio, and developing a plan of action 
regarding improvement of navigation by way of a canal.91   
The managers of the company arrived in Louisville, Kentucky on the heels of the 
previous year’s legislation passed into law by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky incorporating the Ohio Canal Company.92  Passage of 
the incorporating act resulted in the creation of a private company seeking the 
construction and management of a canal around the Falls of the Ohio River.  Aided by a 
recently completed survey of the lands adjacent to the Ohio River at the Falls - conducted 
by Jared Brooks - the members assembled in Louisville to determine the official course of 
the canal.  While Brooks’ survey included numerous sketches and alternative routes for 
construction of a canal, rampant regional partisanship publicized the decision making 
process of the managers of the canal company.  While Kentucky sought to create a viable 
passage around the Falls on the south side [Kentucky side], competing parties from the 
Indiana Territory sought like-wise for their side [the south side].93  In fact, the opening 
address of the proceedings by the managers underscores the competitive partisan spirit 
within the region.  In outlining the reasons for their arrival in Louisville, the managers 
wrote,  
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having discovered from want of information, both with regard to the utility, as 
well as practicability of opening a canal for the purpose of navigating the Falls of 
the Ohio river; and from various impressions, in consequence of an association for 
opening a Canal on the North side of said river, under an act of incorporation by 
the Indiana Territory, the citizens have discovered an indifference to taking 
shares.94 
 
Not only did the canal company’s managers meet to decide the route of the canal around 
the Falls, but they also faced strong competing regional interests.  Specifically, competing 
boosters and citizens on the Indiana Territory side of the Ohio River sought the 
advantages that securing the canal’s construction on the north side of the Falls would 
eventually bring.  To this end, supporters of a canal constructed on the Indiana Territory 
side of the Ohio River contended that the geographical features of the area suited the 
construction and maintenance of the canal much more so than construction on the 
Louisville, Kentucky side.  Consequently, the residents on the Indiana Territory side of 
the Ohio River saw no advantage in supporting the construction of the canal on the south 
side, or Kentucky side, which left the managers of the Ohio Canal Company seeking 
further investment and purchasers for company shares.   
Seeking to secure a canal on the Indiana side, a similar canal company comprising 
directors such as George Rogers Clark, former Vice President Aaron Burr, and other 
politicians received approval in the Indiana Territory in 1805.  With loyalty to the Indiana 
Territory, their recommendations included the construction of a canal on the North side of 
the river.  Their calls for a canal on the north side of the river, in Indiana Territory, served 
as the major concern to the Ohio Canal Company’s managers at their meeting in 
Louisville in September 1805.  However, despite the presence of seemingly influential 
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national political figures, the Indiana Territory chartered company accomplished little 
more than appealing for governmental aid.  Uneasy over the company’s motives, 
Congress quickly sank their hopes by soundly rejecting their appeals.95 
After consultation with Jared Brooks and sifting through all the pertinent 
information gathered, the Ohio Canal Company managers concurred with Brooks’ 
opinion.  Brooks contended that despite geographical and geological information that 
supported construction of a canal on the Indiana Territory side, further analysis of the 
long-term success of the canal did not.  While construction of the canal on the Indiana 
Territory side might be easier and thereby, less costly, constant environmental challenges 
would undoubtedly face the most upriver portions of the canal.  The upriver opening of 
the Indiana Territory canal faced constant hydrological forces that raised the cost of canal 
maintenance.  The upriver head of the canal required constant rock and gravel abutments 
to ward off the undercutting force of the greater downward flow rates and icing and 
debris damage.   
In contrast, long-term maintenance costs offset any challenge in the construction 
of a canal on the Kentucky side of the Ohio River.  Additionally, Brooks speculated that 
the upriver opening of the Kentucky side canal option provided protection from winter ice 
and storm debris.  The slower rate of water that collided with the opening because of the 
bend upriver from Louisville also removed much of the concern over the high costs 
associated with rock and gravel abutments.  In the end, all information pointed to cheaper 
construction costs but higher maintenance and operational costs for a canal on the Indiana 
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side.  Conversely, a canal on the Kentucky side held greater initial construction costs, due 
mostly to the greater prevalence of bedrock throughout the proposed route.  Despite the 
higher initial costs, the continual maintenance and operational costs fell below that of the 
Indiana side because of the more favorable location in relation to potential damage from 
channel flow.96 
 Despite the general optimism that came from the official determination to 
construct the canal on the more physically challenging Kentucky side of the Ohio, almost 
twenty years passed before even the slightest bit of actual progress on the opening of a 
canal on the stretch of the Ohio River occurred.  The major barrier restricting initiation of 
the canal project arose over raising enough capital.  In December 1805, the Kentucky 
General Assembly issued a resolution requesting the Kentucky governor,  
… to transmit to the governors of the states of Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, New-
York, and Maryland, a copy of the act incorporating the Ohio Canal Company,… 
and to invite the enlightened co-operation and aid of the said states in cutting a 
canal around the rapids of the Ohio river, in the accomplishment of which the 
whole western country is so deeply interested.97    
 
Though the state of Kentucky requested assistance in the great undertaking from other 
regional governments and communities in the Ohio Valley, few responded to the call.  In 
reality, while the region contained the beginnings of commerce centers such as Louisville 
and Cincinnati, the region largely still lived in the shadow of settler society.   
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In discussing the offer from Kentucky, future United States Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Salmon P. Chase contended, “Ohio declined, in consequence of the embarrassed 
state of her finances at the commencement of her State Government.”98  Ohio found itself 
unable to provide economic assistance to the construction of any significant works on the 
Ohio River.  Coming into the Union almost eleven years behind Kentucky, Ohio lacked 
the necessary capital and turned to chartering its own private canal companies for works 
on the Ohio River.   
Despite the beginnings of a burgeoning economy based upon river transportation 
of agricultural goods from the Ohio Valley region, Ohio simply did not respond to 
Kentucky’s 1803 request.  Similarly, despite the calls from the Indiana Territory for the 
canal’s construction on their side, the territory’s government also found itself lacking the 
economic ability to assist in the construction of any works at the Falls.  However, in 
1805, the Indiana Territorial Legislature also incorporated a canal company seeking the 
construction of a canal on the north side of the river and entered into direct competition 
with the Kentucky chartered Ohio Canal Company.  Although the region’s state and 
territorial governments sought out assistance, regional boosterism, lack of governmental 
capital, and competing interest offset opportunities for successful completion of 
improvements at the Falls.  Consequently, the people of the Ohio Valley region found 
themselves with governments and private companies unable to address their desires.99 
The lack of a cooperative spirit to participate in the development of a common 
canal by many, if not all, of the region’s governments highlights the competitive nature of 
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the era, as competing interests sought to secure a foothold in the region’s emerging 
economy.  Greater population divisions resulting from the admission to statehood process 
placed state governments in the position of experimenting with legislation and solutions 
that met the needs and desires of their populations.  Equally, although not unequivocally, 
a transformation from regional, or territorial, identity to state identity as a defining 
characteristic of the populace emerged.  However, the lack of consensus also set the stage 
for the expansion of national governmental authority and relegated the construction of a 
canal around the Falls to future decision makers.  While the region’s governments might 
have sought to act in the interests of its people, without a source of external uniting 
authority the governments of the region simply found themselves unable and largely 
unwilling to respond to a need for regional improvement.100   
In the absence of consensus, states such as Kentucky exercised the one portion of 
authority they had.  That authority focused on the legislative process of securing the 
completion of improvements for the benefit of the society.  For Kentucky, that included 
securing private funding and support, and binding the private company to the project 
through state charters.  As such, in response to the lack of additional support by 
competitive neighboring governments, the Kentucky legislature passed an act 
incorporating a private company to undertake the work of improvement in the region and 
through the act allowed the private company to assist in the development of the region 
and its economy.  In turn, the company received the rights to manage the canal and charge 
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tolls as the burgeoning river traffic made its way through the canal.  The ability of the 
private company to seek out and acquire other means of capital potentially opened the 
door for private economic growth, while also giving government an avenue by which to 
initiate steps for the betterment of its society.101 
Despite the creation of the private company and the meeting of its managers in 
Louisville in early fall of 1805, the state of Kentucky, the Ohio Canal Company, and the 
Ohio Valley region lacked the necessary capital for the undertaking at the Falls.  The 
most positive of hopes rested with the private company selling its shares to raise the 
$200,000 in capital necessary to construct the canal on the Kentucky side.  While the 
ability to purchase stock received early enthusiasm from around the region, the sale of 
stocks fell well short of the needed amount; the canal company managed to raise only 
$70,000 before turning to the state later that year.102  
Only two months after the meeting of the Ohio Canal Company’s managers in 
Louisville, the Kentucky General Assembly solicited assistance from the national 
government.  To Kentuckians, as well as all inhabitants of the Ohio Valley region, the 
creation of a canal around the Falls held great consequence to the young nation.  
Approved on December 10, 1805, the Commonwealth’s General Assembly contended, 
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“that the opening of a canal at the Falls of the river Ohio, will be of great public utility, 
interesting to the commerce and agriculture of this state and the western country.”103 
A memorial to Congress in December 1805 painted the picture of the region’s 
need for the waterway improvement by submitting, “to the consideration… whether the 
accomplishment of that useful undertaking would not greatly increase the value of the 
national domains, and render them a much more productive source of revenue for the 
United States.”104  As such, the General Assembly solicited the national government for 
aid and cooperative efforts, “either by subscription or donation in land, or otherwise… to 
be invested in the said company.”105  A congressional committee responsible for 
reviewing the request from the Kentucky General Assembly resulted in mixed outcomes.  
On the one hand, the overall plan for the canal seemed quite feasible to the committee.  
On the other hand, Congress lacked the financial resources to assist as Congress had 
already earmarked the necessary funding for other projects.  Despite the supportive words 
echoed from the halls of Congress, the Ohio Canal Company exhausted its economic 
resources and faded into the history of the region without accomplishing the great canal 
work at the Falls.106 
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Seeds of Defensive Improvement 
 
Despite the best efforts of the Kentucky General Assembly, only a limited spirit of 
cooperation and little necessary capital existed in the opening decades of the nineteenth 
century.107  Although early efforts to entice others in the region to participate in the 
construction of the canal around the Falls struggled, others, regionally as well as 
nationally, realized the emerging importance of the waterway to their own welfare as well 
as the overall region’s welfare.  Contributing to the emergence of a national awareness, 
by 1812 the Ohio Valley region found itself the battleground for much of the War of 
1812.   
Key to military strategy in the region, the Ohio River and its tributaries held great 
defensive value.  The waterway connected battlefields with faster and often more efficient 
supply lines and communications, increased the speed and mobility of the forces around 
the region, and offered important escape routes.108  In the prosecution of the War of 1812, 
the national government seized upon the region’s advantages in resources such as timber, 
shipbuilding, and water navigation knowledge.  Toward the end of the war, Secretary of 
War James Monroe sought out and contracted with Robert Fulton to supply steamboats to 
the national government with the intended purpose of plying the Ohio and Mississippi 
Rivers.109  
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 The contribution of Robert Fulton to the development of the Ohio Valley region 
began years before Secretary Monroe and the national government came calling.  Born in 
1765, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Robert Fulton’s fascination with harnessing steam 
power and shipbuilding brought him to international prominence.  In 1797, he followed 
his passions of combining the two endeavors to Europe where he experimented with 
torpedoes and vessels to carry and launch them.  While in Europe, Fulton caught the 
attention of Napoleon Bonaparte.  In 1800, with the support of Napoleon, Fulton received 
a commission to develop the first practical submarine, the Nautilus.110  After attempts at 
creating a working steamboat on the River Seine in 1803, Fulton returned to the United 
States.  In 1807, with the help of United States Ambassador Robert Livingston who 
Fulton had befriended in Europe, Fulton built the first commercial steamboat, the North 
River Steamboat, which later became known more commonly as the Clermont.   
Fulton’s invention expedited the speed of transportation, increased payload size, 
and made plying the nation’s inland waterways more reliant upon securing continuously 
open and navigable waters.  The advance in water transportation technology held great 
consequences for the Ohio River region and its people.  With the breakthrough in 
technology that made river transportation, especially upriver, more efficient, private 
companies and the national government alike sought out Fulton and others to produce the 
new vessels.  Unfortunately for Fulton, the conclusion of the War of 1812 also brought 
about the end of the military contract for his steamboats.111  Regardless, the introduction 
of the steamboat to the United States’ inland waterways changed the economic landscape 
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of the Ohio River region, as private business, and local, state, and national governments 
all viewed the Ohio River and its tributaries as resources of ever-growing importance.  
Despite the significance of the Ohio River in the economic and military infrastructure of 
the Early Republic that emerged during the second decade of the nineteenth century, the 
physical landscape of the Ohio River still lacked the improvement of a canal.  With little 
work done on the upper reaches of the Ohio River, the lack of improvements at the Falls 
illustrated the reality that very few truly public efforts backed by governmental action 
emerged until the 1820’s.   
 
Governmental Instrumentalism and Private Enterprise 
 
Responding to the changing economic and technological landscape of the region, 
both Indiana and Kentucky sought the initiation of a new wave of private companies to 
undertake the construction and management of a canal at the Falls.  The inaugural Indiana 
legislature, in 1816, passed an act chartering the Jeffersonville Ohio Canal Company for a 
canal on the north side of the Ohio, in Indiana.  Just like previous canal companies 
chartered to construct a canal around the Falls, the act provided the canal company with 
the power to sell one million dollars in company stock and raise additional funding 
through a lottery.  While this provided investments from individuals and business within 
the region, as well as outside investors and speculators, the act limited the ability of the 
canal company to raise additional funds for the construction and maintenance of the 
canal.  Despite general optimism and an official groundbreaking in 1819, the company 
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undertook less than a mile’s worth of canal construction on the north side before lack of 
capital forced the company to cease operations.112      
Similarly, in 1818, Kentucky also witnessed a resurgence of canal fever and 
revisited the idea of canal construction on the south side of the Falls in 1818.  Despite the 
interest, economic fortunes took a turn for the worse the next year and ultimately caused 
the collapse of the new canal effort.  The first major United States financial crisis of the 
young nineteenth century hit in 1819 and signaled an end to the economic expansion 
arising from the War of 1812.  The Ohio Valley felt the effects of the economic crisis as it 
reduced the demand for agricultural goods and cut commercial transportation on the Ohio 
River.  The effects rippled through the commercial centers along the river and 
consequently dried up vital capital for the canal construction.  Exacerbating the economic 
crisis, the region also suffered from a period of drought that dropped water levels on the 
Ohio River and its tributaries, further restricting river commerce as numerous locations 
including the Falls became impassable.113  The financial constriction reduced the 
economic potential of the region and left the likelihood of canal construction to future 
entities.        
Although the availability of funds remained low and competition between states 
and private companies to construct a canal around the Falls remained divided, the 
importance of a canal’s construction galvanized the region and two main options 
emerged.  As Brooks indicated in his surveys of the Falls in 1804, either a canal on the 
North side or an opposing canal on the south side remained viable options.  Both options 
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highlighted the limitations of technological and engineering ability in constructing a 
central canal channel.  The rationale for this decision rested with the geological formation 
that throughout generations created the Falls as the river cut its course.   
As a seemingly geographical oddity that rendered the Ohio River impassable in all 
but the most extreme high water levels, a giant coral reef cut across the river’s channel.  
The physical barrier highlighted the transformative but often limiting power of the natural 
environment.  More likely found at the bottom of the ocean, the giant coral reef creating 
the Falls of the Ohio harkens to ages past.  A relic of the Devonian geological epoch, the 
giant coral reef in fact did occupy space in the bottom of an ancient ocean that existed 
over three million years ago.  In the ensuing years, slow and continuous transformative 
powers buried the mass as glaciers advanced and retreated in the region.  In the years 
since the last major North American ice age, the gradual retreat of glaciers buried the reef 
beneath glacial till and the erosive hydraulic forces began cutting away at the landscape as 
water made its way through the region.  When Europeans first gazed upon the Ohio River 
Valley, the coral again reached from beneath the earth as the obstacle creating the Falls 
on the river.  To those interested in improving the Ohio River at the Falls, the removal of 
the enormous mass remained technologically out of reach.  By the 1820s, the numerous 
surveys conducted by competing interests clearly pointed to projects that bypassed the 
Falls and rendered the construction of a canal as the most likely to succeed.114    
While the options for canal construction coalesced into two options, by 1824, the 
state of Ohio approached both Kentucky and Indiana with a new proposition.  Ohio 
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proposed a joint venture whereby all three states combined technologic, economic, and 
labor resources toward the construction and operation of a canal at the Falls.  The efforts 
of a cooperative endeavor underscored the importance of the Ohio River to the region’s 
economic welfare.   
Despite the overtures of a multi-state cooperative project, Ohio also realized that 
completion of the improvement project rested with the accumulation of capital.  In other 
words, at stake for the area’s communities and individuals were great economic 
advantages that fostered regional competition.  Ohio seized the moment and offered a 
rationale that directly sought to highlight the competitive nature of the region’s boosters.  
Removing preference based upon sound geographical, hydraulic, and topological 
construction, Ohio suggested that in the event of all parties entertaining the offer, the 
location offering the greatest economic and political interests dictated the preferred 
placement of the canal.115 
 Despite Ohio’s efforts at a multi-state cooperative public venture, little 
groundswell for the idea surfaced.  In fact, while the overtures of great cooperative public 
improvement works on the Ohio River never materialized, the rhetoric of improvement 
reached new heights and turned toward themes of patriotism, regionalism, state pride, and 
the improvement of the human condition.  Boosters of a Kentucky canal put pen to paper 
to communicate the significance of the project to their neighbors.  Illustrating the 
significance of the Ohio River to the nation one such pamphleteer wrote, “It has been 
proved enough… that this canal would be a grand friendly accommodation for the 
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commerce of the whole Union on the western waters, and… one of the most valuable 
capitals that human industry could create.”116  Echoing the economic sentiments of 
numerous others, the pamphleteer contended that there should be no delay in creating the 
canal as it served as a “permanent and constantly growing source of revenue” for 
Kentucky.117  Not wanting Kentuckians to be left behind, the pamphleteer questioned, 
“Shall we be sleeping, when the rest of the American family is busily working at internal 
improvements?  Let us rouse from our slumber!”118  Calling upon the spirit of the 
revolutionary era, he harkened, “Like in ’76, let us be patriots.”  However, he quickly 
acknowledged the economic self-interests in the region also, “if we are unwilling to act as 
patriots, let us think only of self interest.  Where is the Kentuckian, who, after a 
moment’s reflection, will not find his self interests, at seeing this done?”119  If the 
project’s economic significance to the individual remained unclear, the pamphleteer put it 
into simpler terms, “It is to be the center point of our affairs, of a great commerce in the 
western world, either out and home, a magazine of wealth, for distribution.  Let every 
citizen contribute his mite, and we shall have it.”120  Despite the pamphleteer’s pro-canal 
stance, not all business owners saw the construction of any canal as a positive.  Business 
owners in Louisville making a living in portaging, or transfer of cargo via land, and 
storage of cargo stood to lose much of their business with the opening of a canal.  If the 
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ships plying the Ohio River no longer required the offloading of their contents before 
confronting the Falls, all involved in such commerce risked tremendous financial loss.121 
 While the pamphleteer and others sought to spur action for a canal’s construction, 
the citizens of Kentucky found themselves embroiled in a great debate over whether the 
construction and operation of the canal should rest in private or public hands.  Historian 
Paul B. Trescott argued, “Articulate public opinion appears to have been favorable to a 
state project, and was in some cases overtly hostile to creating a private company.”  
Hostility resulted from the idea that the creation of a private corporation to operate the 
canal would rob the state and its treasury of income to the detriment of Kentuckians.  
Specifically, concern centered on the power of the private company to charge tolls as they 
saw fit at the cost of investment on behalf of state improvement.122   
 
The Politicization of Privatizing the Falls 
 
 Ultimately, political partisanship and maneuvering gave rise to the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky chartering a private canal company in the face of strong 
public opposition.  Historian Paul B. Trescott wrote on the matter explaining that the 
proposal for a public project “became snarled in the bitter political fight raging in 
Kentucky.”  The fight to which Trescott referred resulted from attempts to stave off the 
economic crisis that hit the Early Republic after the War of 1812.  Attempting to limit the 
effects of the economic downturn, the state government instituted a wide reaching plan 
offering relief.   
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Despite the attempts at limiting the economic effects on the region, one specific 
measure focused on protecting the loss of individual assets.  Specifically, the Kentucky 
General Assembly passed legislation creating a replevin law that greatly extended the 
rights of many who found themselves in debt resulting from the economic crisis.  Heavily 
favoring the debtors, the replevin law provided a remedy to recover property deemed 
taken wrongfully by creditors.123  As such, creditors sought and achieved the replevin law 
ruled unconstitutional.  Trescott contended that an outraged citizenry demonstrated their 
disdain for the ruling by ushering in an election victory for a significant number of pro-
replevin politicians.  The pro-replevin politicians ran on an anti-business platform that 
included efforts of private companies seeking charters for canal construction and 
operations.124   
The overwhelming political firestorm that ensued witnessed the abolishment of 
the sitting court that ruled the replevin law unconstitutional.  The removal of the “old 
court” and the appointment of a “new court” set the stage for an antagonistic relationship 
between relief-seeking legislators and their creditor supporting counterparts.  Trescott 
explained that these competing interests between using government for public benefit and 
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those supporting the interests of private business owners spilled over into the discussion 
of canal construction on the Kentucky side of the Ohio River.125   
In January 1825, a bill supporting a state canal project met sound defeat by the 
state legislature.  Because not all of the “new court” legislators supported a public canal 
construction project, the likelihood of the bill’s passage lessened.  With “old court” 
legislators firmly set upon exacting a measure of revenge over the court’s ouster, the vote 
on the state canal project fell to defeat.  The vote, 49 to 38, dashed the hopes of a publicly 
constructed and operated canal at the Falls.   
Despite Trescott’s views of competing interests over the conflict, the aftermath of 
the state canal bill’s passage illustrated the desire of the state for the construction of a 
canal, as both private business and the individual citizen stood to benefit from the project.  
Seizing upon the groundswell of feeling, politically savvy “old court” legislators 
exploited the overlapping interests of the state’s various constituents.  Drawing votes 
from the “new court” contingent that overwhelmingly supported the canal project while 
additionally securing the votes of “old court” and private business supporter, the 
introduction of a bill chartering a private canal company succeeded.  Two days later, on 
January 12, 1825, the Governor of Kentucky signed the bill into law.  With great skill, 
Kentucky politicians supporting private enterprise secured the privatization of canal 
construction at the Falls.  It was in the wake of such patriotic rhetoric and boosterism for 
canal construction and political conflict that the General Assembly of the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky introduced legislation, in 1825, chartering a new canal company, the 
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Louisville and Portland Canal Company.126  With the charter’s passage, realizationof the 
economic potential and current limitation of the region echoed from Congress.  Before 
Congress in 1835, Representative Patrick H. Pope of Kentucky addressed the 
circumstances that surrounded the situation.  Pope asserted the Kentucky legislature and 
the state’s citizens “were aware that there was no surplus of local capital, and it was to 
tempt employment of foreign means in the undertaking.”127    
Despite the controversial means by which the Louisville and Portland Canal 
Company came into being, general optimism surrounded the venture.  Illustrating its 
positive view, the Kentucky legislature chartered the canal company with initial stock of 
$600,000, with each share at $100.  While the $600,000 in stock provided the company 
with initial capital, the funding fell short of the necessary amount needed for the canal.  
As such, the shortfall set the stage for the private company to seek additional funding 
from the national government.  In other words, the financial construction of the charter 
illustrated a commitment from the citizens and government of Kentucky while also 
presenting to the national government the clear limitations of its abilities to act solely on 
behalf of its own citizens.  In retrospectively commenting on the chartering process of the 
canal company in 1851, Salmon P. Chase reported, “This was undoubtedly the best mode 
of improvement that could have been resorted to, at the time.”128  
  Showing support for the project, the Kentucky legislation set forth a rather liberal 
charter for the canal company.  Under the incorporating charter, the canal company’s 
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management “consisted of a president and four other directors chosen annually by the 
stockholders.”129  In addition to the initial stock capitalization, the charter provided the 
authority to the president and directors to secure other funding as desired.  The state of 
Kentucky reserved only one significant regulatory oversight pertaining to the Louisville 
and Portland Canal and the canal’s company.  The initial charter established basic toll 
rates for the canal at twenty cents a ton,  However, the charter also provided the canal 
company with the ability to raise the tolls if the “annual profits after operating expenses, 
repairs, and improvements, should fall short of 12 ½ per cent of the capital.”130  With a 
responsive eye toward the effects of water tolls on citizens and commercial interests, the 
charter also provided the Kentucky legislature with the reserved right to “reduce the toll if 
the profits exceeded 18 per cent.”131     
 By the 1820’s the majority of the land around the Kentucky side of the Falls of the 
Ohio rested in private ownership.  Seeking to secure the completion of the canal and limit 
conflicts in securing land important to the canal’s construction, the charter also provided 
the use of eminent domain to seize the land.132  Eminent domain rises from an agreement 
between citizens and their government that it is government’s responsibility to use 
society’s resources to the benefit of the whole of society.  In the instance of eminent 
domain, the governed convey to the government the power to “take, or authorize others to 
take, private property for the common good provided that just compensation is paid for 
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it.”133  In this manner, the use of eminent domain assisted in defining the role of a 
responsive democratic government as it sought to serve the needs of its citizens as a 
whole.  As a result, the conveyance of eminent domain to the canal company expedited 
the process of canal construction to the benefit of the whole of society and conveyed a 
clear understanding of the improvement’s significance to the Ohio River region.  
However, the seemingly extraordinary conveyance of the power of eminent domain to a 
private company exposed the company to potential misuse and public skepticism.134  
Nonetheless, the conveyance of eminent domain to the canal company provided the 
directors of the company with a powerful economic tool.  Subsequent legislative and 
legal action limited the company’s power of eminent domain through requiring 
independent appraisals of lands seized.  
Outside of the ability to act on toll charges and conveying the power of eminent 
domain, the Kentucky legislature sought to limit decision-making oversight while 
hopefully creating an environment that encouraged private investment and development.  
In general, the state government attempted the construction of a charter that held the 
private company to assisting economic development of the Falls and the Ohio River while 
allowing the canal company the autonomy to conduct themselves as a truly private 
company.  In fact, outside of the regulation of tolls based on the private company’s profits 
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and expense reports, little governmental discussion over initial construction decisions 
surfaced.   
Conversely, excluding the passage of the canal company charter, the legislature 
also provided little economic assistance.  Summarizing the state’s involvement in the 
Louisville and Portland Canal, Trescott concluded, “No other limitations were placed on 
the valuable privilege granted the company…  There was no time limit on the charter, no 
provision for subsequent purchase or participation by the state.”135  While the practice of 
land grants and economic aid existed in other projects emerging in the Early Republic, the 
incorporating charter of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company provided nothing 
more to the stockholders than potential future stock profits.136   
 
The Business of Canal Construction 
 
Unsurprisingly, the charter members of the canal company represented a roll call 
of prominent Louisville residents.  The charter members strongly represented the 
commercial and local and state governmental interests as city trustees, a state legislator, 
bank owners, and marine insurance agents highlighted the company’s list.137  
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Undoubtedly, the establishment of local citizens as charter members of the canal 
company provided a vested interest in the canal company’s success.  The strategy seemed 
to work as the members almost instantly sold their first thousand shares of company 
stock.  Particularly innovative, the members initiated a payment plan for the purchasing 
of company stock.  Specifically, the company required only ten dollars of the one hundred 
dollar share price at the time of purchase with the remaining ninety dollars due in ten-
dollar quarterly payments.  The installment price plan lowered the initial costs required to 
buy into the canal company and made easy installment payments more palatable to a 
region still crawling out of the aftermath of the financial crisis.  The strategy met great 
success and allowed the company to sell more than a thousand shares by March 1825, 
with over $350,000 received by March of the following year.138   
Additionally, investment from outside the region laid to rest Kentuckians’ 
concerns of private interests corrupting state and local government.139  Historians Leland 
R. Johnson and Charles E. Parrish highlighted the initial external investment in the canal 
company, “John Shackford of St. Louis became the first major investor, subscribing for 
1,000 shares.”  Shackford’s ownership of a river warehouse and commission business in 
St. Louis and his relations to wealthy seafaring family in Portsmouth, New Hampshire 
exemplified an emerging awareness of the regional and national importance of the Ohio 
River and improvements upon it.140  For Shackford and others economic speculators, the 
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investments diversified their financial holdings while also contributing to the rise of 
regional and national markets.   
Other significant investment came by way of Philadelphia.  Historian Paul 
Trescott asserted, “There is considerable evidence that the Bank of the United States, 
which had its main offices in Philadelphia and a branch in Louisville, served as an 
informal channel for bringing outside funds into the project.”  While a nineteenth century 
paper trail has not surfaced to concretely document this contention, it is significant to note 
that leading investors in Philadelphia also held connections to the Bank.  On the other 
hand, charter members of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company also held positions 
with local banks with charter member James Hughes serving as president of the 
Louisville branch of the Banks of the United States.141  Regardless of the reality of such 
connections, for the citizens of Kentucky and the Ohio River region, the investment by 
outside sources provided needed financial assistance for the development of their region.  
The investment from external sources also created a vested interest in the outcome of the 
project and added a measure of stability to the economy of the region.    
  With local, regional, and national financial investments in the canal’s 
construction pointing toward a positive outcome, the canal company proceeded with its 
work.  The positive spirit surrounding the canal’s construction paved the way for 
speculation over the construction timeline consuming little more than $300,000 and 
lasting no more than one summer.142  With optimism running high, the company directors 
announced groundbreaking festivities in July 1825.  While interests in construction of an 
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Indiana side canal faded into history, the Louisville and Portland Canal Company utilized 
the groundbreaking ceremonies as both pageantry and symbolism.  Seizing upon the 
growing fervor over the national economic importance of improvement projects and the 
potential economic role of the canal to the citizens of the region, the canal company’s 
directors invited Dewitt Clinton, governor of New York who navigated the development 
of the Erie Canal, to Louisville to break ground for the canal.  Clinton arrived in 
Louisville on July 15, 1825, after a whirlwind tour and ceremonial groundbreaking for 
Ohio’s canal system.143   
For DeWitt Clinton, the Erie Canal improved upon the natural wealth of 
abundance that the region offered.  The agricultural hinterlands provided lands ready for 
settlement and production, the expanding urban centers required agricultural goods to 
feed growing populations, developing manufacturing required reliable and efficient 
modes of transportation to acquire necessary raw materials and ship finished goods to 
consumers.  Clinton realized the significance of the developing networks of regional and 
national markets and sought to secure the interests of New York in the emerging 
economic transformation.  For Clinton, a network of water transportation routes, 
connecting the eastern seaboard at New York City with the Great Lakes, serving the 
needs of the numerous markets and their constituents were of the utmost importance for 
realizing the true untapped potential of nature.144  Clinton captured the canal’s 
significance in the battle between society and the environment while addressing the 
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Louisville crowd at a banquet.  Upon referring to the providence that placed the obstacle 
comprising the Falls, Clinton proclaimed, it “has also provided great facilities for its 
removal, and the ingenuity and industry of art, will produce a speedy accomplishment.”145  
In one natural occurrence, the Falls of the Ohio presented an impediment to the expansion 
and further development of a society, while also providing society a mechanism for 
social, political, and economic development.     
Despite the positive speculation and ceremonious groundbreaking, one historian 
referred to it as “pathetically over-optimistic.”146  In reality, the construction of the 
Louisville and Portland Canal fell victim to numerous complications.  Work began in 
March 1826, with more modest goals of completion in two years.  Initial construction and 
digging work reaffirmed Brooke’s turn of the century surveys.  While construction on the 
Kentucky side might limit exposure from downriver current, debris, and ice damage, the 
hardened bedrock greatly complicated and slowed digging and raised the overall costs of 
construction.147        
 Environmental challenges did more than slow construction and postpone the 
eventual opening of the canal.  The euphoric proclamations of an early completion 
created unrealistic expectations for shareholders, citizens, and river users.  When news of 
environmental delays struck, shareholders confidence and public opinions soured.  The 
effects of disappointed shareholders and investors left the canal company reeling, 
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ultimately the company admitted to the loss of $160,000 in pledges through individual 
defaults by the end of 1826.  After reviewing the company’s stockholders lists, Trescott 
contended that the shares defaulted comprised “people in the locality who were best 
aware of the difficulties.”148  Lacking local public financial support, the company found 
itself with a canal project behind construction timelines and facing significant financial 
shortfalls needed to get the project back on track and see it to completion.    
 
National Government Becomes a Stockholder in Canal Development 
 
 With initial public financial support dwindling and construction falling behind, 
the canal company sought other avenues for securing the necessary construction and 
operation funds.  The financial crisis that hit the region and the nation in the years after 
the War of 1812 faded into memory as the 1820’s went on.  The ensuing years held 
witness to the rapid development of agricultural production and regional population in the 
Ohio Valley region.  Subsequently, with the region’s development its importance to the 
nation grew.  By 1826, the completion of a canal around the Falls of the Ohio River 
became a necessary improvement for the advancement of the region and the nation.  For a 
canal company in dire need of an infusion of capital, the regional and national importance 
of the canal played to their advantage.                                                                                                                              
 If there was a good time for financial problems, the canal company found itself 
there.  With the emerging regional and national importance of improvements growing, the 
canal company found heightened interests before the national government.  In March 
1825, John Quincy Adams ascended to the Presidency and brought a longstanding 
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nationalistic political belief as a member of the Federalists, Democratic-Republicans, 
National Republican, and Whig parties.  He also firmly ensconced himself within social 
efforts of improvement and modernization calling for the abolition of slavery, and 
educational reform.149  Complimenting his stances on improvement and nationalism, 
Adams selected Kentuckian Henry Clay as his Secretary of State.150  Clay’s reputation as 
a skillful orator, statesman, and his role in the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives earned him the nicknames, “The Great Compromiser,” and “The Great 
Pacifier” while bringing together opposing sides.  Strongly rooted in Alexander 
Hamilton’s American School of Economics, Clay advocated modernizing much of the 
nation’s economy.  Through tariffs to protect and encourage industry, the establishment 
of a national bank, and internal improvements such as canals, river improvements, 
railroads, and ports, Clay contended the nation would prosper and successfully compete 
against international interests.151  In the wake of Adams’ own contributions to the Monroe 
Doctrine, Clay’s views of economic modernity backed up the strong words of warning the 
doctrine issued.152  With Adams, Clay, and others rising to the highest levels of national 
political power, market oriented public works project, met with increased interest from 
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Washington, D.C.  For the shareholders of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company, 
the transition to a political ideology supportive of improvement projects proved more 
than timely. 
 With the political climate leaning towards economic support of improvement 
projects, the directors of the Louisville and Portland Canal appealed to Congress for 
financial assistance in bringing the canal to completion.  The growing awareness of the 
importance of the Ohio River in commerce brought the plight of the canal company to the 
public and those plying their wares on in the river’s commerce provided the political 
incentive for Congress to act.  Positively responding to the needs of its constituents in 
May of 1826, Congress, undoubtedly aided by the political skills of Clay, voted to 
purchase $100,000 shares of company stock.  The purchase provided the company with 
vital financial resources while also creating a unique situation.153   
With the stock purchase, the national government became a shareholder in the 
private canal company chartered under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  In 
this manner, the national government found itself in a most complicated situation of 
assisting the public good while using the nation’s economic resources to buy into a 
private company.  However, these competing and concurrent roles often found the 
national government’s actions at odds over the ensuing years.  While the government 
sought to assist development for the region and the nation, the private company’s first 
responsibility rested with profit for its shareholders.  As a result, the government found 
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itself with a vested interest in the completion and economically successful operation of 
the Louisville and Portland Canal.154   
Although the purchase of canal company stock by the national government held 
great significance and conveyed positive governmental support, the reality of the situation 
after the 1826 stock purchase remained relatively unchanged.  Last minute changes in the 
canal’s channel complicated construction decisions and placed the project even further 
behind deadline.  Further complicating matters, nature stepped in to delay construction 
efforts once contractors mobilized.  Almost endless stretches of water met the contractors 
at the construction site in March 1826.  Severe seasonal flooding swallowed the adjacent 
lands and swamped much of Louisville.  While the city’s streets became thoroughfares 
for water vessels, the canal site remained submerged beneath the surging waters.  
Although the canal company directors quickly addressed the situation with claims that an 
earthen levy on the south side of the canal would eliminate future concerns, the flood 
damage extended to subcontractors and investors.  As some contract partners sold their 
stakes in the project, workers lined up for the project also scattered.  While the canal 
company secured many workers from the Erie Canal project, the uncertainty created by 
the flooding, rumors of disease, and the numerous other improvement projects springing 
up proved to be the impetus for laborer exodus and further delayed construction.155     
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With pressure from competing canal projects, commercial interests, and the 
region’s citizens mounting, the canal company sought avenues to get the project back on 
track.  Before the flooding in early 1826, the canal company directors and contractors 
sought out individuals with prior experience with the hopes that it would translate to 
successful construction of the Louisville and Portland Canal.  Specifically, the contractors 
turned toward workers with experience in the Erie Canal.  However, while a few laborers 
undoubtedly made their way to Louisville and the canal, the contractors found the task 
difficult to accomplish as numerous factors worked against them.  Chiefly, many laborers 
avoided the project in the wake of 1826 flooding for fear of disease.  Rumors, fueled by 
newspaper reports throughout the region, spread word “that the first workers were 
afflicted by smallpox and other diseases.”156  Low wages, especially in light of disease 
rampant rumors, also made it difficult for contractors to attract quality workers to the 
project.  As a result, the contractors raised their proposed wages from eight dollars per 
month to ten dollars a month.  While this attracted a few workers, the increase lacked the 
needed appeal to fill out the workforce.  Ultimately, the contractors increased pay to 
twelve dollars per month “plus lodging and all the wholesome food and whiskey the 
workers could consume.”157  Countering any notions of dragging work out, the 
contractors also instituted extra incentives for drillers by offering pay per inch drilled.  
For skilled drillers, such an incentive surely seemed enticing. 
Attempts at luring experienced individuals to the canal project did not stop with 
laborers.  By early 1828, the company found itself with construction on the canal less than 
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half-completed and increasing conflict with contractors and subcontractors.  At the center 
of the conflict, workers, contractors, and subcontractors claimed the canal company owed 
back wages and expenses.  Regardless of the validity of the claims, the conflict 
highlighted the precarious situation surrounding the canal company’s finances.  In 
response, the company directors turned toward the tried and true methods to get the 
improvement project back on course and looked to Canvass White.  White, from 
Philadelphia, held the significance of being one of the nation’s leading canal experts with 
experience on the Erie, Delaware, Raritan, and Union canals.  Despite offering to appoint 
White the Chief Engineer of the project, White’s health precluded him from serving in 
such an active role.  However, White “visited Louisville several time to give technical 
advice” ranging from recalculations of work completed to revision in lockgate designs.  
Despite the efforts of the canal company’s directors to bring in leading national canal 
experts, by the end of 1828 the canal around the Falls of the Ohio River remained 
incomplete.158 
 The early months of 1829 opened to increasing financial difficulties for the canal 
company.  Within the first months of the new year, the canal company called in all 
remaining pledges for stock shares purchases and consumed nearly all its available 
finances.  With a vested interest in seeing a successful completion of the canal, both the 
Kentucky legislature and Congress acted with assistance for the company.  Upon 
determining that work could not be completed without additional resources, the State of 
Kentucky passed legislation amending the canal company’s charter by increasing the 
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capital stock by one thousand shares while also authorizing the company directors to 
borrow money.  Due to difficulties in 1826 and 1829, mostly over flooding and lack of 
workforce, the canal company also found itself with numerous forfeited shares in the 
company.159  Although the Kentucky legislature acted swiftly to increase the capital stock 
of the canal company, with numerous shares already in forfeiture the state authorized 
increase provided little to no relief for the company.   
 While the state legislature sought to extend mechanisms to the private canal 
company, the increase in capital stock proved ineffective with few potential shareholders 
in the general public willing or able to purchase the stock.  Like Kentucky that held a 
vested interest, that of the benefit of its citizens, in the completion of the improvement 
project, the national government also held a vested interest in the project on behalf of the 
betterment of the nation’s citizens.  While the national government previously came to 
the aid of the canal company by purchasing shares that provided a necessary influx of 
money, the canal company found itself in familiar territory, again lacking the needed 
funds to complete the canal’s construction.  This time around, the national government 
found its commitment to the project’s completion two-fold.  On one hand, the same 
commitment to assisting the improvement of the nation’s citizens and society remained a 
steadfast rationale for investing in the canal company.  On the other hand, the national 
government found itself as a stakeholder in the private company using money entrusted to 
the national government by the nation’s citizens.  As such, thousands of citizens’ dollars 
remained at risk in the possible failure of the canal company.  In this manner, whether the 
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national government remained convinced any true merits of the canal remained largely 
irrelevant.  The only hope of recovering the citizen’s investment in the Louisville and 
Portland Canal Company rested with exercising governmental authority for further 
investment in the canal company.  As such, in March 1829, Congress authorized the 
purchase of forfeited canal company shares totaling $133,500, comprising the increased 
capital stock authorized by the Kentucky legislature.160     
 
Reversal of National Politics and Improvement 
 
 With Congressional approval for the purchase of the forfeited, stock in hand, the 
canal company directors expeditiously awarded new contracts totaling $150,000 for the 
completion of the canal.  Unfortunately, the quick response by the Kentucky legislature, 
Congress, and the canal company directors came to naught.  The old Adams and Clay 
national political alliance supporting internal improvement project and other mechanism 
of economic development fell under attack.  The culmination of the national political 
shift resulted in the election of Andrew Jackson.  To Jackson, defeating the Adams 
administration served as a repudiation of ever-increasing corrupting powers of private 
interest in government.  Whether as an act of retribution or of political ideology, 
President Jackson rarely allowed a bill supporting internal improvements of 
transportation to cross his desk without vetoing it.  When the legislation authorizing the 
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purchase of the forfeited Louisville and Portland Canal Company arrived on Jackson’s 
desk he refused to sign it.161       
 Jackson’s refusal to sign into law the authorization of forfeited canal company 
stock highlighted the national conflict over competing ideologies of a positive 
government.  While Adams and Clay sought to develop and strengthen a national 
government and serve all the nation’s citizens through legislation aimed at mechanisms 
that facilitated economic and social growth, Jackson saw the centralization of power 
within a national government to be the manifestation of corrupting influences and opened 
the door to regional, sectional, and individual interests.  To this end, Jackson thought it 
irresponsible for the national government to find itself wrapped in matters of state 
governments or private companies.  In Jackson’s estimation, congressional authorization 
of the forfeited canal company stock entangled the national government with state 
government and private company matters.  Further, because the Kentucky legislature 
conveyed the rights to charge tolls on the canal to a private company, Jackson felt it was 
it improper for the national government to utilize the authority and finances entrusted to it 
by the citizens of the country to assist private company development.  Historians Leland 
R. Johnson and Charles E. Parrish captured Jackson’s thoughts in summarizing his veto 
response to Congress, ‘The power which General Government would acquire within the 
several States by becoming the principal stockholder in corporations… and giving a 
proportionate vote in all their elections, is… in my view dangerous to the liberties of the 
people.’162  Although President Jackson’s veto staved off further investment in the 
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Louisville and Portland Canal Company for the time being, it did little to remove the 
finances already extended by the national government.  As such, the financial investment 
of the citizens of the United States, via the national government, remained tied to the 
success or failure of the canal company.    
 The news of a presidential veto shocked the canal company directors and left them 
scrambling to keep the company and the construction project alive.  While the 
presidential veto did little to help attract new investors, the company directors ordered a 
prospectus demonstrating the profitable viability of the company once the canal opened.  
Additionally, with prior attempts at securing large-scale investors to purchase company 
stock resulting in mixed success, the canal company directors added a new twist to 
attracting prospective investors.  The company turned to borrowing money from willing 
lenders with the option of receiving canal company stock as repayment.163  With 
prospectus and borrowing approach in hand, the directors again turned to private 
capitalists to secure the future of the canal.  Fortunately, for the canal company, efforts at 
drawing eastern investors paid off as the prospectus caught the attention of Thomas 
Hulme.   
Hulme, then residing in Philadelphia, made his name in bleaching and coloring 
fabrics in England.  Hulme grew frustrated over English politics, especially confiscatory 
estate taxes, and immigrated to the United States and arrived in Philadelphia in 1817.164  
Perhaps by providence, Hulme embarked upon a trip down the Ohio River seeking out 
investment opportunities and consequently became all too well acquainted with the 
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obstacles affecting travel on the Ohio River.  When the canal company directors arrived 
in Philadelphia in 1829 seeking investors, Hulme, with intimate knowledge of the 
obstacle facing river transportation at the Falls, jumped at the opportunity.  Employing 
their new strategy to make the canal company a viable investment opportunity, the 
directors appealed to Hulme for a loan of $100,000 rather than purchasing company stock 
in installments.  The immediate infusion of capital allowed the canal company more 
maneuverability in dealing with contractors and resuming the canal’s construction.  In 
exchange for the loan, the directors offered Hulme the opportunity to accept repayment in 
the form of company stock, if he preferred.  Additionally, the directors sweetened their 
offer by appointing Hulme a director in the canal company.  To the canal company, the 
investment of money by Hulme created a vested interest- only as long as he remained 
unpaid- if he chose repayment rather than stock.  Enticing Hulme to opt for repayment in 
stock concretely vested him not only in the short-term completion of the canal but also 
the continued fortunes of the company once the canal opened for business.  Hulme agreed 
to loan the canal company to $100,000 in cash, equaling approximately a thousand shares, 
and accepted appointment as one of the company’s directors.  The transaction and 
subsequent repayment in company stock resulted in Hulme becoming the largest investor 
in the company.  With the much-needed money in hand, the directors refocused their 
efforts on construction with excavating resuming in early 1830.165          
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The Operation of a Canal 
 
 While the canal lacked finalized construction details, the canal company actually 
opened in early December 1830, complying with the original charter legislation requiring 
the canal’s completion no later than January 1831.  The canal lay two miles long with 
three locks.  The bottom of the canal channel lay over one hundred feet from the top of 
the levees, with the tops of the levees spanning two hundred feet of water.  The canal’s 
significance was not lost on the nation, as it was “the first major improvement to be 
successfully completed on the great central river system of the United States.”166  
Situating the importance of the canal within the national context, Trescott wrote, “By 
comparison with the Erie Canal and other eastern projects, is was gigantic in dimensions 
– ‘having a capacity equal to that of 25 common canals’ – and became a cynosure of 
tourist interest.”167  The size and the scope of the canal reflected the growing reliance 
upon water commerce and the resulting increase in both vessel size and cargo and in 
vessel quantity plying the Ohio River.  To the people of the Ohio Valley region, 
specifically Louisville and Kentucky, the canal represented the ingenuity of society, 
positive government, private economic investment, and the improvement of nature to 
more accurately reflect modernity.  
Despite the addition of Hulme and his financial resources, Trescott maintained, 
“This sum was sufficient to get the canal opened in December, 1830, but it was still 
unfinished and the company had to borrow more money in 1831.”168  The Kentucky 
legislature passed legislation approving an unlimited increase in capital stock on the basis 
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that the sale of additional stock went toward any remaining completions needed on the 
canal in addition to payments of interest on outstanding loans.  Attempting to get its 
financial matters in order, the canal company found itself $190,000 in debt  but with an 
operating canal in 1831.  However, even the most skeptical now admitted that the 
company stood to make a healthy sum with the canal in operation.  As such, most of the 
creditors responded more than willingly to the company’s offer of payment in the form of 
stock shares in the Louisville and Portland Canal Company.  So positive was the response 
that of the $190,000 outstanding debt, the company settled $172,000 with payment of 
shares.  Not to be forgotten, with the completion and opening of the canal, the national 
government held $290,000 in capital stock of the privately held canal company.169  
 
Corruption of Public Good for Private Gain or Economic Reality? 
 
Despite the proliferation of traffic on the Ohio River during the antebellum era, 
the opening of the Louisville and Portland Canal did little to reduce the already steadily 
dropping costs of transporting commerce on the Ohio River and Mississippi River 
networks.  For those transporting goods on the Ohio, hopes of cost savings with opening 
of the canal at Louisville proved unfounded.  The savings resulting from no longer 
needing to portage goods around the Falls now filled the coffers of the canal company as 
those hauling freight now paid toll for passage through the safer canal route.  While the 
canal removed much of the volatility of the Falls, little savings materialized with the 
canal’s creation.  Further, although the proclamations of greatness at the opening of the 
canal heralded a new era of commerce on the Ohio River, almost immediately the canal 
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company began fielding complaints concerning the restrictive size of the canal when 
compared to the ever-growing size of transportation vessels.  The complaints would set 
off a continual battle throughout the nineteenth century between advances in water vessel 
technologies that allowed greater shipping volumes and cost effective expansions and 
revision to the canal addressing the changes.  Specifically, as the canal company adjusted 
toll rates to cover improvements to the canals, shippers sought to move greater volumes 
through the canal at a given time to offset the toll rate increases.   
Admittedly, profitability arising from tolls remained elusive in the first years of 
operation.  However, the company thereafter began realizing a significant profit such that 
by 1837 the company raised toll rates from twenty cents to sixty cents per ton.  By 1839, 
the canal hit full stride with 300,000 tons of boats, people, and goods passing through the 
canal.  Although dramatically rising profits reassumed shareholders, commercial 
transporters utilizing the canal found the tolls unrealistically high and ever on the rise.  In 
1833, boats passing through the canal paid forty dollars on average.  Only five years later 
in 1838, using the canal cost nearly double. Despite the realization of profits, the canal 
company found itself returning to its stockholders less than eight percent per year on their 
stock.170   
For commercial shippers invested heavily in water transportation and the Ohio 
River, profits to the stockholders meant little.  The rapidly increasing toll costs combined 
with the increasing costs of changing technologies hurt their bottom line.  Responding to 
the increased toll costs, commercial shippers remained on the lookout for more efficient 
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and most importantly cheaper means of bypassing the Falls and the canal with some 
reverting back to portaging goods around the Falls.  While on the watch for cheaper 
alternatives for transporting goods, the growing commitment to water commerce placed 
added burden to those plying the rivers.  As such, those heavily involved in utilizing the 
Louisville and Portland Canal and forced into paying tolls petitioned the national 
government for relief.  Referring to the significance of the canal and its controlling 
private company, Salmon P. Chase declared, “they were in possession of a completed 
Canal – the lock and key of communication between the Upper and Lower Ohio.”171  
Concerns over the centralizing power resulting from private control of the canal 
continued to grow.  The Kentucky legislature echoed the petitions of commercial interests 
by calling upon the national government to take over controlling interest in the canal.  
Underscoring the heightened tensions over the matter, reports of current stockholders 
willing to sell their shares, at reasonable rates, to the national government surfaced.  In 
part, the stockholders stood to lose if the national government took over the canal without 
purchasing their stock.  Additionally, stockholder attentive to their finances feared 
renewed interests from competing states and private companies seeking to resurrect canal 
construction on the Indiana side of the Falls.172  In the end, if the national government 
took over the canal without reimbursing them, or the canal on the Indiana side 
materialized, the stockholders of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company stood to 
suffer significant losses to their investments.   
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In June 1836, the United States Senate passed a bill endorsing a buyout of the 
private stockholders of the canal company with the hope of limiting, if not removing, tolls 
at the canal.  Despite the intention of the Senate to respond to the petitions concerning 
tolls, the bill died in the House of Representatives.  The death of the bill resulted from a 
coalition of seemingly unlikely cohorts.  Although individuals petitioned the national 
government for relief, not all petitioners purely represented the ideas of holistic public 
good.  Old tricks died hard as the growing concerns over tolls at the Louisville and 
Portland Canal developed.  Regional, state, and private interests again revived the idea of 
an Indiana side canal.  In fact, the Indiana legislature only shortly before the introduction 
of the Senate bill enacted legislation chartering a new canal company.  As such, the most 
significant concerns arose from Indiana interests.  As the coalition for the construction of 
an Indiana side canal pandered to those involved in river commerce for support, they also 
joined in petitioning Congress.  Reviving the old competing interests, the Indiana 
contingent fought the idea of national government buyout limiting their ability to 
construct and operate a competitive canal on their side [the North side] of the Falls.   
In addition to the Indiana contingent, opposition concerned with the 
constitutionality of Congress’ actions surfaced.  In part, this group echoed the stance 
argued by Jackson concerning the role of the national government in private business.  
More significant to the group, however, was the perceived invasion of state rights by 
authorizing the purchase of a private company with finances given to the national treasury 
by all the states.  In their minds, such actions by the national government offered no clear 
advantage to states not connected with the Ohio River system and, above all, rested 
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outside of constitutional authority.  Further, they argued, even if the actions proved 
constitutional, the future operation of the canal by the national government would 
undoubtedly be less efficient than under private control.173 
While the coalition in opposition to the national government further funding the 
canal company ultimately was triumphant in defeating the bill, the increasing outcries 
against canal tolls at the Falls signaled a shift in public opinion.  During the formative 
years of the region, when its population needed improvements at the Falls to assist 
expansion and development, the region’s population supported the construction of the 
canal.  However, desires and needs changed with a canal in operation.  For commercial 
and individual interests alike, the operation of the canal and collection of tolls by private 
entities became both a symbolic and a real restriction to free flowing river commerce and 
communication.  For citizens of the adjacent state of Indiana, chartering the canal under 
Kentucky jurisdiction provided little benefit for either economic or social development.  
For citizens and surrounding states, with a privately operated canal in operation, the 
promise of river improvement for water transportation and regional development now 
symbolized the restrictive accumulation of power by private capitalists.     
The canal presented obstacles for those involved in commercial endeavors on the 
river also.  Changes in shipping and boat technologies put larger boats on the waterway.  
Unable to match the pace of technological change, the canal became restrictive with many 
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ships reverting to offloading cargo into Louisville and bypassing usage of the canal.  For 
the shippers, the canal no longer fit their needs as the canal’s size restrictions forced them 
to decide between relying on smaller ships to fit through the canal or bigger ships with the 
prospect of offloading at Louisville and bypassing the canal altogether.  No matter the 
decision made, the canal left commercial interests on the river paying more in tolls or 
more for the portaging of goods around the canal.  It was with these negative aspects in 
mind that the petitions reached the floor of Congress and soundly defeated the funding 
bill. 
Growing opposition, coming from all corners, to the privately held canal signaled 
a shift in the Ohio Valley region and the nation’s perception of the purpose and usage of 
the canal.  With the canal seemingly representing an obstacle to economic and societal 
development, the company directors displayed an astute awareness of the changing 
climate.  As financial investors, the directors realized that construction of a competing 
canal stood to inflict financial damage.  The opening of an opposing canal held the 
promise of toll competition between the two canal companies that would lower the profits 
of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company.  Further, the construction of a competing 
canal provided the opportunity for the integration of new technologies in canal operation 
as well as modifying canal size while directly addressing the growing concerns over the 
limiting size of the Louisville and Portland Canal.  The result of such adaptation stood to 
indisputably drive business away from the Kentucky chartered canal company.174   
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The growing sentiment against the tolls on the Portland and Louisville Canal 
amongst the region’s citizens echoed the political shift occurring on the national stage.  
President Jackson implemented his ideology of the role of government through vetoing 
the appropriation of national government finances supporting private companies.  
Jackson, using veto power, sought to limit those seeking to utilize the government to 
funnel resources and authority to private business.  To Jackson and likeminded 
politicians, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 promised to make the nation’s waterways 
free of tolls.175  The enforcement of such tolls on the waterways only inhibited expansion, 
development, and utilization of the waterway.  While the Kentucky legislature broke from 
this spirit in conveying the authority to place tolls upon the users of the canal to the 
private company as an enticement for the canal’s construction, by the 1840’s the authority 
to charge tolls to the Ohio River and Louisville and Portland Canal users increasingly 
served only the interests of the private company.  To this end, the region, nation, and 
Ohio River users stood ready for the removal of toll charges at the canal.   
Despite the general readiness, by all but a few investors, to remove tolls at the 
Louisville and Portland Canal, the private company status provided the directors with the 
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money for defense and other national interests.”  For further discussion of Andrew Jackson’s thoughts on 
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legal authority to enforce the tolls.  However, while the directors of the canal company 
proceeded with operation of the canal, individual investors developed a strategy to 
neutralize the numerous opposition forces and at the same time return a profit on their 
investments in the canal.  Primarily, the company appealed to the Kentucky legislature in 
a memorial expressing their concerns over calls by Indiana and others interests for the 
national government to offer a remedy by building a competing canal.176  The canal 
company did not completely disagree with the injurious petitions by others.  Specifically, 
in presenting the memorial to the Kentucky legislature, the canal company wished to 
show that it was most interested in seeing the waterway eventually rendered free from 
tolls.  However, the company faced ruin and inability to pay its shareholders in the event 
that Congress or any other governmental authority incorporated a new canal company at 
the Falls.  
Sensing the shift concerning public support of private improvement projects and 
the door closing to national government investment, the investors proposed a remedy to 
the Kentucky legislature.  To correct the situation, the company devised a plan to “avert 
all competition by a disposition of their stock, which promised to make the Canal 
ultimately free and at the same time to secure to the stockholders ample return.”177  The 
consolidation of stock into the hands of fewer and fewer shareholders relieved many of 
their commitments to the canal company while easing the complicated process by which 
the government moved toward sole ownership of the canal.  While the altruistic plan to 
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free the canal, and subsequently the Ohio River, from the shackles of tolls served the 
good of the society, the investors most certainly held financial motives.  Under the 
repurchasing plan, only the company directors held the authority for reacquisition of the 
capital stock.  The company directors held in trust the collected stock until the directors 
repurchased all other company stock.   
With the Kentucky legislature convinced of the virtues and inevitability of free 
passage through the Portland and Louisville Canal, legislation authorizing the company to 
apply all yearly profits solely toward the repurchasing of company stock materialized in 
January 1842.  Although the company sought, and received, the authority from the 
Kentucky legislature to buy back company stock at inflated prices rather than paying 
dividends, the consolidation of shares into the hands of a few left the few with stronger 
bargaining power and greater financial rewards.  With the authority of the Kentucky 
legislature, the canal company put the plan into action repurchasing only as much 
company stock as the net earnings from each year provided.178  Significantly, any 
involvement or authority arising from the national government remained missing from the 
plan and subsequent state legislation amending the canal company charter.  As such, the 
Kentucky legislature authorized the canal company’s plan to allow the national 
government to purchase the canal and remove the tolls without Congressional consent or 
intentions of buying the canal.  Unfortunately, the canal company directors’ plan did little 
to improve conditions for all pleading for governmental relief and removal of the 
economic burden of the canal tolls.        
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Despite offering no immediate relief from tolls, the canal company continued 
upon its course of buying back its stock.  With favorable economic conditions and traffic 
through the canal between 1843 and 1855, the company made steady progress toward the 
stock purchase.  The consolidation of the stocks continued until 1855 when the company 
held in trust all capital stock, excluding one share for each director.  The charter 
incorporating the canal company required each director to own shares in the company as a 
measure of financial accountability.  For others not so protected by the charter, 
repurchasing of their stock by the canal company left them contemplating the significant 
loss of potential revenue and illustrated the economic power the canal tolls provided to 
the company directors while highlighting a fear of governmental oversight.  Historian 
Paul B. Trescott identified one stockholder commenting on the topic in 1854.  The former 
shareholder wrote,  
Thus are my individual interests all retired from that company, and I fear I shall 
never be able to find as good an investment for the money as that has been.  And I 
understand that another year will pay off all the private stockholders, when I 
suppose the concern will fall into the hands of some democrat pet of the 
Government, and of course go to the dogs.179     
 
Regardless of the rumination over lost economic opportunities by prior 
shareholders, the work of reacquiring canal stock consumed thirteen years of company 
efforts, culminating with the report of the final shares repurchased in 1855.  In January 
1855, word reached United States Secretary of the Treasury James Guthrie that the canal 
company finalized the acquisition of the individual shares of stock and held them in trust 
for the national government to purchase and convert the canal into a publicly held entity 
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under the authority of the national government.  While initial communication from 
Secretary Guthrie contained a sense that the finalization of the conversion by the national 
government remained a mere formality, true finalization remained elusive.180   
The directors remained in control of the operation and management of the canal 
while waiting for the government’s buyout of the canal company to obtain approval.  On 
the suggestion of Secretary Guthrie, the canal directors reduced tolls by half, dropping 
them to twenty-five cents per ton.  While the reduction in tolls seemed to calm tensions 
for the short term, little evidence exists to show any increase in traffic resultinged from 
the reduction.  Additionally, Secretary Guthrie sought to address concerns over the 
operation of the canal by authorizing the company to use surplus revenues for canal 
improvements and repairs.  While the Secretary authorized repairs on the canal, he 
explicitly directed the directors of the canal company not to undertake any projects aimed 
at enlarging the canal.181   
Secretary Guthrie’s involvement with the canal company seems rather 
questionable.  James Guthrie’s connections to the Louisville and Portland Canal emerged 
long before his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury.  Guthrie numbered among the 
charter members of the canal company when the Kentucky legislature incorporated the 
company.  Accordingly, Guthrie’s allegiance fell squarely with the Ohio River region, 
specifically Louisville proper.  As an aspiring attorney, Guthrie rose to prominence and 
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represented Louisville in the state legislature where he supported improvement-friendly 
legislation and action.  During the latter part of the 1820’s and through the 1830’s, 
Guthrie also served the canal company in a dual role as both a director and company legal 
counsel and successfully fought off numerous contractor claims against the company 
prior to 1840.182  However, by 1850, John Hulme’s self-imposed removal from the canal 
company left the door open for the ascension of Guthrie to the top position within the 
canal company. 
Guthrie more than adequately filled the position vacated by Hulme.  By 1850, 
Guthrie had risen through the ranks of Louisville elite, becoming the largest landowner in 
Louisville with over two hundred acres in his possession.  With his social ascension 
gaining statewide notice, Guthrie received word that Kentucky governor Lazarus Powell 
wished to appoint Guthrie successor to Henry Clay’s Senate seat in 1852.  Guthrie 
declined the appointment despite the prestigious nature of the offer.  President Franklin 
Pierce called upon Guthrie to accept appointment as Secretary of the Treasury in his 
administration and Guthrie found President Pierce’s offer too good to pass over.  Guthrie 
accepted the offer and placed himslef squarely at the center of the Louisville and Portland 
Canal transfer plan.  Guthrie stood to make both significant financial and political gains 
with the successful navigation of the canal from private ownership to public ownership 
and operation.  For the canal company, and in the most optimistic of eyes, Guthrie’s 
appointment paved the way for the final realization of safe, and more importantly, free 
passage through the Falls of the Ohio.183       
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When the matter of finalizing the transition appeared before the national 
government in 1853, Secretary Guthrie lacked the authority to finalize the purchase of the 
canal.  As such, Guthrie understandably stopped short of any financial transaction 
between the national government and the canal company.  However, Secretary Guthrie’s 
actions, on behalf of the national government, ultimately held no legal authority, 
rendering his suggestions of toll rate reductions and authorizations of canal revenue usage 
as nothing more than suggestions.  Since the national government held capital stock in the 
company, due to the initial financial assistance under the Adams administration, Secretary 
Guthrie may have held the authority to represent the national government’s interests in 
the canal company.  Even if this scenario were the case, questions remain over the 
constitutional origins conveying authority to Secretary Guthrie in representing the 
national government in the canal company, as no legislation originating from Congress 
nor any executive order originating from the President currently known details such 
authority.  Despite the perceived questionable constitutionality of Secretary Guthrie’s 
actions, no significant concerns appeared in the historical record and the citizens and 
government of Kentucky, surrounding states, and the directors of the canal company 
seemingly accepted without reservation Secretary Guthrie’s recommendations and 
directives.  As the matter stood in 1853, the canal company found itself holding in trust 
all company shares, a national government debatably unable or unwilling to purchase the 
canal company, and tolls still assessed for those using the Louisville and Portland Canal. 
Despite Secretary Guthrie’s directives to the canal directors, the national 
government’s unwillingness to purchase the company left the entity in limbo.  Legislation 
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presented to Congress in 1854 authorizing the President to finalize the purchase and 
assume control of the canal passed in the Senate but failed in the House of 
Representatives.  The introduction of the bill in 1854 began a repetitive cycle covering 
the next twenty years before a final resolution completed the transfer of canal 
ownership.184   
 
Treading Water at the Falls 
 
 Despite Secretary Guthrie’s close connections with the Louisville and Portland 
Canal Company, matters of greater national importance continually pushed the 
governmental purchase of the canal to the side.  While repeated attempts to remedy the 
canal’s affairs surfaced before Congress, the sectional crisis loomed on the nation’s 
horizon.  While polarizing issues such as slavery, states’ rights, and economics 
increasingly dominated the national political stage, usage of the Portland and Louisville 
Canal remained important to commerce on the Ohio River.  Although the canal company 
directors, with the assistance of Secretary Guthrie, sought to complete the transition of the 
canal to governmental control, the inaction by Congress and the President left the canal 
directors locked in perpetual uncertainty. 
 By 1853, the canal directors found the canal falling into great disrepair and further 
behind the technological curve.  With the capital stock repurchase winding down, the 
canal company began diverting profits toward repairs on the canal.  Specifically, Guthrie 
applied the funds toward repairing “crumbling locks and widening the canal from its 
restrictive fifty-two foot width.”  Examining the effects of the finished repair and 
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widening in 1856, Historians Leland R. Johnson and Charles E. Parrish declared, 
“Guthrie’s project made the canal a useful adjunct to military logistics during the civil 
war that followed.”185   
Guthrie effectively maneuvered between the role of Secretary of the Treasury and 
one of the canal company directors and select few remaining shareholders.  Using 
political influence, Secretary Guthrie kept the national government purchase of the canal 
constantly before the minds of congressmen and the executive branch.  At the same time 
Guthrie served as secretary, he continued serving as one of the directors of the canal 
company and set forth an agenda to focus on maintaining and upgrading the canal.  
Guthrie realized allowing the canal to fall into disrepair would worsen the company’s 
position of attempting to convince the national government to purchase the canal.  If the 
canal fell too far into disrepair, its economic viability greatly diminished.  First, to repair 
the canal to operable standards undoubtedly would require significant investment of 
citizen’s finances.  As trustees of the nation’s finances the national government, Congress 
and the president might find it much more palatable to abandon the Louisville and 
Portland Canal for new canal construction.  Further, the costs of upgrading the canal for 
modernizing river transportation technologies grew greater with each passing year that 
they delayed the upgrades.  Without such upgrades, the viability of successful operation 
of the canal became less appealing.   
Additionally significant, with each passing year without governmental purchase of 
the canal, the overall technological changes in transportation modes held great 
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consequence.  With mid-century approaching, a transformation in support of 
transportation modes swept westward.  More cost effective modes of transportation such 
as railroads gained more of the nation’s focus.  Railroads offered greater flexibility as rail 
lines required much less site preparation and leveling, allowed multidirectional layouts, 
promised navigation around significant geographical obstacles with greater ease, and 
remained accessible even in winter.  Encountering natural obstacles such as geographical 
formations creating barriers to regional, state, and national expansion required greater 
ingenuity in problem solving on waterways.  Addressing similar concerns, railroads 
offered the option of simply skirting the obstacle.  Juxtaposed with railroads, canal 
construction proved highly inflexible even with modern technological innovations in 
dredging and construction.  Construction of canals through great expanses that lacked 
waterways proved extremely costly and limited most canal construction to deepening, 
widening, or temporarily diverting from a current waterway.   
Utilizing its authority to assist the canal company and the state’s citizens, the 1857 
session of Kentucky legislature amended the canal company’s original charter providing 
the company with the authority “to construct, with the revenues, and on credit of the 
corporation, a branch canal sufficient to pass the largest class of steam vessels navigating 
on the Ohio River.”186  The actions of the Kentucky legislature provided a greater degree 
of maneuverability for the canal company in order to provide a canal that met the needs of 
the region and states river users.  While the Kentucky legislature did not provide 
economic assistance, it provided new avenues of securing needed funding to improve the 
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canal while not interfering in the canal company’s plan for the national government’s 
purchase of the canal.  Rather, the actions of the Kentucky legislature provided a measure 
of commitment to assuring the canal’s viability until the national government acted.   
Despite the unsuccessful previous attempts at gaining Congressional approval for 
the purchasing of the canal, Guthrie presented for the consideration of Congress a bill 
authorizing $500,000 for further construction specifically aimed at building a branch 
canal and locks to expedite boats passage through the canal in 1857.  Once again, Guthrie 
and the canal company received an unfavorable decision as Congress rejected the request.  
Illustrating the increasingly vitriolic and partisan nature of politics in the 1850’s, 
Louisville newspaper editors blamed the bill’s failure on a political coalition from 
Indiana.  The editors specifically placed the blame at the feet of Indiana Free-Soilers and 
their nominee for president in the 1856 election, John Fremont.187  Surely, the Louisville 
editors concerned themselves more with the likelihood of Indiana boosterism and the 
resulting partisanship favoritism should an Indiana politician rising to the presidency.  
In light of growing social, economic, and political tension, Secretary and canal 
director Guthrie balanced the politics of both roles in maintaining a profitable canal in the 
midst of growing national transitions away from private ownership of waterway 
improvements.  Maintaining the viability of the Louisville and Portland Canal through the 
1850’s proved a significant challenge.  While organizing a political majority in favor of 
finalizing the purchase of the canal remained out of Secretary Guthrie’s grasp, director 
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Guthrie and the canal company persevered through the allocation of revenues toward 
canal repairs and improvements.  Widening the canal to sixty-five feet and opening two 
basins for opposing boats to pass each other numbered among the major accomplishments 
during the 1850’s on the canal.  Although the canal company initiated numerous canal 
revisions, improvements, and upgrades during the 1850’s, technology stayed at least one-
step ahead.188        
 
Improvement through Political Stalemate 
 
In May 1860, with the nation caught in the escalating climate of sectional conflict, 
Congress adopted legislation in favor of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company.  
Finding itself needing to tread lightly, Congress reaffirmed its support of the canal’s 
continued operation but did little concerning the purchase of the canal company.  The 
volatility of governmental action carried the baggage of regional, state, and sectional 
interpretations.  With states’ rights supporters outraged over what they perceived as the 
corrupt use of governmental authority and their opposition likewise concerned, paralysis 
struck Congress rendering it mostly ineffective in conducting the business of the nation.  
For the canal company, Congress addressed their concerns by maintaining the status quo.  
In the joint resolution, Congress took no action pertaining to the governmental purchase 
and operation of the canal.  However, Congress confirmed the viability of the canal by 
voting for the continuation of the canal company as a private company while pledging its 
shareholder votes in support of undertaking significant improvements.  Further, the joint 
resolution confirmed the Kentucky legislature’s amendment authorizing the use of 
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revenues and corporation secured credit for financing the improvements.  Despite the 
positive support lent to the canal company by Congress, additional resolution provisions 
prohibited the company from pledging the “faith or credit” of the national government 
and that under no circumstance should the national government be liable for the 
improvements.  Finally, the resolution also required that upon completion of the 
improvements, the canal company could not collect any tolls in excess of the costs of 
canal repair and management.  Historian Paul Trescott insisted, “The measure assuaged 
the objections of the economy bloc and appeased the state-rights advocates and the 
Indiana interests.”189   
In addition, to appeasing of competing interest groups, the actions by Congress in 
passing the joint resolution of 1860 signaled a shift in the national government’s 
involvement in the canal company.  While the national government provided financial 
assistance in the early years of the canal’s construction and operation, government left 
business decisions to the canal company’s management and directors.  While the 1860 
joint resolution provided no measures to finalize acquisition of the canal, for the first time 
in the history of the Louisville and Portland Canal the national government dictated 
company policy and business plans.  Although the transition did not transfer or finalize 
ownership, the actions of Congress conveyed a quasi-ownership presence through 
providing directives.190  Ultimately, the joint resolution formalized the national 
government’s authority in overseeing the canal company’s management that Secretary 
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Guthrie exhibited through his concurrently held roles as Secretary of the Treasury and 
director of the canal company.  
The shift in congressional actions of dictating company policy and establishing a 
quasi-ownership of the canal by the national government provided tense moments for the 
directors.  Although the national government refrained from taking legal control of the 
canal, by 1860 the consolidation of nearly the entirety of company stock rested in trust 
while awaiting the government’s purchase.  Pointing to the unique nature of the 
collective, historian Paul B. Trescott wrote, “The federal government owned, in fact if not 
in law, 99.95 per cent of the stock, while the management, holding the other 0.05 per 
cent, retained operating control.”191  As such, the directors found themselves acting on 
behalf of the best interests of the national government while also acting upon the interests 
of the stockholders of the private canal company.  While the objectives of the two 
interests often fell into line, the canal directors found themselves with great autonomy 
with a nation severely divided over sections difference and the outbreak of conflict and 
war.  In fact, so convinced of the inevitable purchase of the canal, the canal directors 
ceased compiling and submitting their annual reports to the Kentucky legislature and 
Congress after 1860.192    
 
Canal Operation during War 
 
The outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861 brought more of the same for the 
Louisville and Portland Canal Company.  Company directors juggled the need for repairs, 
maintenance, improvement, and expansion with financial obligations while the national 
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government largely deferred decision-making of canal matters in favor of focusing on war 
matters.  In the absences of financial assistance or congressional and national 
governmental involvement, the directors found undertaking any improvements to the 
canal difficult as the Union threw intensive efforts behind winning the war.  With 
commercial traffic slowed in the first year of war, the canal company faced the necessity 
of raising tolls to fifty cents per ton despite the directive from Congress restricting the 
increase in tolls.  Again, the canal company directors pointed to the lack of action in 
purchasing the company stock held in trust.  Until the canal company received payment 
for the stock held in trust on the government’s behalf, they were under no legal obligation 
to abide by the directive.  Initial increases in tolls temporarily relieved the financial strain 
of undertaking the improvements.  However, by 1863 and 1864, the financial situation 
worsened, reflecting the deepening wartime financial problems.193   
By 1866, the directors stood precariously on the edge of ruin, hemorrhaging with 
over $1,600,000 in debt and unable to continue the improvement constructions, forcing 
the cancellation of the remaining items on the construction and repair agenda.194  
Unfortunately, the canal company found itself back in familiar territory as it lacked the 
finances for much needed improvements and repairs, without investment opportunities, 
and unable to attract the attentions of the national government for financial assistance.  
With a canal in significant disrepair, falling behind the needs of commerce, and 
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financially restrained, securing national governmental assistance remained the only viable 
option despite less than favorable national interest.    
 
Undercurrent of Change 
 
 Fortuitously, the conclusion of the Civil War held great promise for the Louisville 
and Portland Canal and its company.  Although the realities of war left the nation with 
significant wounds, both physically and psychologically, the nation found itself with a 
monumental rebuilding task ahead.  Sustaining significant physical damage from 
conducting the war mainly on its soil, the South faced massive infrastructural rebuilding 
and expanding just to return to prewar conditions.  Despite comprising only a portion of 
the massive reconstruction needed, post-war support shifted toward investment of 
national resources into reconstruction efforts.  While the South suffered significantly 
greater infrastructural damages resulting from the war, regional, and state interests 
throughout the North and West captured the reinvigorated spirit of improvement.  
Although states and territories further to the west faced a conundrum over which modes 
of transportation infrastructure best suite their needs, the massive investment on the Ohio 
River at the Falls remained to significant to abandon.195  
 Focused on assessing the state of the Ohio River system in 1866, the Army Corps 
of Engineers initiated surveys of the Portland and Louisville Canal as part of its Ohio 
River improvement program.  Corps officials, quickly recognizing the importance of the 
canal, became significant supporters of the canal despite the unfinished state of 
improvements.  Although the early days of commerce on the Ohio river system and the 
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canal served a major route between the agricultural activities of the Ohio Valley region, 
by the 1860’s the agricultural and frontier regions of the United States pushed westward 
out across the Mississippi River Valley and onto the Great Plains assisted by railroad 
development.  The population shift lessened the significance of the Ohio River system 
and the Louisville and Portland Canal on the nation.  However, the river system and the 
canal at the Falls continued to provide a vital role in the transportation of the nation’s 
market goods, albeit shifting to shipments focused on “heavy, low-value industrial 
supplies and products.”196    
 Regardless of the transformation in commercial usage of the river system and 
canal, it remained a vital asset of the nation and subsequently garnered great support from 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers.  With the national mood in largely in favor 
of the revival of improvement projects, the Corps appealed to Congress for the needed 
financing to undertake another wave of massive upgrades to the canal.  Highlighting the 
shift in national mood, in 1867, Congress authorized the Corps to proceed with surveys 
and preparation of costs for revision, including a revived plan for an Indiana side canal.  
The Indiana side canal proposal failed yet again, and Congress consented to the resulting 
plans devised by the Corps’ engineers.  The six-year span epitomized a renewed 
cooperative focus by the national government on upgrading the canal to serve the needs 
of society through the second half of the nineteenth century.197 
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While the immediate post-war years provided the conditions the canal directors 
hoped for with the national government finally passing legislation improving the canal, 
the new conditions strained the relationship between the private canal company directors 
and the national government.  While the government authorized the Army Corps of 
Engineers to undertake massive improvement projects on the canal, it lacked the authority 
to do so.  Because the private canal company still held in trust all the shares of the 
company, minus the original investment by the national government in 1829, the national 
government lacked authority to dictate company policy.   
With the ownership of the canal now creating legal restriction to fulfilling the 
objectives of the national government, Congress addressed the matter.  Thirty-one years 
after the canal company directors skillfully created a plan to transfer ownership of the 
canal to the national government while protecting their investment, their efforts proved 
successful.  The early months of 1873 witnessed the national government officially 
beginning the transition with the passage of legislation authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to “assume control and management of the canal and appropriate the necessary 
funds.”198   
Although the legislation provided the mechanism for the purchase of the canal 
with the public’s finances, one hurdle remained.  Despite Congress’ intentions, 
outstanding bonds taken on by the canal company for repairs and improvements to the 
canal remained outstanding until 1866 and created a barrier preventing the national 
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government from fully acquiring the canal.  However, breaking with its past reluctance to 
assume ownership, Congress pressed onward.  In May 1874, Congress authorized the 
Army Corps of Engineers to take over operation of the canal and the Treasury 
Department to acquire all the private company’s shares while paying off all remaining 
outstanding bonds, debts, and other financial obligations of the canal company.199 
In June 1874, with legislation passed by Congress, the national government 
completed the acquisition of the Louisville and Portland Canal from the privately held 
company.  Although an additional eight years passed before Congressional legislation 
officially removed all tolls from the canal in 1880, the national government rose to its 
role of serving the needs of its society through the eventual purchase and operation of 
canal vital to the nation’s internal transportation system.200 
As settlers pushed into the Ohio River Valley region, settlers lacked necessary and 
efficient means of transportation.  Environmentally blessed with the Ohio River and its 
tributaries, the region’s settlers turned to the waterways as viable means of transportation.  
The growth of populations and emergence of market-oriented production increased 
demands upon the region’s waterways, straining them.  Geographic happenstance created 
natural barriers like those forming the Falls of the Ohio and hindered further development 
of the region.  Lacking capital but needing improvements to provide more efficient and 
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safe water-based transportation, citizens, boosters, and government sought means of 
improving nature for their use. 
State and regional governments lacked finances for large-scale improvement 
efforts.  In turn, they used their authority to secure the needed works through the 
chartering of private companies.  Governments conveyed ownership and operation 
oversight of the projects upon completion to the private companies in exchange for 
overseeing the construction of the improvements.  In turn, the private companies sought 
investment from both local and national interest to secure the future of their companies.  
With the legal authority to charge usage fees such as tolls, the companies stood to realize 
significant financial gains.  However, the companies balanced profits with repairs, 
upgrades, and necessary public support. 
The implementation of tolls and other charges by private companies created 
centralization of power while creating new economic barriers for citizens and commercial 
users of canals and other improvement projects.  As the region and the nation underwent 
a shift in views over privately held improvement projects, the national government 
retreated from supporting them financially.  Investors with much to lose with the 
nationalization of private improvement companies struggled to transfer power to the 
national government and protect their financial investments.   
While, undoubtedly, numerous private and public improvement projects failed, 
others such as the Louisville and Portland Canal Company succeeded in significant part 
due to timing of social and political shifts.  Although the private canal company struggled 
with securing necessary financial assistance for providing a canal serviceable for societal, 
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regional, and commercial needs, it greatly benefited from the national post-war shift 
towards expansion, reconstruction, and a revival of the improvement movement.  While 
the private canal company provided the business structure and plan for construction and 
operation, neither the canal nor the canal company seemed likely to succeed without the 
intervention of the federal government.   
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Chapter Three 
Illinois and Michigan Canal:  
Perfecting Nature’s Project 
 
Completion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal fulfilled years of planning and 
struggles to provide the inhabitants of the fertile prairie peninsula with an effective 
connection between two great water transportation routes, the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence waterways and the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers corridor.  Regional and special 
interests sought to secure the construction of a canal across the continental divide and link 
Lake Michigan with the Illinois River.201  Settlers, farmers, and commercial interest alike 
stood to benefit from the economic advantages created by securing a canal that linked the 
interior of the continent with eastern markets via the Great Lakes and the Mississippi and 
Ohio River networks.  However, desire to secure the canal alone proved inadequate.  
Technological limitations, insufficient capital and labor, special interests, and political 
ideology complicated the construction of a canal.  Until citizens, businesses, and 
government addressed each of the limiting factors, an adequate link between Lake 
Michigan and the Illinois River remained elusive.  Only at the time when the factors 
coalesced in the right order did a durable shift in the development of society occur and 
provide the opportunity for the Illinois and Michigan Canal to fulfill their needs.     
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The Incomplete Work 
 
 By the seventeenth century, French colonial ventures reached into the inland of 
the North American continent “in search of water links through the continental interior 
between Quebec and Louisiana.”202  Stretching upward, from present day New Orleans, 
on the Mississippi River and down the St. Lawrence River to the Great Lakes, French 
explorers sought out the vast resources of the untapped continent.  Together, French 
interests “combined imperial strategy and trade with native peoples whom they sought to 
convert to Catholic Christianity.”203   
Like other French explorers focused on inland trading network development and 
religious conversion of the indigenous populations, Canadian explorer Louis Jolliet and 
French Jesuit priest and explorer Father Jacques Marquette set out to explore and survey 
the vast Canadian wilderness.  Their journey carried them through much of the Great 
Lakes region, including much of what would become the Northwest Territory.  However, 
in 1673, Jolliet and Marquette’s journey wove generally southward via waterways, 
ultimately reaching the Mississippi River.  Their arrival at the Mississippi River in 1673 
signaled the arrival of Europeans to the upper Mississippi River corridor.  The discovery 
of the massive inland waterway dissecting, north to south, much of the lower half of the 
North American continent assisted launching the French inland trading industry.  For 
Jolliet and Father Marquette, reports and fears over encountering hostile indigenous  
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peoples further south halted further exploration of the Mississippi River.  Instead, the 
explorers turned their attention northward, and to their return trip.204      
Jolliet and Marquette made their way northward via the Mississippi River, 
reaching the confluence of the present-day Illinois River.  Upon reaching the junction, the 
explorers deviated from the Mississippi River and followed the Illinois River northeast, 
making a short portage to the Chicago River and moving on to Lake Michigan.  Despite 
the loss of Jolliet’s drawings and diary in an incident at the rapids on the Montreal River, 
Marquette’s diaries of the journey capture the thoughts of the exploring duo.205 
Acute insight and awareness of the region’s geographical formation are of 
particular importance in the recordings of Jolliet and Marquette’s explorations.  
Specifically, the portage area between the Illinois River and the Chicago River, ultimately 
reaching Lake Michigan, garnered their attention.  The area held unique natural 
environmental features and drew societies, from the Paleo-Indian era onward, repeatedly 
to the area.   
While the land mass comprising the portage area is small enough to make 
portaging of small vessels acceptable, the area represents a continental divide.  The 
region’s geography provides a natural and uninterrupted waterway from the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, if not for the short distance forming the natural barrier 
of the continental divide.  Thus, waters from the Chicago River and northward drain into 
the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, while waters from the Illinois River drain into the 
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Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.  Upon arriving in the area in 1673, Jolliet 
noted that with waterways to either side of the divide, “it would only be necessary to 
make a canal, by cutting through but half a league of prairie, to pass from the foot of the 
lake of the Illinois [Lake Michigan] to the river Saint Louis [Des Plaines],” providing a 
navigable water passageway to the Gulf of Mexico.206                   
Despite Jolliet and Marquette’s favorable views toward the construction of a 
navigable connecting waterway, another noted Frenchman, Réné-Robert Cavalier, Sieur 
de la Salle thought otherwise.  LaSalle arrived in the region in 1682, leading the effort to 
reestablish French authority in the area after British-supported Iroquois attacks forced 
their retreat from the region.  LaSalle strengthened French dominance in the region, 
resulting in French control of the fur trade in the area.  Resulting from French 
entrenchment, LaSalle gained significant insight on the fur trade and commercial 
navigation on the region’s waterways, including the portage between the Chicago River 
and the Illinois River.  LaSalle concluded that money stood in the way of the canal.  
However, even if the capital existed it would be useless until they undertook additional 
work on the Illinois River.  By LaSalle’s estimate, deepening and widening near forty 
leagues of the Illinois River was the main barrier.  In fact, as historian Michael P. Conzen 
pointed out, “LaSalle was technically correct, and it would be nearly a century and a half 
before anyone gave practical consideration to realizing Jolliet’s broader vision.”207 
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Changing conditions in the struggle for control over the North American continent 
partly consumed the century and a half before serious canal consideration again occurred.  
Similarly to the conflict of European empires discussed in Chapter Two, the confluence 
of multiple empires and indigenous interests in the region resulted in conflict over the 
region’s resources and ultimately culminated in outright violence conflict between the 
British, French, and indigenous cultures.  The British and their Iroquois allies gradually 
wrestled control of the region and its lucrative fur trade away from the French.  The 
gradual removal of the French from the region culminated in the French and Indian War.  
With consequences larger than the regional fur trade, British, French, and numerous 
indigenous nations fought over securing access to resources.  Ultimately, the British and 
British-allied indigenous nations proved victorious in 1763.208 
The aftermath of the French and Indian War left the region firmly under British 
control.  While British expeditions embarked down the Ohio River in order to secure the 
former French outposts and forts in the region, much of the upper reaches of the Illinois 
River Valley and the portage near Lake Michigan remained of lesser importance.  Despite 
the British advances into the Illinois River Valley, conflicting policies and diverging 
views on the status of the British North American colonies lay on the horizon.  British 
North American colonists argued with Parliament and the Crown over funding of the 
troops to protect North American colonial and British interests.  Unlike the attempts of 
unauthorized colonists to venture past the Appalachians and into the Ohio region, few 
reached into the Illinois River Valley.  While larger matters remained more pressing as 
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relations between the North American colonists and the British Empire deteriorated into 
war, settlement of the region by British colonists lagged.209  
In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, citizens of the newly formed United 
States resumed their pre-war push west of the Appalachians.  While the initial wave west 
reached into the Ohio River Valley, settlement further west into the area of the Illinois 
River and Lake Michigan remained sparse.  Despite the lack of an immediate wave of 
settlement into the region, in 1803 the national government established Fort Dearborn at 
the mouth of the Chicago River.  The fort served much the same purpose as the previous 
French forts of the region.  Years of wars between French, British, colonial, and 
indigenous cultures, in addition to western expansion over the Appalachians after the 
Revolutionary War held profound effects on the indigenous populations.  The rapidly 
changing world forced many indigenous societies to migrate westward in hopes of staying 
in front of, and often away from, white settlers.  With the establishment of Fort Dearborn 
in 1803, traditionally located indigenous societies and those newly arrived formed the 
basis of the last profitable fur trading ventures of the region.  Despite the multicultural 
trade network, by the 1820’s a new wave of settlement swept the region.210    
The Right Place, Wrong Time 
 
 Anticipating both the future settlement and economic growth of the area along the 
Illinois River and the Southern portion of Lake Michigan, Peter B. Porter of New York 
proposed the development of a commercial network, reaching from the Great Lakes by 
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way of the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico through a series of canals.  With 
hopes of securing financial assistance of the national government, the proposal reached 
Congress in 1810.211   
With great optimism, a national system of water transportation that included the 
canal replacing the Chicago portage, appeared in 1810 before Congress.  However, no 
legislation materialized despite the grandeur of this a nationalist plan.212  In part, the 
limited population growth experienced by the region in the first few decades stymied 
economic aids such as infrastructural improvements.  For a region based largely on the 
fur trade and using relatively light vessels for transportation, any canal development at the 
time provided little to no great benefit to development.  Further, as settlement migrated 
westward over the Appalachians, through the Ohio Valley, and into the region south of 
Lake Michigan, prime fur trapping and trading regions of the inland shifted further 
westward.  Ultimately, caught for the time between two frontiers, the region lacked 
regional boosters and national support to obtain a canal across the portage.   
In contrast, early efforts at securing financial resources, lands, and governmental 
approval for the construction of the Erie Canal proved more successful in the east.  In 
large part, a greater availability of capital, societal need, and economic development 
concerns reached the critical mass necessary to pressure local, state, and national 
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legislators to push for the canal’s construction.  Far to the west, the region utilizing the 
portage lacked private capital for investment, and held little consequence to the nation as 
a whole in the early decades of the nineteenth century.213 
 As with the Ohio River region, the War of 1812 highlighted the role of waterway 
transportation in the young nation.  Accenting the transformative events of the War of 
1812, Historian J. W. Putnam wrote, “The unfortunate experiences of that war 
emphasized the importance of such a route over which military and naval forces could be 
transported to the northern frontier expeditiously.”214  In other words, an infrastructural 
development of the nation’s transportation provided defensive networks, commercial 
avenues, and facilitated communication between regions resulting in connecting the 
farther reaches of the young nation with the most settled and developed centers of the 
east.  As such, the War of 1812 squarely placed the Chicago portage and future canal 
construction before the nation, despite the sparsity of settlement at the time. 
 Claims to land by indigenous populations limited the influx of settlers to the 
Illinois Territory.  Fears of violent retribution from indigenous cultures against settlers 
flowing into the territory created a barrier regardless of the validity of claims.215  
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Additionally, lands held sovereign by indigenous populations limited migrating settlers’ 
access to land for homesteading, ultimately limiting economic development.  To combat 
this barrier to society development, government officials initiated discussions with the 
respective sovereign nations with the hope of securing land in the name of the United 
States.  In 1816, the national government entered into a treaty with the united tribes of the 
Ottawas, Chipawas, Pottowottomee, among others, securing from them title to lands 
consisting of much of the territory surrounding the southern portion of Lake Michigan 
and the Illinois River Valley.216  To the national government, the 1816 treaty and 
subsequent land cession removed the barrier created by the habitation of the region by 
indigenous peoples.  Not only did the treaty transfer the lands to the national government, 
in turn, the government facilitated the redistribution of the land to private citizens as a 
means of assisting territorial development.  It is of no small consequence that the ceded 
treaty lands contained the region targeted for canal development.  Underscoring this most 
important connection, Putnam stressed,  
Ninian Edwards, one of the commissioners who negotiated the treaty, afterwards 
asserted that the Indians were influenced to make the sale of this land by the oral 
assurance that canal would be opened through it, thereby increasing their 
opportunities for trade.217 
 
Specifically, the lands ceded included a strip “twenty miles wide from the upper Illinois 
River to the mouth of the Chicago River on Lake Michigan,” comprising the portage area 
between the two waterways. 
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 With the treaty approved by Congress, efforts to transfer the lands into the public 
domain proceeded.  The process by which the treaty lands transferred into the public 
domain came as a result of the American Revolution.  As Americans looked to the newly 
secured western lands with anticipation, conflicting claims to the lands limited the 
utilization of the lands in an orderly manner.  The Continental Congress reached a 
compromise after much debate between the states over the issue of claims to western 
lands by Massachusetts, Virginia, and Connecticut.  In exchange for the states with 
western land claims ceding those lands to the national government, all the states ratified 
the Articles of Confederation.  With the western lands in the possession of the national 
government, Congress passed the Land Ordinance of 1785.  The ordinance authorized the 
survey and orderly sale of the lands while also setting the precedent of using surveying 
methods set up on a grid system that included 36 sections per township.218  As a result, 
the 1785 Ordinance provided the procedure by which the lands ceded by the 1816 Indian 
Treaty in the Illinois Territory underwent survey and transfer into the public domain.   
 The national government conducted two additional surveys of the lands.  While 
the initial survey focused on establishing townships and sections for the impending 
onslaught of settlers, the two new surveys focused on topographical information.  The 
resulting surveys both highlighted the importance and ease of a canal’s construction 
across the portage while differing on the more specific details of canal construction that 
would be most advantageous.219  While both surveys called for a canal linking Lake 
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Michigan to the Illinois River, they differed in two primary aspects.  While one survey 
pointed toward construction of a canal, with locks at both ends and fed with water from 
the adjoining Des Plaines River, the other tipped toward construction further to the 
southwest and fed with water from Lake Michigan.  Both surveys offered viable avenues 
for the successful construction of a canal linking the Great Lake system with the 
Mississippi River system.220    
 The generally growing interest in the happenings in the Illinois Territory also 
highlighted the increasing pressure of population growth as the settler frontier encroached 
upon the region.  With government acting on behalf of the strong national interest in 
western expansion and settlement by aiding in the acquisition and conversion of lands for 
their use, the territory also moved toward developing a more responsive government.  
Greatly influenced by John C. Calhoun’s national defensive transportation system plan, 
Congress responded positively to the supporters of statehood, in the Illinois Territory.  
State Whigs, farmers, and commercial interests claimed that the inclusion of the Chicago 
portage in the boundaries of the new state ultimately ensured the success of both the state 
and the canal.  By pushing the border northward, beyond the Chicago portage region, the 
canal and the state linked their futures together.  Further, the nation also stood to gain 
greatly from the completion of the canal as it linked national waterway systems together.  
With the northern border secured, Illinois gained admission to the Union in 1818.221     
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Even as Illinois entered into statehood, the rest of the nation slipped into 
economic difficulties.  The first major financial crisis of the young century hit in 1819 
and signaled an end to the economic expansion arising from the War of 1812.  While 
settlers in the Ohio River Valley felt the effects of the economic crisis as it reduced the 
demand for agricultural goods and cut commercial transportation on the Ohio River, the 
new state of Illinois remained relatively untouched.222  While undoubtedly some 
economic constriction occurred in the state, several key factors limited the reach of the 
crisis.   
Although the effects rippled through the commercial centers along the Ohio River 
and consequently dried up vital capital for numerous improvement projects, Illinois 
remained less inhabited and further behind the economically developed levels of the Ohio 
Valley region.  Further, the Ohio Valley region also suffered from a period of drought that 
dropped water levels on the Ohio River and its tributaries and exacerbated the economic 
crisis within the region; no such significant difficulties arose in Illinois.223  More 
specifically, as Illinois had not taken steps toward actual construction of a canal and still 
lacked a waterway thoroughfare such as the Ohio River, it never had the economic 
development to lose as the Ohio Valley region did.  For Illinois and future hopes of a 
canal, the state’s rudimentary conditions at the time of the financial crisis limited its 
potential and real exposure.         
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Preparing the Frontier for Improvement 
 
The ability of Illinois to weather the economic crisis allowed it to enter the 1820’s 
ready to take advantage of economic investment and development.  By the 1820’s, the 
wave of frontier settlers pushed beyond the Ohio River Valley and into Illinois and the 
eastern reaches of the Mississippi River Valley.  While the greatest areas of settlement 
focused on the southern portions of Illinois, settlers hungrily consumed the fertile lands 
along the river valleys, with settlement reaching up the Illinois River valley to present day 
Peoria, Illinois.224 
While northern areas remained under the habitation of indigenous peoples, 
southern portions of Illinois fell before the homesteader’s plow and axe.  Assisting the 
orderly transfer of the state’s lands from the public domain into private ownership, 
surveyors worked the state from south to north, east to west.  In Sugar Creek, a tributary 
dumping into the Illinois River below Peoria, federal surveyors under Angus Leis 
Landham’s direction “criss-crossed more than five-hundred linear miles of Sugar Creek 
county in two months” in the spring of 1821.225  Historian John Mark Faragher described 
the environment of settlement in the region, “They advanced upon unplowed prairie and 
virgin timber and left behind blazed trees, numbered posts, and mounds of earth, the 
template of a new, rational landscape.”226  The process of applying the township system 
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of land surveying, established by the Land Ordinance of 1785, across the lands of Illinois 
laid the foundation for a society on the move westward. 
With lands surveyed, prospective settlers poured into the area seeking out lands.  
Although governmental support of internal improvements facilitated the movement of 
resources, goods, and people, the national government also assisted the westward push 
through land grants and sales.  The Land Ordinance of 1785 initially established the 
minimum purchase of 640 acres (a full section) for the price of $1.00 per acre with the 
finalized price established at public auction.  Initial land sale efforts ran into several 
barriers.  The minimum of 640 acres left many farmers unable to buy land, while land 
speculators purchased large tracts of land by effectively influencing the government to 
reduce the one dollar per acre requirement.227   
During the early years of the Republic, debate over the nation’s land disposal 
policy raged between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.  Federalists such as Alexander 
Hamilton called for a policy of high land prices in order to deepen the National Treasury.  
They also sought the sale of large parcels of land to speculators rather than the sale of 
small parcels to individual settlers.  Anti-Federalists such as Thomas Jefferson envisioned 
an agrarian nation built upon the idea of individual land ownership.  This plan called for 
disposal of the public domain at modest prices, if not free, to individual settlers.  The 
Anti-Federalist argued that an economically stable nation would develop with the transfer 
of the public domain into private individual ownership.228  
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Throughout the nineteenth century, the national government experimented with 
various methods and requirements of land sales that allowed individuals to realize land 
ownership.  In experimenting with various methods of land disposal, the government 
extended credit to buy land, encouraged sales of large tracts of land to speculators, 
adjusted the area requirements for land purchase from 640 to 80 acres, and tested the land 
market with land prices per acre ranging up to $2.00.229    
In 1803, Thomas Jefferson brokered the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from 
Napoleon and France.  Aside from a constitutional issue arising from the presidential 
purchase of the land from France, the national government found itself with the additional 
problem of managing the massive amount of newly acquired public lands.  In an effort to 
oversee the public domain, in 1812 the national government established the General Land 
Office.  Although matters of the public domain previously resided within the Department 
of the Treasury, the magnitude of lands to manage prompted Congress to authorize the 
creation of the General Land Office.230 
Although historical argument over the success of the government’s land sales and 
use policies still exists today, those individuals reaching westward to the Mississippi 
River corridor undertook settling Illinois and the surrounding region.  Early settlement 
patterns concentrated on the river corridors; along the rivers, streams, and Lake Michigan, 
the settlers found ample forested lands that provided the necessities for survival - shelter, 
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fuel, and relative abundance of wildlife.231  However, as settlements expanded the settlers 
moved further away from the river corridors and out into the open prairie.   
As settlers moved northward toward Lake Michigan and the northern border of 
Illinois, they viewed the region with optimism.  Like much of the continent’s middle 
prairie lands, Illinois held great promise in its fertile soils and natural resources.  
Hardwoods such as oak and hickory lined the river corridors and offered a ready supply 
of fuel and building supplies for settlers.  Despite the lack of timber, except along the 
river corridors and lakeshores, settlers soon began writing to relatives about the potential 
of the prairie soils.  The rich soils that supported a prairie ecosystem held the promise of 
providing tremendous agricultural production.  While early settlers viewed the fertile 
lands with skepticism, they soon found that rendering the prairie ready to grow crops 
required hard work but rewarded them with great fertility and productivity.  With 
woodland growth limited to riparian zones, the Illinois lands often required little intensive 
effort to remove timber for planting.  The soils were highly productive without the need 
to lay fallow, and farmers found crop rotation to eliminate soil exhaustion unnecessary.232   
Interest in infrastructure improvements increased as settlers poured into the region 
south of Lake Michigan.  While the 1810 census recorded only 12,282 people in the 
Illinois territory, by 1830 the number swelled to157,445.  Focused mostly on agricultural 
production, the communities of the area grasped the need for effective means of 
transportation by which to ship their goods to market and needed goods back into the 
region.  Those fortunate enough to settler on the lower sections of the Illinois River found 
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themselves close to the Mississippi River and Ohio River network.  However, settlers 
north of the Chicago portage and the upper portion of the state found themselves limited 
to overland or lake shipment of their agricultural goods.233  In a larger sense, the portage 
area limited the development of Illinois by placing farmers at a distinct economic 
disadvantage to others in the region.  Then again, with future settlement of the northern 
reaches of Illinois almost assured, establishing the state’s northern border far enough 
north to ensure canal placement within the state became of great state interest.  Securing 
the additional lands served as an impetus spurring settlement and development, while 
directly addressing the barrier restricting the region’s development.  
 
Notions of Improvement and Statehood 
 
Regardless of whether the promise of a canal drove settlement and development 
or the opposite, by the 1820’s, a clear contingent calling for construction of a canal 
connecting Lake Michigan and the Illinois River emerged.  While the nation as a whole 
struggled with recovery from the financial crisis resulting from the debts incurred during 
the War of 1812, Illinois turned its attention toward establishing its young government.  
Although providing measures of governance occupied the attentions of the first state 
general assemblies, thoughts of a serviceable canal rested not far away.  The inaugural 
message of the first governor, Shadrach Bond, underscored the importance of the canal in 
the future development of the state.  Bond contended that the canal was of the utmost 
                                                          
233
 Cozen and Carr, eds., The Illinois and Michigan Canal, 7. 
152 
 
importance to the state and once completed would link with the Erie Canal in creating a 
great economic thoroughfare.234 
Despite recognizing the importance of the canal in the development of the state, 
government officials and citizens realized that greater objects stood between them and an 
operable canal.  As a newly admitted state to the Union, Illinois lacked private capital for 
investment in the canal’s construction.  Additionally, with a state government barely 
underway, public sources of capital remained limited or non-existent.  Much like those 
seeking for the construction of the Louisville and Portland Canal at the Falls of the Ohio, 
limited access to necessary funding provided the opportunity for the state government to 
serve its citizens by seeking new avenues for the funding of an improvement project’s 
construction.235           
 Setting the state’s early agenda, Governor Shadrach Bond proposed a means by 
which construction of the canal might become possible.  In giving the state government’s 
and the governor’s inaugural message, Governor Bond presented the idea of petitioning 
the national government.  Governor Bond drew upon the actions of other states and 
territories lacking the necessary private or state funds to undertake such drastic 
modifications to the landscape.  While the state lacked the capital to fund the canal 
construction, Illinois still contained a great amount of unsettled land within its borders.  
As such, Bond proposed petitioning the national government for “a diversion of a portion 
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of the funds arising from the sale of public lands in the state to that object.”236  Although 
no immediate state legislative action resulted from the governor’s proposal, the inaugural 
message linked the fortunes of the state of Illinois with the construction of the canal. 
As presented in Chapter One, by the 1820’s, fervor for public improvement 
projects increased as a responsive national government sought mechanisms assisting 
development in the expanding country.  Often, the national government found itself 
unable to provide financial assistance.  However, in presenting his message to the state, 
Governor Bond’s proposal echoed the growing trend of positive governmental action 
from both a state and national level.   
At the state level, the Illinois government moved onto matters pertaining to the 
canal quickly after extinguishing the immediate issues arising from the new state’s 
creation.  Addressing the canal topic, the General Assembly officially requested the 
national government’s assistance in the canal’s construction.  Specifically, the General 
Assembly petitioned for three key matters.  First, the General Assembly sought the 
authority from the national government to construct the canal through land comprising a 
portion of the public domain.  Second, the state government asked the national 
government to transfer the ownership of the sections of public land that the canal cut 
through to Illinois.  Finally, the General Assembly sought outright financial assistance 
from the national government by transferring the rights to the two percent road fund 
reserved from the sale of lands from the public domain to the construction of the canal.237  
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Together, the three key components secured the future location of the canal, while 
also offering financial assistance.  Through the transfer of the public lands under 
consideration to the state, the state then held the keys to development around the canal.  
The General Assembly envisioned that the revenue obtained from the sales of the public 
lands to private individuals would go toward funding the construction and future 
maintenance of the canal.  Additionally, the Illinois legislative body pictured the lands 
also contributing to the establishment of communities along the canal.  The communities 
promised to provide shipping points along the canal and to transitively spur regional 
development of both agriculture and industry, ultimately utilizing the canal for the 
transportation of their goods to distant markets.  In this manner, the Illinois project 
became a conduit of both economic development as well as community and town 
development.  Although completion of the canal loomed far in the distance, the 
cumulative of the approach created markets, suppliers, buyers, and the network by which 
they interacted.  Further, the request from the General Assembly placed a portion of the 
responsibility for a successful canal at the feet of the national government by transferring 
the rights to the road fund revenue to canal construction.  
In March 1822, Congress addressed the memorial request by the state of Illinois.  
Congress provided a limited amount of direction for the state in its quest for a canal.  The 
Seventeenth Congress approved the land grant request and conveyed the lands comprising 
the zone for future construction of the canal and ninety feet either side to Illinois.  With 
the transfer of title to the state, the national government provided future revenue for the 
canal as the state sold the lands into private ownership.  However, Congress stopped short 
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of the remaining requests.  Instead of transferring additional public lands to the state, 
Congress limited the sale of public lands surrounding the canal’s route.  Further, 
Congress provided the state with the authority to utilize any resources found on the 
reserved lands for the canal’s construction.238  These actions greatly limited the state’s 
avenue of raising revenue for the canal’s construction through sales.  However, one can 
only assume that Congress provided resource rights to the adjacent lands in the hopes of 
limiting the overall cost of creating a canal that linked Lake Michigan and the Illinois 
River. 
 
Establishing the Canal Board 
 
While Congress’s actions limited the ability of Illinois to raise the necessary funds 
for total canal construction, Illinois proceeded with what plans it could.  Returning to the 
Illinois General Assembly in February 1823, discussions pertaining to the canal resulted 
in state legislation establishing a board of commissioners.  Of greatest importance, the 
legislature directed the commissioners to determine the best canal route and calculate the 
costs of the project.239  Executing the directives of the state legislature, the board of 
commissioners undertook the process of surveying for canal routes and calculating the 
project’s costs.   
Due to marshy lands and relatively high water levels on the rivers in the fall of 
1823, only preliminary examinations occurred.  However, the year 1824 brought better 
conditions and witnessed the commissioners completing the surveys and calculations for 
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several route alternatives.  Despite some minor variations, five alternative routes 
projected connections of the Chicago River to the Illinois River, via the Des Plaines 
branch.  Each route varied only marginally in its direction and connections.  Further, cost 
estimates varied relatively little in comparison to the scope of the project with the most 
expensive route reaching $716,110.71 and the cheapest route at $689,746.96, with only a 
difference of $25,363.75 separating the five routes.240 
With the completion of the state assembly’s directives, the picture looked gloomy.  
Although Congress conveyed land rights for the canal’s construction, the state still lacked 
the finances for projected construction costs.  In an effort to provide a remedy to the 
financial shortfall, Governor Coles proposed a rather slow process of canal construction.  
The governor proposed that the state set aside a portion of revenues annually in the hope 
of establishing a fund for the canal’s construction.  While the idea held merit, the state 
legislature reasoned that the deferred construction resulting from the plan negated the 
potential benefits of the canal.  They feared that if years passed before such a fund 
accumulated enough to begin construction, the state faced the risk of falling behind the 
rest of the region in economic growth.241               
In response to their fears, the state legislators again turned to the national 
government and petitioned Congress for the much-needed funds.  The petition seized 
upon the spirit of improvement and focused on the benefits and national scope of the 
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work.  Tied together with the other transportation improvement projects underway or 
recently completed throughout the nation, the completion of the canal in Illinois helped 
form a truly national system.  Perhaps undermining the petition, a fallback option for 
funding also appeared.  Sponsored by Daniel P. Cook, the alternative plan called for 
obtaining the needed revenue from the school fund.  The school fund derived from the 
sale of public lands.  The national government directed a portion of the revenue toward 
the funding of a school within each township.  While unique in its approach, the 
legislation drew little serious interest from Congress and left Illinois still lacking the 
necessary funding.242    
Lacking further assistance from Congress, the state legislature returned to the 
work of creating a working plan for the canal.  In January 1825, the Illinois General 
Assembly replicated a system of canal management and oversight that other improvement 
projects, including the Louisville and Portland Canal, found themselves under.  
Specifically, the 1825 state legislation chartered a private company, the Illinois and 
Michigan Canal Company, for the purpose of constructing the canal across the Chicago 
portage.  Similar to the Louisville and Portland Canal Company chartered by the state of 
Kentucky, the Illinois legislature chartered the company with initial capital stock of 
$1,000,000.  However, the Illinois General Assembly took the private company idea a 
step beyond that of Louisville and Portland Canal Company; the legislature provided the 
company with the authority to increase the capital stock as it saw necessary for the 
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completion of the canal.243  This fundamental difference allowed the Illinois and 
Michigan Canal Company to maintain greater autonomy over construction and financial 
management rather than requiring a return to the state legislature for additional 
supporting legislation. 
Further, the legislative charter of the canal company prescribed the process by 
which the company fulfilled its purpose of constructing and operating the canal.  
Specifically, the charter dictated when the company must begin construction, the latest 
completion date, and the technical details of construction such as width and depth.  The 
specific dimensions of the canal required in the charter included forty feet wide at the 
water’s surface, twenty-eight feet wide at the bottom of the canal, and a depth of no less 
than four feet.244   
With an eye toward securing investors, the charter also authorized the company to 
collect tolls from those using the canal.245  Much like the Louisville and Portland Canal 
Company charter, the Illinois and Michigan Canal Company charter provided economic 
incentive for would-be investors.  The charging of tolls allowed private investors to 
recover their initial investments and at least the possibility of making a profit.  Unlike the 
Louisville and Portland Canal Company charter that capped tolls based upon tonnage 
only, the Illinois legislature dictated tolls by a combination of tonnage and miles of the 
canal used.  Of course, the decision to charge based upon distance travelled on the canal  
rested with the rationale that the Illinois and Michigan Canal covered a far greater 
distance than the Louisville and Portland Canal.  Additionally, other tributaries dumped 
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into the Illinois River and the connecting improvement as the canal knifed its way across 
Illinois.  While the Louisville and Portland Canal only circumnavigated the Falls of the 
Ohio and lacked connecting canals, the Illinois and Michigan Canal stretched a greater 
distance and encountered other waterways, and in the future, stood to connect with other 
canals planned for the region.      
 The company charter also provided a curious additional provision that other 
improvement projects often lacked.  Particularly, the state legislature included a measure 
that allowed the state to purchase the private company in future years.  In detailing the 
company’s charter, James W. Putman wrote, “It further provided that at the expiration of 
fifty years the state might acquire the canal by payment of the actual cost of construction 
and six per cent semi-annual interest from the date of expenditure to the date of 
acquisition by the state.”246  Unlike the neighboring Louisville and Portland Canal that 
lacked such a provision, the state of Illinois and the canal company legislatively sought to 
address future concerns over the viability and sustainability of the canal.  The unique 
legislation provided a sense of security for investors and supporters of the canal with the 
incentive that the state reserved the right to purchase the canal back from the private 
company if the state deemed the purchase in the best interest of the state. 
 Despite the creative Illinois charter addressing some of the significant 
complications and shortcomings of the Kentucky charter for the canal at the Falls, the 
newly created canal company found the odds for success not in its favor.  Longstanding 
advocate of a federally funded and supported canal, Daniel P. Cook staunchly opposed 
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the state’s liberal charter on the grounds that with the state providing the canal company 
such substantial autonomy any hope of securing federal favor vanished.  Notwithstanding 
the abundance of financial maneuverability conveyed by the state legislature, the canal 
company fell short of securing investors willing and able to purchase the $1,000,000 in 
canal company capital stock.  Complicating matters further, Governor Coles joined the 
chorus of opposition to the canal company charter and questioned the benefit of heavily 
investing the state’s resources in a private company.  Erring on the side of caution, the 
governor requested the General Assembly to repeal the company charter.  Facing 
financial difficulties and strong political opposition, the canal company abandoned its 
efforts and the General Assembly followed with the repeal of the charter.247     
 With successes of the Erie Canal becoming more certain and a shift in the national 
mindset culminating in the improvement minded Adams Administration taking the 
Presidential office in 1825, Illinois turned its attention back toward securing federal 
support for the canal.  Much as the case with the Louisville and Portland Canal’s quest 
for federal help, the arrival of the Adams administration revived canal supporters’ hopes.  
Seizing the opportunity, the Illinois General Assembly joined others around the nation 
petitioning the improvement friendly national legislatures.  The efforts of the Illinois 
government found friendly ears as Congress passed legislation in March 1827 supporting 
the Illinois canal project.  Adjusting the limitations of the previous Congressional action 
on behalf of the canal project, Congress provided the state of Illinois with additional 
lands surrounding the canal.  Instead of the limited land transfer consisting of the canal 
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zone and ninety feet either side of the canal and resource utilization conveyed in the 
original legislation, Congress transferred the surrounding public lands.  Specifically, 
Congress transferred ownership of the alternating sections of land, five miles in each 
direction from the canal to Illinois for the sole purpose of constructing a canal linking the 
Chicago River to the Illinois River.  In discussing the 1827 congressional land grant to 
Illinois and accompanying improvement bills for other states, Putman contended, “It was 
in progress of these bills through the Senate that the plan of granting alternate sections of 
public land in aid of internal improvements was evolved.”248  The system of conveying 
alternate sections of public lands for large-scale improvement projects became a facet of 
almost all subsequent land grants and became integral in grants of lands for railroad 
construction throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century.  
 
Early Effort at State Improvement 
 
 The official grant of land for the canal by Congress reawakened spirits and offered 
the first real prospect for the canal’s creation.  Acting quickly, the Illinois General 
Assembly selected the odd-numbered sections on either side of the canal.  In 1829, the 
General Assembly again took up canal matters, passing legislation creating a new board 
comprised of commissioners.  Providing some measure of accountability, the state 
legislature required that the appointment process established the three commissioners.  
The Governor of Illinois held the appointment power in determining the three 
commissioners and required the appointment of new canal commissioners biennially.  
The bill authorized the commissioners with the authority of overseeing land sales, 
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establishing the towns of Ottawa and Chicago, undertaking new surveys for the canal 
route, and preparing construction cost data.249  Despite such ambitious directives, the 
commissioners hired a surveyor and began their work. 
 The early vigor of the commissioners fell prey to old problems.  In a reoccurring 
theme of the quest for large-scale public improvement projects in early settler societies, 
the commissioners’ best attempts at land sales produced a cash flow far below the 
anticipated and needed amount for initiating construction of the canal.  Although by 1829, 
Illinois had witnessed enough population growth for statehood, the population growth 
over the next ten years fell short of the population needed to purchase the lands of the 
canal grant.  While the national government experimented to find the correct balance 
between minimum size of land and price per acre of that land to sell through the General 
Land Office, capitalists purchased large quantities of land from the government.  In turn, 
the speculators subdivided the land parcels and often resold the lands with various 
methods that individuals found more feasible.250  Regardless of settler motives, the reality 
for the canal company remained that their land sales lingered below the necessary levels 
for company operation and canal construction.251 
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Responding to the canal company’s inability to raise enough funds through the 
sale of public lands, Illinois appealed to Congress for a remedy.  The appeal to Congress 
hinged upon the legislative body reclaiming the unsold granted lands at the price of $1.25 
per acre.  In effect, Illinois sought Congressional action that nullified the grant of lands 
and provided instead financial assistance equal to the going rate of public land sales at the 
time.  In this manner, the action provided the financial assistance necessary for canal 
construction while releasing the Illinois government from the responsibility of overseeing 
the sales of their own granted public lands.  Much to the dismay of all involved in the 
canal project, the House of Representatives decisively rejected the proposal and offered 
alternative action.252   
 Adding to the dire circumstances, the canal commissioners continued with their 
orders and sought additional means of funding.  Despite the ability of other canals to 
attract private investors, the commissioners experienced no such luck.  Included in 
proposals put forward, the canal commissioners sought loans from capitalists with the 
hopes of spurring interest and activity.253  The lack of the slightest overture of support 
from the national government, aside from the original grant for the canal, greatly hurt the 
ability of the commissioners to attract willing capitalists.  
 Significant loan proposals did surface from the canal commissioners’ efforts.  
Scouring the eastern United States for investors, the commissioners found willing 
capitalists in New York.  However, the willing investors asked rather steep concessions.  
Specifically, the investors offered funding based only upon five plans they determined.  In 
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this manner, capitalists determined the parameters of the canal project and conditions of 
the financial loan.  The first plan consisted of the state transferring the federally granted 
public lands to the investors, the investors constructing the canal, and owning the finished 
improvement project and granted lands.  The second proposed plan focused on the 
creation of a coinciding railroad improvement company.  Under the railroad company 
plan, the investors demanded the state hold half of the capital stock of the state-chartered 
railroad company.  In addition, the investors called for Illinois to transfer ownership of 
the canal grant lands to the company and the two entities to work jointly for the 
construction and operation of both the ensuing canal and railroad.  The third plan 
proposed focused upon only a loan for the construction of the canal.  While this plan fit 
the objective of the canal commissioners, Illinois rejected the proposed loan.  Because the 
loan called for a repayment term of fifteen years with interest of five percent, neither the 
commissioners nor the Illinois legislature found the plan reasonable.  Much like the 
Louisville and Portland Canal Company chartered in Kentucky, the fourth plan called for 
the incorporation of a private canal company in which the investors would purchase the 
capital stock.  Peculiarly, any measure transferring ownership rights of the land remained 
absent from the plan.  Finally, the fifth plan wove together investment for canal 
construction and land speculation.  The plan called for the Illinois legislature to sell half 
of the federally granted lands to the investors for no more than $1.25 per acre in exchange 
for the investors purchasing one-half of the total capital stock arising from the creation of 
a private canal company.  While each of the proposed plans clearly demonstrated the 
experimentation that occurred in creating avenues of funding and constructing 
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improvement project during the era, each plan decisively aided the investors more so than 
Illinois.  Conversely, with few viable options for pushing forward with the canal, Illinois 
chose against accepting any of the investor proposals.254    
 While the search for investors failed for the time being, the proposals presented to 
the canal commissioners by eastern investors foreshadowed the emerging competitive 
threat from a new transportation technology.  The proliferation of steam locomotives and 
the expansion of the railroads westward provided the nation with many of the same facets 
of commerce, shipping, and communication that water-based transported sought to 
address.  Seeking to secure their investments, capitalists sought to balance investment in 
water transportation projects with rail development.  They presented to the canal 
commissioners funding for the canal while seeking to secure access to resources, land, 
and governmental policies friendly to their plans of future rail expansion.  In highlighting 
the looming competition, historian James W. Putman wrote, “By the beginning of 1831, 
the idea that the railroad was destined to be the mode of transportation of the future was 
gaining adherents in Illinois.”255      
 Canal supporters received another seemingly fatal blow as the chief engineer for 
the canal commission provided a clearer picture of the current economic realities of the 
canal project.  Engineering reports estimated the cost of constructing a canal at 
$1,601,695.83 to $4,107,440.43.  Two differing approaches to canal design accounted for 
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the wide-ranging estimates.  While the more expensive canal drew waters from Lake 
Michigan and contained a deeper channel with an elevation eight feet above Lake 
Michigan, the more inexpensive canal constituted a shallow design.  While more 
economically feasible, the shallow design limited the long-term viability of the passage.  
As such, the cheaper price tag accompanying the shallow canal also held the hidden cost 
of producing a shorter feasible lifespan before vessel size and capacity outdated the canal.  
In stark contrast, railroad advocates approximated the value of a rail line supplanting the 
canal route at $1,052,488.19.  When examining viability of the deeper and more 
expansive canal, the approximately $3,000,000 additionally needed for the canal’s 
construction above the construction costs of a railroad provided an economic barrier the 
state could not accept.  Although the more inexpensive shallow channel canal proved 
competitive in costs, the shorter lifespan resulting from its design rendered the option 
financially unacceptable.256       
With canal construction taking a serious blow, the canal commissioners found the 
feasibility of providing an operational canal slipping away and reported to the state 
legislature.  In 1833, the canal commissioners recommended to the Illinois General 
Assembly that the state should abandon canal construction and instead exhaust all 
avenues for the construction of a railroad.  The canal commissioners based their 
recommendation upon three key issues.  Based upon their information, the cost of a canal 
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loomed too great in the face of the more cost-effective railroad.  The railroad offered a 
technological advantage in confronting the seasonal weather that canal technology simply 
could not adequately deal with.  Because winter temperatures dipped below freezing, 
continual passage through the canal would not be possible.  However, railroads remained 
largely immune to extended periods of freezing.  Remaining open year round promised 
the steady flow of commerce into and out of the region.  Additionally, rail travel held the 
promise of greater quantities of shipped goods in less time.257      
 If early railroad advocacy in Illinois wounded the canal commission, the canal 
commissioner’s report to the General Assembly made canal construction and its 
supporters the equivalency of political poison.  In the face of such anti-canal sentiment, 
ardent canal supporter Governor Reynolds reversed his position.  The governor asked the 
General Assembly to consider the construction of a railroad meeting the same goals and 
improvements as those originally outlined with the canal project.  Reacting to the 
governor’s message, the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation in March 1833.  In 
the act, the General Assembly abolished the board of commissioners responsible for the 
canal and required the return of all assets to the state of Illinois.258   
Despite abolishing the board of commissioners, the General Assembly provided 
no more legislative directives.  As such, the act stopped the state’s pursuit of a canal 
while not initiating a state supported railroad project in the canal’s place.  With the 
pursuit of a canal stopped and no directive aimed at railroad development, the citizens of 
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Illinois, private business, and others of the region still lacked the transportation 
connection they sought.  
 
The State Politics of Improvement 
  
By the beginning of 1834, Illinois lacked a viable and uninterrupted transportation 
connection, via the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River transportation network to the 
markets of the eastern seaboard.  While Illinois struggled over finding a suitable 
transportation connection and a means of funding and constructing the project other states 
found effective means to accomplish similar improvement projects.  In the Northeast, 
almost nine years had passed since the completion of the Erie Canal.  In fact, 1834 
brought a renewal of efforts aimed at expanding and improving the Erie Canal.  Illinois’s 
neighbor to the east, the state of Kentucky and private business found a way to complete 
the Louisville and Portland Canal and brought it into operation in 1830.  Subsequent 
improvements on the Mississippi River and several of its connecting rivers to the west 
paralleled westward migration as states and territories pushed forward with improvements 
for navigation.259   
Although the town of Chicago witnessed a surge in population growth in the four 
years following its first lot sales, as of 1834 the lack of a more efficient and reliable 
connection between the lands south of the Chicago portage and the future Midwestern 
hub of commerce still remained a barrier to growth.  While Chicago held the regional 
advantage resulting from its location on the south shore of Lake Michigan, the barrier 
created by the portage limited the access to the interior lands of Illinois.  In essence, every 
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year Illinois remained unable to come to a resolution over the canal, the state, its citizens, 
and its economic development faced greater risk of falling behind other developing 
regions and states.260  
The converging economic and developmental concerns of the early 1830’s found 
their way into the state’s political realm as the campaign season of 1834 arrived.  With 
Northern constituents concerned over measures that protected their development of the 
Northern portions of the region that included the canal zone, pro-improvement politicians 
sought office in the state legislature.  While long time canal supporter Joseph Duncan 
successfully ran for the office of governor, elections placed others supporting a platform 
of state economic activism in the General Assembly.  Contending, “Time and experience 
have verified to a demonstration, the public utility of internal improvements,” the young 
legislative candidate Abraham Lincoln emerged.261   
To the new Assemblyman, internal improvements held great promise for all 
people of Illinois.  In Lincoln’s view, every corner of Illinois stood to benefit from state 
supported railroad, canal, waterway, and infrastructural improvements.  All such 
improvements facilitated connecting the most rural portions of the state with the most 
highly developed economic centers.  For agriculturalists, the connections provided a 
means of more efficiently shipping crops to markets while making it possible to obtain a 
greater profit margin.  For private business, the improvements offered better connections 
with their suppliers while providing more reliable and efficient modes of shipping their 
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goods.  In other words, with the economic development of the region stood to gain as 
outside investment flowed in.262          
 Although a freshman legislator in 1834, Lincoln received an appointment to the 
committee on Public Accounts and Expenditures.  From his position, Lincoln maintained 
a tremendous vantage point.  There, Lincoln examined the proposals for internal 
improvements in the state and sought strategies to fulfill his campaign promises of 
pushing for state support of improvement projects.263  Lincoln and other improvement 
supporters waiting impatiently for action only waited momentarily as newly elected 
Governor Duncan revived the issue in his inaugural speech.              
  Highlighting the state’s needs, Governor Duncan espoused internal improvements 
throughout his inaugural speech.  Historian James Putman stressed that the matter so 
preoccupied the state and its politicians that the governor dedicated nearly “one-third of 
his entire inaugural speech to an effort to convince the General Assembly that the 
interests of the state would be better served by a canal than a railroad.”264  Governor 
Duncan moved beyond the previously stated issues with prior economic canal 
construction discussions.  Rather than providing an economic solution to the cost 
estimates previously brought before the General Assembly, the governor contended that 
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not just any canal would suffice.  Instead, he sought the construction of a grand canal that 
would serve even the largest of vessels plying the nation’s inland waterways.265  
 Rallying support for his vision, the governor cited three major improvement 
benefits of canal construction over railroad investment.  Most significantly, the governor 
contended that a canal held the potential of linking together the emerging national 
economy and provided Illinois with a prominent role in that economy’s commercial 
development.  Illinois stood to take advantage of serving as the middle ground between 
rural agricultural goods in the territories to the Midwest and West and the purchasers in 
the East.  The construction of a canal would provide additional water to the Illinois River 
and subsequently improve the already navigable and highly utilized waterway.  With the 
additional water flow, the Illinois River stood ready for future expansion and placed 
Illinois with an advantage of spurring further commercial development.  Perhaps most 
controversial, Governor Duncan pitted canal construction directly against railroad 
development and expansion.  The governor contended that a state supported canal 
provided greater autonomy to the state’s farmers.  While monopolistic railroads limited 
shipping options and forced farmers to accept their terms or risk the inability to reach 
their markets, a state controlled canal allowed farmers to transport their own goods to 
market.  Albeit a bit simplistically, the governor seized upon a feared railroad domination 
that resurfaced in the latter part of the nineteenth century with the rise of the Patrons of 
Husbandry, the Grange, and the Populist Party.266    
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While the three advantages highlighted by the governor do not specifically address 
competition from neighboring projects, the matter undoubtedly contributed to his remarks 
on the large scale of the canal project.  Although other improvement projects on the Ohio 
River came online earlier, the projects ran into complications adjusting to newer 
transportation technologies.  While once planned to accommodate the newest vessels, 
projects such as the Louisville and Portland Canal faced reinvestment for modification 
acceptable to the needs and desires of commercial transportation.  If the projects lagged 
behind current needs or their management refused to undergo modifications to 
accommodate the newer technologies, the regions and their waterways risked a retreat 
from the area by commercial interest.  Attuned to the rapidly changing landscape of 
improvement and transportation technologies, the governor’s vision of such a grand canal 
provided a measure greater security for state development and commercial investment.   
 
Bridging the Divide 
 
In 1834, Illinois stood poised to attempt canal construction again.  The citizens of 
the state expressed their desires for improvement projects that aided state development.  
Numerous memorials from the region’s communities reached the Illinois General 
Assembly and urged canal construction.  Citizens contended that access to the waterways 
provided cheaper transportation options than railroads.267  The voters, in turn, elected 
politicians such as Duncan and Lincoln that supported using state governmental authority 
to initiate improvement projects that removed barriers to economic and regional 
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development.  In turn, the newly elected officials actively sought canal construction with 
a renewed vigor. 
  Seizing upon the groundswell of public interest and support for the canal, a bill 
addressing the canal arrived before the Illinois House of Representatives in February 
1835.  The bill called for the establishment of a board of five commissioners with similar 
responsibilities as those from the original canal commission.  The legislation called for 
the commissioners to oversee the construction and operation of the canal.  Additionally, 
the legislature conveyed special authority to the Governor and not to the board of 
commissioners.  The Illinois Governor possessed the authority to conduct negotiations for 
a loan worth no more than $500,000.  Specifically, the General Assembly authorized the 
governor to negotiate with land sales and future anticipated canal revenues arising from 
tolls.  In other words, although the legislature provided a mechanism by which the 
governor utilized profit projections to secure the $500,000 loan, the state legislature 
limited the resources available to negotiate the terms of a loan.  The General Assembly 
viewed the bill with great optimism and although the prescribed number of 
commissioners indicated in the bill underwent scrutiny from Representative Lincoln, the 
bill gained the approval in the House by a vote of 40 to 12.  Making it official, the 
governor approved the bill on February 10, 1835.268   
With the canal bill signed into law, the state proceeded with issuing canal stock 
notes, drawing five percent interest and payable only after 1860.  Seeking the large scale 
investors needed to purchase the majority of the canal stock and secure the loan 
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provisions of the bill, Governor Duncan sent representatives to the eastern financial 
centers of the United States.  Despite negotiations with leading lending houses, including 
Rothchilds, the Illinois envoy returned no closer to securing purchasers of the loan.269   
Although Eastern investors passed on the investment opportunities, the capitalists 
offered encouragement and advice to Illinois.  Witnessing the successful completion of 
the Erie Canal and other improvement projects, the capitalists concluded that the 
proximity of the Illinois project to two major water networks almost assured success.  
Other investors contended the improvement spirit simply stretched their resources too far 
and precluded them from taking on additional ventures if the state of Illinois refused to 
pledge the faith of the state in supporting the investors.  However, further resistance to 
investment stemmed from the five percent interest rate guaranteed by the state in the 
canal stock.  Because interest rates in the United States were generally higher than the 
five percent provided for in the state certificates, investment in the Illinois stock appeared 
less lucrative than other investments.  If Illinois refused to increase the interest rate 
offered on the stock, the state stood little chance of finding investors in the United States.  
As such, the only option for investment at the five percent interest rate rested across the 
Atlantic Ocean.  However, the project also presented great risks to European investors as 
they often viewed projects on the American frontier with a wary eye.270   
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In response to the unwillingness exhibited by potential eastern investors, 
Governor Duncan urgently called upon the General Assembly to provide a remedy to the 
problem.  Despite still believing in a great canal that more than adequately handled the 
needs of commercial navigation, the governor recounted the events of the trip east in 
search of investors.  Upon relaying the discussions with eastern capitalists, Governor 
Duncan highlighted what he perceived to be the remaining obstacles for securing the 
needed investors.  Specifically, the governor viewed the market price of the federally 
granted lands to be more than sufficient, especially as increasing numbers of settlers 
arrived and drove up the demand for the lands.  Further, the governor contended that the 
mood of the national government almost assuredly guaranteed further federal land grants 
to fund the project, if required.  As such, with no fear of land sales falling short of what 
canal construction needed, the governor held no reservations in petitioning the General 
Assembly to pledge the faith and credit of the state of Illinois in exchange for the 
investment from eastern capitalists.271    
 Although the General Assembly quickly engrossed itself in the work of providing 
the measures the governor sought, a vote on an initial bill addressing the governor’s 
wishes failed.  Approximately a month after the governor addressed the General 
Assembly, the legislature passed a bill providing the requested measures on January 7, 
1836.  Specifically addressing the governor’s request, the new legislation provided the 
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governor with the authority to “issue stock for a loan of $500,000 with interest as ‘six per 
cent. annum payable semi-annually.”272   
Despite the role of the governor, and his envoy sent east to secure funding, 
Historian Wayne C. Temple contended a closer examination of the final bill signed by the 
governor contained components skillfully incorporated by Representative Lincoln.  The 
final bill signed into law contained a provision allowing the governor to appoint a board 
of three commissioners.  This stood in stark contrast to the previously failed bill that 
called for five commissioners.  Although Lincoln provided no clear rationale for the 
variation, Lincoln, himself, introduced a similar amendment reducing the commissioners 
to three during a previous version of the bill.  The political struggle over the size and 
scope of the commissioners illustrated the experimentation of both the state legislative 
and the executive bodies.  Further, Lincoln also petitioned unsuccessfully for the 
inclusion of a clause providing the governor executive power to remove canal 
commissioners in the event that the General Assembly was in recess.  Despite failing to 
get the amendment into the previously failed legislation, the Lincoln amendment 
resurfaced by the time the newly created legislation reached Governor Duncan’s desk in 
January 1836.273  Together, the attempts to reduce the number of canal commissioners 
and refine the appointment and removal powers illustrated attempts, by state politicians, 
to be more accountable to their constituents.   
 The state government moved rapidly to establish the new canal commissioners 
after the legislative breakthrough.  Expeditiously, the commissioners sought out and 
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retained the services of William Gooding.  Gooding served as an integral part in the 
engineering of the Erie Canal and came highly recommended.274  Gooding and the 
commissioners commenced with determining the route and depths needed for canal 
construction.  Through their calculations, the commissioners and engineers determined 
that “the canal should be no less than thirty-six feet wide at the bottom of the cut and 
sixty at the water line, with a depth of six feet.”  Such a positive spirit encompassed the 
commissioners and state government that the commissioners extended the construction 
contracts upon the conclusion of the engineers’ calculations and surveys in June 1836. 
The positive spirit remained too little to overcome the financial needs for 
constructing the canal.  Although securing financial investors remained a significant 
target, other financial concerns resurfaced first.  Despite canal construction estimates 
ranging upward in excess of $4,000,000, updated costs for construction of a canal capable 
of handling current and future demands surpassed those previously presented.  
Specifically, newer estimates included an additional fifteen feet in width and one foot in 
depth canal to handle canal traffic.  Engineer Gooding and the commissioners contended 
that despite the extensive costs a lake-fed canal of such scope undoubtedly filled the 
needs of the state, its citizens, and commercial interest into the foreseeable future.275    
In June 1836, the commissioners proceeded with construction plans for the canal 
despite lacking a clear strategy for securing the necessary funding.  They divided the 
canal into three main segments, the Summit division, the Middle division, and the 
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Western division.  With the hope of constructing various portions of the canal at the same 
time, the commissioners broke the three main divisions into even further segments.  The 
more intensive the work in any sub-divided section, typically the shorter the canal 
commissioners made the difficult section.  However, with no solution to the financial 
shortage immediately available, the commissioners adapted their plan to begin work 
closest to Lake Michigan and the growing town of Chicago in the Summit section.  In 
part, the canal commissioners hoped that the initiation of construction on the canal near 
Chicago might spur more settlement and commercial development.  In turn, more 
settlement and commercial development would provide the commissioners with more 
capital through the sales of the granted lands that comprised many of the plots of the 
town.  Additional concern surfaced over the scarcity of labor and the resulting higher 
wages demanded by those the canal commissioners secured.  The final consideration 
centered upon unreasonably high contractor bids for specific portions of the canal.  While 
the commissioners secured several contractors with reasonable bids, other contractors 
increased their estimates for work in large part due to skepticism over the canal’s 
completion.  In response, the canal commissioners anticipated the more experienced 
contractors to finish their work and provide tangible evidence that the completion of the 
canal remained only a matter of time.276  Further, beginning construction with the 
acceptable contractors bought the canal commissioners enough time until labor wages and 
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material prices dropped enough to allow the unacceptable bids of the other contractors to 
fall in line with the estimates of the canal engineers.           
Much to the dismay of the canal commissioners, several of the approved 
contractors forfeited their work before the official construction even began.  While not 
the start of construction the canal commissioners wished for, the forfeitures by several 
contractors actually provided the canal project with a minimal financial increase.  After 
accepting the contractors’ bid, the canal commissioners insisted upon the adherence to a 
contract that required contractors in violation of the contract to forfeit a penal bond 
established before work began.  The forfeiture clause bound the contractors to a penalty 
of five percent of the original contract amount.  In this manner, the canal commissioners 
sought only serious bidders and held them financially responsible for progress on their 
portion of the canal construction.277 
 Not all of the contractors fell through and the commissioners felt that those who 
remained provided enough labor and organization to begin canal construction.  Drawing 
upon the symbolism of the patriotic and nationalistic celebration of the Fourth of July, the 
canal commissioners, state dignitaries, and citizens of Illinois welcomed the official 
beginning of construction on the Illinois and Michigan Canal on July 4, 1836.  Although 
filled with grand ceremonies and celebrations, the official beginnings of canal 
construction ushered in no great buzz of canal activity.  Rather, activity behind the scenes 
consumed the remainder of the summer and most of the fall.  Instead, historian James W. 
Putnam contended, “Much of the time was consumed in preliminary preparations such as 
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constructing roads across the marsh, building houses for the laborers, and procuring 
machinery and other supplies.”278  With the expectation that work would pick up, the 
commissioners signaled the go ahead to additional sections on the Western section of the 
canal.  Despite the preparations, little construction occurred on the canal throughout the 
remainder of the year. 
 Meanwhile, Governor Duncan renewed his search for canal investors.  With the 
terms of the bonds reworked by the General Assembly, the governor found willing 
listeners this time around.  Despite the rather inauspicious start 1836, December brought 
forth willing investors.  In New York, the governor quickly reached an agreement and 
secured a loan of $100,000 at five percent interest.  The work of the Illinois legislature, 
governor, and improvement supporters paid off with the governor announcing the loan 
upon his return to the state.  Conveying the news of the secured loan to the General 
Assembly, the governor also advocated for the state to show further support by means of 
legislation authorizing the state government to purchase capital stock in all improvement 
projects in the state.279  Through such actions, the state provided legitimacy to the project, 
potential investors, and its citizens.        
 The Illinois General Assembly revisited the legislation at the request of the 
governor in the early months of 1837.  On February 12, 1837, the legislature passed a bill 
amending the previous canal legislation.  The legislation contained several significant 
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changes and reflected legislative experimentation with the management structure of the 
canal.  As would be a similar political battle in Iowa over the oversight of its 
improvement project, the General Assembly removed the authority of the governor to 
appoint canal commissioners.  Instead, the legislature reserved the appointment authority 
for themselves.280   
Although little evidence exists to conclude a political struggle between the 
governor and the legislative body occurred, the General Assembly clearly took issue with 
gubernatorial appointment.  An examination of section two of the new legislation 
provided one possible explanation.  The legislation called for the canal construction “to 
proceed immediately and without delay, to the prosecution and final completion” of the 
canal.  The language of the passage indicated a growing displeasure over the rate at which 
the canal project progressed.  Together, reserving the appointment authority and calling 
for more accountability sent a message of heightened accountability to the governor and 
the citizens of the state.281             
 With the governor’s signature in March 1837, the amended canal bill passed 
appointment authority to the General Assembly and provided the governor with the 
authority to pledge the credit of the state for the purchase of capital canal stock.  With 
little delay, the General Assembly identified and appointed the new canal commissioners.  
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Lincoln-supported William F. Thornton won the presidency of the board of 
commissioners.282 
  Entering the winter of 1836, the canal commissioners remained highly optimistic 
that the following year would witness full construction efforts on the canal.  With 
legislative reorganization, expanded financial support from the state government, and 
construction preparations well underway, the canal project flirted with becoming a reality.  
Unfortunately, for the canal commissioners and state of Illinois, 1837 brought a national 
economic crisis.  The status of the canal project when the Panic of 1837 hit the nation led 
one scholar to refer to the Illinois General Assembly and state officials involved in the 
canal project as a “Star-studded group who brought financial ruin to the State of Illinois 
through a wholly unrealistic system of internal improvements.”283   
While scholars have referred to numerous improvement projects of the era as 
“follies,” the notion is a bit troubling.  Ill equipped to manage the financial, logistical, and 
political issues enveloping such expansive projects, settler societies found their 
opportunities for infrastructural improvements greatly limited.  With limited means of 
accumulating the needed capital and a federal government offering little more than lands 
of the public domain for further funding, regional, state, and territorial governments faced 
the necessity to experiment with authority to bring the projects to fruition and meet the 
needs and demands of its citizens.  
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Despite the positive upswing of land sales for the canal project in the early months 
of 1837, by the end of the year almost ten percent of the land purchasers forfeited by 
failing to make their first payment.284  Optimism abounded in spite of the land sale 
forfeitures with officials estimating the failed transaction affecting continual work on the 
canal minimally.  On the national stage, the Panic of 1837 provided the Whig Party with 
the opportunity to promote the principle of “using the state actively for the benefit of the 
people.”285  Specifically, supporting the intervention of the federal government to lessen 
the effects of the Panic enabled the Whigs to turn out voters in numbers to compete with 
the Democrats.     
The ideology of state support promoted by Whigs directly contributed to the 
expansion of the country, the effort to re-establish a national bank, and the development 
of internal improvements supporting the nation’s growth.  Whigs such as William Henry 
Harrison “advocated federal subsidization of internal improvements and endorsed 
[Henry] Clay’s scheme for distributing federal land revenues to the states for that 
purpose.”286  In an effort to support the “release of creative energy,” Whigs proposed 
legislation that promoted federal assistance for projects that benefited the general good of 
the nation and its emerging national economy.287     
In stark contrast to the Whig Party, Democrats stood firmly against federal 
involvement in such matters.  Antebellum Democrats contended that under Whig policies 
                                                          
284
 Howe, Documentary History of the Illinois and Michigan Canal , 85-88; Putman, The Illinois 
and Michigan Canal, 41. 
285
 Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the 
Onset of the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xiii. 
286
 Ibid, 41. 
184 
 
the national government had marched headlong into irresponsible fiscal management.  
Whether through the extension of land grants, credit, or other monetary means, Whig 
policies placed the national government and its people in great debt.  Democrat Martin 
Van Buren echoed the party’s platform by claiming, “the less government interferes with 
private pursuits the better for the general prosperity.”288  Historian Marvin Meyers 
suggested the rapid population growth and influx of capital, albeit in the form of credit, 
created a boom during the 1830s and 1840s.  Echoing the ideas of Democrats, Meyer 
contended that the boom “which prompted ambitious improvement schemes strikes one 
as sound, the mode and tempo of execution as audacious, often reckless, sometimes (as in 
Illinois) absurd.”289 
 In Illinois, the economic downturn hit home and greatly undermined canal 
construction.  Seeking to protect itself, the State Bank of Illinois closed its doors and 
suspended all business on May 4, 1837.  While the actions of the bank did little to stop 
financial transactions in the state, the move caused construction on the canal to halt.  The 
canal board of commissioners utilized the Chicago branch of the State Bank of Illinois for 
its financial matters, including holding canal fund deposits of approximately $400,000.290   
Additionally, the second scheduled payments for Chicago land sales remained in 
jeopardy.  With the bank shut down, the canal commissioner risked losing the additional 
funds, in the neighborhood of $375,000, if deposited in the state bank.  While the 
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temporary suspension complicated construction plans on the canal, an even greater risk 
remained.  Illinois law dictated that the bank lost its charter if it stopped specie payment 
for more than sixty days.  The canal risked defaulting payments to contractors and falling 
further behind in construction with the possible revocation of bank’s charter and 
subsequent liquidation of the bank’s assets.  Conversely, a return to specie payment by 
the bank would eventually deplete the bank and force the bank to pay creditors only a 
portion of their original deposits.  Either scenario placed the successful completion of the 
canal at great risk.291   
 In addition to the canal, the suspension of specie payment by the bank posed great 
risk to the overall health of the state.  Considering the circumstance, the government 
sought a remedy to the banking crisis.  Seizing the initiative, Governor Duncan called a 
special session of the General Assembly to address the financial crisis.  The special 
session produced legislation extending indefinitely the suspension of specie payment.  
Most importantly, the removal of the sixty-day limit allowed the canal project to avoid 
collapse.292   
While the legislation provided the state with a limited remedy, staving off a 
banking collapse, the bill still complicated canal construction.  While calling the special 
session of the General Assembly, Governor Duncan also called upon the legislature to 
take actions that threatened the continuation of state supported internal improvements.  
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Seeking to remove excess financial burdens from the state government and the state’s 
citizens, the governor asked the General Assembly to reverse legislation pledging state 
backing of internal improvements within the state.  While the General Assembly provided 
the governor with the revised legislation for state banking, the lawmaking body thought 
otherwise.  Representative Lincoln vehemently disagreed with the governor and joined 
the majority in voting down the governor’s proposal to reverse state support for internal 
improvements.  Further indicating his full faith in the state’s internal improvement 
projects, and the canal specifically, Lincoln joined other officials in signing a petition 
supporting the continued surveying of the “General System of Internal Improvements.”293  
With a vote of confidence from the state legislature, the canal company proceeded with 
construction efforts, land sales, and further surveying.  
As the canal commissioners fought off a financial crisis with the help of the 
Illinois General Assembly, prospects for the canal project picked up in what appeared as 
little more than a turn of luck.  By the fall of 1837, progress on the canal reached the 
stage of construction projected for the previous year.  Owing in part to a new influx of 
new arrivals to the region, land sales rose and provided the commission with a much-
needed financial boost.  As land sales picked up for the canal commission, the new 
arrivals placed pressure on the state’s resources.  Specifically, housing booms increased 
demand for building supplies and food necessities.  The increase in demand for food and 
building supplies hit the commission’s budget and resulted higher wages and material 
fees in combination with creating competition that resulted in labor and material 
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shortages.  The increased competition and resulting shortages forced several contractors 
to forfeit their contracts and left the commissioners searching.294   
Responding to the challenges created by the increased demand for supplies, the 
canal commissioners struggled to find methods of providing a steady flow of needed 
supplies for construction.  The commissioners proposed establishing a store, located at 
Lockport, Illinois, to provide the canal contractors with the supplies and machinery 
needed for construction but not readily available in the region.  The commissioners had 
no desire to create a profitable supply store and restricted sales to only those contracted 
by the canal commission and for their work on the canal only.  In this manner, the 
commissioners hoped to provide a steady flow of materials to keep work moving forward 
while also restricting the loss of the needed supplies to other construction projects in the 
state.  Financially, the commissioners provided contractors with supplies and in turn 
subtracted the price of the supplies from their individual contract finances.  In essence, 
the board of commissioners became both project manager and supplier.  While a bold 
business move, the risk proved so successful that no further contracts were lost.295   
While the nation struggled with the Panic of 1837, the canal project survived.  At 
times during the year, the canal faced almost certain failure.  A population boom, supply 
shortages, and a growing undercurrent of opposition to internal improvement opposition 
threatened the canal’s future.  However, by year’s end, quick action by the state 
government, a providential population boom, and bold experimentation by the 
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commissioners placed the Illinois and Michigan Canal’s construction back on track and 
poised for successful completion.  
In 1838, the progress on the canal remained on the upswing.  By the end of the 
year, contracts of all but a portion of the middle division of the canal existed.  
Construction work remained steady with numerous sections of the western portion of the 
canal completed or in an advanced stage nearing completion.  In general, the optimism 
reached new heights with the commissioners’ major concerns centered upon balancing 
ledgers.  In reporting to the Illinois House of Representatives in early 1839, 
Representative Lincoln contended work progressed so far that ‘if we would, we cannot 
retreat from it, without disgrace and great loss.”296  Although not a ringing endorsement, 
the statement by Lincoln highlighted the financial and political losses Illinois risked with 
a retreat at such an advanced stage of construction.          
With the immediate finances of the commission secured for the year, the 
commissioners began expressing concerns of impending future financial difficulties.  As 
more and more contractors working on the canal reached completion on their sections, the 
commissioners needed more capital on hand to pay contractors in full.  While sales of the 
federally granted lands remained brisk, the sales fell short of the pace needed for payment 
of contractor services.  With a shrinking treasury and increasing expenditures, the 
commissioners gradually faced a familiar situation and called upon the state government 
for assistance.   
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 The Illinois General Assembly addressed the matter in the early months of 1839.  
In reporting to the legislature, Representative Lincoln introduced a new initiative.  
Lincoln proposed that Illinois purchase unsold lands from the public domain from the 
national government and resell them.  In order to make the venture worthwhile, Lincoln 
suggested purchasing the lands for twenty-five cents per acre from the national 
government, followed by Illinois reselling them to willing individuals at $1.25 per acre.  
If approved, the canal commission stood to gain the one-dollar profit from the land sales.  
While advantageous to Illinois and the canal project, the plan held little, if any, benefit for 
the national government.  Despite Lincoln’s attempts to persuade congressional 
representatives of the benefits to Illinois and the nation, the federal government found the 
idea difficult to support.  As much of the nation still suffered from the effects of the Panic 
of 1837, Congress found little to like about Lincoln’s proposal.297  While the plan assisted 
Illinois and the canal, the nation stood to lose a great deal from accepting a price 
substantially below the established sale price for lands of the public domain.       
While Lincoln’s proposal failed, the commissioners still needed an influx of 
finances.  Responding to the commissioners’ needs, Illinois authorized a new loan of 
$400,000 with six percent interest.  Illinois representatives found willing investors for the 
authorized sums.  However, the terms of the loans negotiated provided only marginal 
immediate assistance.  Terms of the loans required monthly payment of $100,000 to the 
state and thus stretched the $400,000 sum out over the much of the remaining year.298   
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By June 1839, the project required immediate help as the commissioners’ ledgers 
showed a deficit of over $200,000.  Governor Thomas Carlin, succeeding Governor 
Duncan in 1838, moved swiftly authorizing $500,000 of state bonds on the market with 
the funds applied to the canal finances.  Few willing buyers surfaced with the canal 
commissioners only selling $100,000 of the bonds.  With the release of state bonds 
failing, the governor turned to the State Bank of Illinois to provide funding to cover canal 
construction for the remainder of 1839.  Governor Carlin hoped the measure proved 
enough to keep the pace of construction constant and progressing while continuing the 
search for additional sources of funding.299    
 Searching for purchasers of the remaining loan, Illinois representatives 
approached European investors and broker houses again.  With few takers, Illinois finally 
secured purchasers for the loan with the brokerage firm of John Wright and Company.  
Negotiations resulted in an agreement for the brokerage firm to eventually acquire 
$1,000,000 in state bonds.  Perhaps highlighting the reason for the brokerage firm’s 
willingness to work with Illinois, the firm folded before purchasing the entirety of bonds.  
Because of the incomplete transaction, the canal commissioners only received an influx 
of approximately $145,000.300    
 The limited inflow of capital for construction left the state of Illinois and canal 
commissioners mired in a perpetual financial struggle.  With a nation suffering from the 
financial aftershocks of the Panic of 1837, Illinois found only a few willing and 
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financially stable investors.  Reflecting the height of financial severity reached in Illinois, 
Governor Carlin called a special session of the Illinois General Assembly in December 
1839.  In addressing the legislature, Carlin, “pleaded with the legislators to solve the 
financial problems of the State which was in debt over 11 million dollars.”301  Over 
$42,400,000 of outstanding canal stock, with six percent interest, alone contributed to the 
financial crisis.  Evaluating the circumstances surrounding the canal in 1839, historian 
Wayne C. Temple contended, “The Canal would cost Illinois taxpayers 8 million to 
finish.”302  By the end of 1839, monthly canal construction expenditures reached upward 
of $150,000.303  
By 1840, the canal ledgers highlighting little positive flow mirrored the financial 
state of Illinois as a whole.  Unfortunately, for the fortunes of the canal, the special 
session of the legislature provided little relief.  While proposals calling for the suspension 
or cancellation of all state improvement projects rose, only two measures passed.  
Representative Lincoln accounted for one of the measures.  Lincoln introduced a proposal 
providing the General Assembly with the authority to elect a Treasurer for the board of 
canal commissioners.304  Whether the measure provided a concrete benefit or break from 
the past, the passage of the measure suggested a concern with accountability.  In theory, 
the joint legislative body electing the treasurer instilled a higher level of accountability.  
The elective power reserved by the joint assembly held the promise of a more thorough 
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pursuit of the candidate’s qualification.  In turn, the legislators held firm to the idea that 
financial viability of the canal project stood a much greater chance with a truly qualified 
treasurer.  
In addition to the minor revision pertaining to the manner in which the board of 
canal commissioners received its treasurer, the only other substantive measure that arose 
provided an unlimited power to the commissioners for the full calendar year of 1840.  
The joint body authorized the commissioners to sell as much of the canal grant lands as 
necessary to pay the interest on the canal loans.  However, the General Assembly 
immediately turned the measure upside down.  Perhaps in hopes of luring the return of 
Providence to the improvement project, the legislature courted good favor by authorizing 
the transfer of granted lands to religious organizations at no cost.  Regardless of the 
intent, the offer of free lands limited the available parcels for the canal commissioners to 
sell.  As a result, it undermined the nature by which the legislation materialized.305  
With contractor bills coming due and little resulting from the special session of 
the General Assembly, the canal commissioners again turned to alternative plans to fulfill 
contractor payment.  With little option, the commissioners resorted to issuing checks, 
payable in the future, to contractors.  Due to the financial instability, the commissioners 
could not set a specific future date for payment.  Instead, the commissioners leveraged 
interest to offset the inability to pay immediately upon services rendered.  The 
commissioners extended checks, accruing six percent interest annually, and payable to 
contractors at such a time as funds became available.  The commissioners hoped that the 
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lure of accruing interest provided contractors with reassurance that ultimately they would 
receive more than full pay.  Additionally, the board trusted that the interest paid would 
entice other contractors to continue work even in the event word spread of the 
commissioners’ inability to make immediate payment.  In the meantime, the 
commissioners pressed onward with land sales under the new and more liberating 
authority granted during the special session.306 
At the end of 1840, even the most optimistic mind struggled to remain convinced 
of the canal’s eventual completion.  Although the commissioners continued with land 
sales, the result amounted to little more than a great disappointment.  Sales of lands 
during June and July barely produced $7,000.  Mindful of their responsibilities to the 
citizens of Illinois, the commissioners deemed that continued sales of lands extremely 
suppressed prices benefited no one.  As such, the commissioners abandoned funding the 
improvement project through land sales.307 
With little remedy for the canal’s financial woes coming from the legislature, 
sales of granted lands, or investors, progress on the canal slowed to a crawl.  Fearful of 
losing their investments in the canal, the project’s major contractors gathered for a 
meeting in Lockport.  The meeting resulted in a proposal that converted contractors into 
partial investors of the canal.  The contractors proposed they purchase $1,000,000 in state 
canal bonds at full value.308  With the purchase at full price, the contractors provided the 
canal commissioners with much needed capital and, in turn, allowed the contractors to 
                                                          
306
 Howe, Documentary History of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, 87, 148; Putman, The Illinois 
and Michigan Canal, 49-50. 
307
 Ibid. 
308
 Putman, The Illinois and Michigan Canal, 50. 
194 
 
proceed with their work.  Rather than purchasing the bonds at the depressed market price, 
the contractors exposed themselves to tremendous potential loss.  However, the 
acceptance of the contractor’s proposal converted the contractors into vested parties in the 
canal’s success as they only stood to make money, or at least break even, with the 
opening of the canal.  For Illinois and the canal commissioners, the proposal dispersed 
authority and distributed financial responsibility amongst more parties.  With the 
transaction completed, the canal commissioners and contractors enabled construction on 
the canal for a few more months.309    
 
The “Great Emancipator” or “Great Facilitator?” 
 
 By the early months of 1841, the commission extinguished the funds secured from 
the project’s contractors.  However, the commissioners and contractors carried on with 
construction, convinced that the state legislature would finally provide a true and 
successful financial solution for the canal.  Shortly before the new year began, Governor 
Carlin again called upon the General Assembly.  With the state’s internal improvements 
in dire financial shape, the governor implored the legislators to provide true relief.  
Seeking a strong leader to provide a quick and pragmatic solution for the internal 
improvement problems, the first session of the General Assembly resulted in the 
appointment of Lincoln to the committee on Canal Lands.  Historian Wayne C. Temple 
contended, “As floor leader of the Whigs, Lincoln exerted stalwart influence upon the 
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entire legislature.  He had a reputation for honesty and common sense.”310  Although 
highly debated, little relief surfaced for the canal during the first session.      
 Only two days later, the General Assembly opened the second session and 
attention turned immediately to the financial situation again.  Grabbing the attention of 
the legislature, Lincoln swiftly introduced legislation providing payment of the interest on 
the state’s canal debt.  Following the introduction, Lincoln dutifully dove headfirst into 
canal legislation.  Building upon his long held promotion of internal improvement 
projects in the state, Lincoln supported legislation urging the continued and early 
completion of the canal voted upon on February 27, 1841.  With the votes counted, 
Lincoln successfully secured the passage of the legislation by the House, 37 to 33.  
However, the bill met defeat in the Senate.  While the attempt to secure early completion 
failed, the legislation seeking the payment of interest on the state debt introduced by 
Lincoln succeeded.  Resulting from the Lincoln introduced legislation, the General 
Assembly authorized a new tax of on all property in the amount of ten cents per one 
hundred dollars of property value.  To pay any additional uncovered interest on the debt, 
the legislature also directed the commissioners “to raise $300,000 by pledging internal 
improvement bonds.”311     
 The year 1841 held great significance for the Illinois and Michigan Canal.  With 
canal funds depleted and no stable financial solution found, the future of the canal 
teetered perilously on the edge of complete failure.  Adding to the dire financial 
circumstances surrounding the canal, Illinois’ internal improvement lost one of its most 
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ardent legislative supporters.  With the close of the legislative session in 1841, 
Representative Lincoln left the state capital and never sought re-election to the state 
government.  While the state’s financial matters undoubtedly weighed heavily upon 
Lincoln, the 1840’s witnessed Lincoln’s fate intertwined with the changing nature of 
American politics.312  
 Lincoln, a member of the Whig Party, found himself at odds with Democrats over 
the use of public funds for internal improvements and economic development.  Deeply 
rooted in a frontier region that required assistance in development, Lincoln found it the 
duty of government to respond to the needs of its citizens.  Much like the argument for 
the Illinois and Michigan Canal, regional improvements assisted the immediate region 
and state in addition to connecting the nation together.  The very process of improving 
upon the landscape wove together the interests of the nation and its citizens and solidified 
their futures.    
The contrasting political ideologies of the two parties diverged further in the late 
antebellum period and saw the Whig Party lose prominence.  A rebound in the nation’s 
economic fortunes after the Panic of 1837 combined with the splintering of the Whig 
Party over the issue of slavery, specifically the compromise of 1850, undermined the 
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party’s platform and led to the entrenchment of Democrats.313  While the Whig Party 
struggled to reunite, the emergence of the Republican Party spelled their end. 
The issues of slavery, economic development, western expansion, and the 
Mexican War divided the parties of both Whigs and Democrats.  Democrats fell along 
regional lines of North and South in supporting slavery.  While Northern Democrats 
generally supported a more moderate approach to slavery, Southern Democrats stood 
strongly behind the sovereignty of the states to decide the slavery issue.  Northern 
Democrat Stephen A. Douglas epitomized expansionist Democrats that saw benefits in 
national improvement projects such as the trans-continental railroad.  In an attempt to 
skillfully navigate the political waters and ensure a northern-based route for the railroad, 
Douglas offered to southern senators a compromise.  To calm southern senators wanting 
the national rail line to pass through southern cities, Douglas offered the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty in the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Despite the splintering, many 
Democrats remained united behind the state’s rights platform offered by Douglas.314  
However, the unity of the Whigs further split due to the rise of other parties such as the 
anti-immigration, “American” Know-Nothing Party.  The deep divisions within the Whig 
Party and the regional division between Democrats allowed the Republican Party to 
successfully elect Abraham Lincoln as President in 1860.315    
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With many of the ex-Whigs migrating to the Republican Party and influencing the 
party’s ideology, they looked favorably upon expansion and internal improvement 
projects.  Upon Lincoln’s election as President, Southern states called for secession from 
the Union.  In response, Lincoln threatened military force in preserving the Union.  Under 
growing tensions, many southern elected officials resigned from their positions in 
opposition.  While the crisis devolved into the Civil War, it allowed the Republican 
controlled Union government to chart a favorable agenda for a strong central 
governmental role in shaping the development of the national economy.316 
 For Illinois and Representative Lincoln, 1841 signaled the shift in national focus 
and political influence.  By the time the new state legislature began, Democrats held firm 
control and few supporters of the canal or internal improvements remained. The political 
shift left visible marks on the canal as construction waned, several contractors forfeited 
their contracts and money, and little financial investment loomed.  Along the canal 
corridor, state bonds sold to fund the canal project had long before become common 
currency.  Illinois allowed holders of state warrants and bonds to redeem canal lands for 
the script, few willing individuals wished to take a chance on the lands.  Without an 
operable canal cutting through the area, the reocurring problems of transportation offset 
the potential of the lands.  As such, most bondholders retained their script with the hope 
of collecting full value in the future.  However, as Illinois’ financial situation worsened, 
the state bonds flooded the market.317  With little state or national government support, 
severe financial problems, and fewer willing takers, depreciation set in and work ground 
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to a halt on the canal.  Only contractors capable of providing their own funding for work 
continued while holding onto hope that the completion of the canal offered the best 
scenario for recovering their costs. 
 
From Problem to Solution 
 
 While few held onto hope, February 1842 brought about bad news again.  With 
the Panic of 1837 still restricting capital throughout the nation and Illinois’ finances in 
desperate shape, news broke that the State Bank of Illinois had collapsed.  Undoubtedly, 
the failure of the State Bank hurt Illinois as a whole as state debt approached nearly 
$14,000,000.  One of the major contributors to the financial difficulties of the state 
undoubtedly remained the canal, with interest due on canal loans reaching over $800,000 
per year.  The state found itself in great debt resulting from internal improvement 
investment and as yet had no significant canal linking the two major waterways together 
and making Illinois the center hub.  With debt reaching $14,000,000 for the canal project, 
the path forward remained difficult.  While canal supporters searched for avenues 
forward, the high debt load also created great difficulty for Illinois to save face and retreat 
from the project.  With few options emerging, the completion of the canal and the 
fulfillment of its potential provided the only foreseeable solution to the financial crisis of 
the state.318  
 Although the Panic of 1837 contributed to the disappearance of willing investors 
and available capital, the Illinois and Michigan Canal project placed great financial 
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constraints on the citizens of Illinois.  However, the canal also provided the one 
opportunity for the state to improve its financial situation.  Though the canal planted the 
seeds of financial burden, by the 1840’s it continued to hold the promise of providing 
Illinois with great wealth and stability.  As Representative Lincoln foreshadowed with 
comments before his fellow legislators years before, the advanced state of improvement 
then ongoing in Illinois prohibited the option of retreat.  The only path forward remained 
to finish construction.  The canal’s completion then provided a source of revenue through 
tolls for canal users.  In turn, the presence of the canal created an environment more 
conducive to settlement and development.  With more settlement and development, 
Illinois stood to gain more revenue and greater overall property value establishing a 
greater tax base.319  
 The rhetoric and facts surrounding the canal’s status and potential in the early 
1840’s differed little from its earliest contemplated days.  Despite seeing the potential, 
capital remained the most significant barrier between a vision and a functioning canal.  
With no investors willing or capable of completing the project, the only viable option that 
remained was plunging the state further into debt.  With estimates for the canal’s 
completion reaching upward to $3,000,000, the proposition of sinking further state 
resources into the project simply stood as too great a challenge.  With the insolvent 
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circumstances Illinois faced, releasing such an enormous amount of bonds onto the 
market proved unrealistic and highly improbable.320 
 Seeing no other recourse, attentions turned toward finding alternative methods for 
finishing the canal.  With finances comprising the greatest barrier confronting the canal’s 
completion, efforts centered upon cost savings.  Almost from the initial stages of 
planning, the canal commissioner and contractors sought to minimize cost overhead 
through the planning and contract bidding process.  Few options remained for contractors 
to reduce construction costs.  In searching about for a solution, a close re-examination of 
the early stages of canal planning provided a sliver of hope.   
In the initial push for canal development, surveyors presented two significant 
canal proposals representing a wide expanse of financial outlay.  Original discussions 
suggested that while the more expensive canal drew waters from Lake Michigan and 
contained a deeper channel with an elevation eight feet above Lake Michigan, the more 
inexpensive canal constituted a shallow design.  Although the shallow design estimates 
provided a more economically feasible canal, the shallow design limited the long-term 
viability of the passage.  As such, the cheaper price tag accompanying the shallow canal 
also held the cost of a shorter lifespan before finding itself outdated by vessel size and 
capacity.  Although the more inexpensive shallow channel canal proved competitive in 
costs, the shorter lifespan resulting from its design rendered the option financially 
unacceptable.321   
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The 1840’s placed the completion of the canal in a much different context.  
Illinois no longer held such optimism for the canal.  Instead, based upon financial 
constraints, finishing construction on the deep channel, the lake fed canal simply was not 
possible.  Rather, many contemplated the lost opportunity to build the much cheaper 
shallow-cut canal from the onset.  While the long-term prognosis for the cheaper canal 
left many remorseful over the lost opportunity, the operable canal could have released 
much of the financial burden Illinois now held.  Further, with a steady flow of capital, 
albeit less than the deep channel canal, Illinois could have entertained ideas of expansion 
in later years.  Instead, Illinois bet its financial stability on the construction of a massive 
canal and the economic fortunes of the young country.322 
Lamenting over missed opportunities did little to relieve the current problems.  
However, the discussions provided a potential solution to the state’s canal situation.  
Despite the financial complications, construction on many of the sections of the canal 
reached completion.  Those sections remaining unfinished stood as the physical barrier to 
completion.  As such, the idea of applying the shallow-cut canal plan to the unfinished 
sections emerged as a viable solution.  Instead of finishing the remaining sections with 
the deeper channel, canal supporters proposed that construction focus only on a much 
shallower, albeit navigable channel in those sections.  The plan provided the potential for 
a completed canal while the shallower cut also required less construction investment.  A 
shallower channel consumed less time, required less labor, and most significantly, less 
                                                          
322
 James W. Putman contended in his economic analysis of the Illinois and Michigan Canal that 
the idea surfaced from Justin Butterfield, a friend of Arthur Bronson, the largest investor in the canal.  With 
the idea coming from investors, state officials felt positive that the plan would move forward and spur 
further investment from eastern capitalist. 
203 
 
money.323  Of course, the trade-off for Illinois remained that the shallow sections of the 
canal ultimately limited the shipping potential of the entire canal.  However, for the sake 
of Illinois, any canal was a better option than no canal.         
With a possible solution in the wings, attention turned toward determining the 
costs of the modified plans.  Calculations revealed that a sum of $1,600,000 stood 
between the state and a finished canal.  Although still a steep price, the shallow-cut plan 
cost almost half of the needed amount estimated for finishing the deeper channel.  With 
favorable overtures from investors reaching the state, Illinois jumped to action.324     
 During the remainder of 1842, the commissioners and state officials judiciously 
laid the groundwork for the revised canal plan.  During the summer months, the Illinois 
legislature authorized the Chairman of the Committee on Canal and Canal Lands to travel 
to New York and meet with leading investors.  News of Illinois’ willingness to accept and 
implement the modified canal plan met with welcoming feedback.  With the consent of 
the major investors, canal commissioners and state officials turned their attention toward 
passing supporting legislation.325 
 Opening a new era in the canal project, supporting legislation gained passage in 
February 1843.  The successful legislation authorized the governor to enter into 
negotiations to secure a loan for the $1,600,000 estimate of the shallow channel plan.  
Under the bill, the state legislature authorized the governor to go “all-in” in order to 
secure the capital.  However, reversing its prior stance, the legislature allowed the 
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governor to utilize all the canal’s assets and potential to secure the loan.  In past attempts 
at securing investment and the completion of the canal, Illinois looked specifically to land 
sales and investors.  Illinois never seriously considered any legislation transferring or 
selling operation, oversight, or possession of the canal to secure the necessary funding.  
However, desperation dictated new levels of negotiation.  Under the new legislation, 
Illinois presented the idea of establishing a deed of trust to secure payment.  In exchange 
for the capital, the state implemented a board of trustees to oversee the canal.  While the 
state stopped short of giving all power over canal matters to private investors, the new 
board of trustees relinquished the majority.  The board, consisting of three trustees, 
included one state appointed trustee and two investor chosen trustees.  However, the 
legislature sought to limit potential exploitative motives while protecting the interest of 
the citizens and state of Illinois.  Significant limitations included restrictions governing 
the conditions of land sales or leases, usage and sale of town lots, and the assigning of 
water rights and waterpower from the canal.  Although the limitations appeared 
inconsequential, they highlight legislative attempts at securing the future interests of the 
state.  Without the restrictive oversight measures, Illinois stood to lose the ability to 
respond to the needs of its citizens as they arose.  Instead, private investors might harness 
much needed water from the canal and legally restrict access and usage of the resource.  
In any event, the legislation provided greater latitude for investors while still protecting 
the interest of the citizens of Illinois.326   
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 With American investors secured, representatives of the state and canal turned 
their attention to Europe once again.  Unlike their American peers, European creditors 
remained less enthusiastic.  The financial crisis of the nation and the turmoil of Illinois 
led European investors to remain leery of investing in the canal.  Further, with few, if any, 
favorable returns produced for European investors to date, the restructured canal and 
management hierarchy added to their wary view.  However, the arrival of former 
governor Davis in Europe to present the new canal plan and lead negotiations provided 
enough comfort.  The summer 1844 trip by the former governor resulted in securing the 
European investors.  The investors agreed to take on the remaining portion of the needed 
loan on the condition that Illinois reinstitute the interest tax the state repealed in 1843.  In 
no real position to protest, the Illinois delegation accepted the condition.327 
 By June 1844, the state secured the much-needed loans and the board of trustees 
took their places.  Assuming control of the canal project, the trustees vigorously prepared 
to resume construction on the canal.  With the funds from the new loans scheduled for 
payment in September, the trustees needed to move fast to open the bidding process for 
the revised canal plans.  The trustees awarded new construction contracts to several of the 
canal’s long-time contractors as their revised bids met the trustees’ expectations.  While 
the remaining contractors resumed construction on their sections, the trustees opened the 
sections not under contract.  With much of the region still suffering the aftereffects of the 
Panic of 1837, the new trustees found numerous willing contractors for the work 
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remaining.  Unlike the early years that presented material and labor shortages, the trustees 
found more than adequate material and a relative abundance of labor.  As the Panic shut 
down much development, settlement slowed and demands for food and building supplies 
lessened.  With few projects requiring workers, contractors had little difficulty securing 
laborers willing to work much cheaper.  Further, investment in agricultural development 
throughout the region resulted in an abundance of agricultural goods in the region’s 
market.  As a result, the economic downturn provided numerous advantages for the canal 
trustees that previous commissioners never had.328   
   The years since the slowdown and stoppage of construction of the canal exacted a 
toll on the canal.  Deterioration and unfinished work allowed the incomplete canal to fall 
into general disrepair.  As such, with construction renewed on the canal, repairing the 
general decay consumed much of the remainder of 1845.  The 1843 act creating the board 
of trustees required the completion of construction of the canal within three years of the 
trustees taking possession.  With the finished sections in disarray and other section still 
needing extensive work, contractors had much in front of them.329   
 Rising to the demands of the challenging timeframe, contractors and workers 
poured their labor into the construction.  The mid-decade years of 1845, 1846, and 1847 
still presented challenges to the canal workers.  Abnormally high precipitation hit the 
region during the final years of construction with flooding adding to the difficulties of 
construction.  Although the flooding slowed work and increased costs, the surplus of 
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construction supplies, labor, and food limited financial complication.  Although abundant 
labor kept wages relatively low and construction on track, the flooding caused work 
conditions to deteriorate.  Subsequently, sickness and disease increased for workers on 
the canal.  Despite the complication, for the first time in the project’s history, the canal’s 
financial circumstances remained adequate and allowed construction to continue 
unabated.330          
 As 1848 dawned, Illinois stood on the verge of fulfilling the promise of creating a 
transportation route that linked together the great waterways of the Great Lakes and the 
Mississippi River systems.  As the snow retreated from the region and the ice pack melted 
on Lake Michigan, the Illinois and Michigan Canal lay ready to unite the waters so long 
separated by the continental divide.  Centuries of human observations marveled at the 
untapped potential of the near perfect corridor.  Limitations in technology, capital, labor, 
and resources placed the unfinished work of nature out of the reach of those that inhabited 
the region.  Numerous false starts, plan revisions, limited financial resources, and 
political bickering undermined the pursuit of a canal.  Despite the barriers placed before 
the canal, the Illinois and Michigan Canal opened for business in April 1848.  Although 
an additional twenty-eight years passed before the trustees of the canal finally retired all 
debts in 1871, securing the completion of the canal provided a strong foundational base 
for the development of Illinois and the region.331 
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Chapter Four:  
Forging the Way Upriver: 
The Des Moines River Improvement 
 
The Des Moines River Lands Grant and Improvement Project embodied years of 
planning and struggles of providing the inhabitants of the Des Moines River Valley 
region and western settlers with a safe, efficient, and effective passage into and out of the 
prairie lands and upper Midwest.  Regional and special interests sought to secure the 
construction of the river improvement project to assist settlement, provide a defensive 
transportation networks, and connect the region with developing markets.  However, 
desire to improve the river alone proved inadequate.  Technological limitations, 
insufficient capital, special interests, and political ideology complicated the construction 
of the river improvement.  The struggles over the project provided an example of the 
mechanism by which a new social contract emerged.  Despite the project never reaching 
operable completion, the process of creating the Des Moines River Improvement Project 
provided platforms by which commercial, social, political interests in society refined the 
role of government.   
Unlike the previous case studies presented, the Des Moines River Improvement 
Project never reached completion.  However, the project on the Des Moines River served 
as a mechanism of durable transformation.  As such, the Des Moines River case places 
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activist governance and process as a more significant factors in durable shifts, while 
relegating successful completion of great public works to a lesser role.    
 
Onto the Prairie 
In 1673, the French explorer Louis Jolliet and his party landed on the western 
bank of the Mississippi River and became the first known Europeans to step foot in the 
lands comprising the future state of Iowa.  Numerous Native American tribes - 
Meskwaki, Sauk, Ioway, Santee Sioux, Winnebago, Potawatomi, Missouri, and Oto - 
populated the region during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.  Many 
of the tribes practiced semi-nomadic lifestyles, migrating through the region with 
seasonal change.  The Meskwaki and Sauk, however, located settlements along the major 
river ways and planted crops such as corn, beans, squash, and pumpkins in the fertile 
river bottom soils.332  
 With both Spanish and French explorers present in the region, Spain and France 
disputed its possession until 1803.  While nominally under French possession, Napoleon 
offered at the bequest of the United States the lands of the Louisiana Purchase, including 
Iowa, for the sum of fifteen million dollars.  Historian Dorothy Schwieder wrote, “With 
the purchase, the size of the American nation more than doubled, and the region later to 
become Iowa officially became part of the United States.”333  The region encompassed 
part of the territories of Louisiana, Missouri, Michigan, and Wisconsin before becoming 
its own territory in 1838.   
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  White settlement strained relations with many of the Native Americans.  
Conflicts such as the Black Hawk War of 1832 and numerous settler murders heightened 
tensions while undermining tribal claims to lands.  Through numerous conflicts and 
cessions of lands, tribes relinquished their land rights to the federal government and 
opened the way for further white settlement of the territory.334  A rapid influx of settlers 
to the region resulted in the national government admitting the Iowa Territory to 
statehood in 1846.335      
By horseback, wagon, rail, and steamboat settlers made the journey to the eastern 
edge of the Iowa territorial lands.  The trail experience for most settlers traveling to Iowa 
was unlike that of the overland routes further to the west.  Historian Glenda Riley wrote, 
“Most Iowa-bound settlers were traveling over parts of the country which were 
comparatively well-settled.”336  In large part, the advancement of transportation 
technologies aided the traveling experiences of the Iowa-bound settler.  The nineteenth-
century American traveler was able to exploit those advancements.  Scholar Jack Larkin 
suggested that radical advancements in nineteenth-century America in “speed, scale, and 
experience of traveling came with the application of newly emerging transportation 
technologies - the railroad, the steamboat, the building of canals - to American 
conditions.”337  While there were not yet any railroads that cut into the Iowa landscape, 
those that already reached into Illinois facilitated movement westward.  Upon harnessing 
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steam power, boat traffic on the Mississippi River increased and the river became a major 
thoroughfare for both the transportation of goods and the migrating population.  
Prospective settlers could arrive along the eastern border of Iowa simply by buying 
passage on a steamer going down the Ohio River, then back up the Mississippi River to 
ports such as Keokuk or Dubuque.338 
On June 1, 1833, the Iowa Territory opened for settlement.  As settlers moved 
westward into the Iowa territory, they viewed the region with optimism.  The territory of 
Iowa held great promise in its fertile soils and natural resources.  Hardwoods such as oak 
and hickory lined the river corridors and offered a ready supply of fuel for settlers.  
Additionally, the hardwoods proved valuable in making equipment handles, repairing 
wagon wheels, and building homes.  Despite the lack of timber, except along the river 
corridors, settlers soon began writing to relatives about the potential of Iowa’s soils.  The 
rich soils that supported a prairie ecosystem held the promise of providing tremendous 
agricultural production.  While rendering the prairie ready for agriculture required hard 
work, the fertile soils rewarded many settlers.  The settler could extract a profit from the 
land without intensive efforts to remove timber.  The soils were highly productive 
without the need to lay fallow, and farmers found crop rotation to eliminate soil 
exhaustion unnecessary.339   
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Numerous waterways cut north to south aiding settlement of the territory.340  The 
Des Moines River, with headwaters in present day Minnesota, bisects the State of Iowa 
passing through the current state capital of Des Moines, and converging with the 
Mississippi River at Keokuk.  As such, the route of the Des Moines River proved to be of 
key importance - steamboats delivered settlers into the center of the region, exported their 
goods to other markets, supplied outposts such as Fort Des Moines, and tied the interior 
farmlands of the state to the Mississippi River transportation network.341  The perceived 
promise of the region drew 1,194,020 people within the first thirty-seven years of official 
settlement of the region.  The rapid influx of settlers allowed Iowa to achieve statehood 
on December 28, 1846.342    
 
Governmental Improvement 
 
Early political influence in the Iowa territory by the Whig party shaped the 
region’s growth and land disposal policies.  Despite the abundance of fertile soils for 
agricultural production and people’s willingness to work the lands, state Whigs argued 
that without local and federal aid Iowa would not be able to maximize its role in 
economic markets.  Historian Robert Cook suggested “The Whigs central contention was 
that notwithstanding the fertility of the prairies, the lands were valueless until it was first 
improved…and then linked to the market by an efficient financial and transportation 
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infrastructure.”343  One call for investment in improvements came by way of the Des 
Moines River Lands Grant.  The first session of the twenty-ninth Congress passed a bill 
providing $3,300 for the employment of a competent engineer to survey the Des Moines 
River under the direction of the Secretary of War.344  
With the endorsement of the possibilities of successful navigation on the Des 
Moines River from the river survey, Congress constructed the Des Moines River Lands 
Grant, which gained approval on August 8, 1846.  Creation of the Des Moines River 
Lands Grant allowed the federal government to provide Iowa with public land “for the 
purpose of aiding said territory to improve the navigation of the Des Moines River from 
its mouth [located at Keokuk, Iowa along the Mississippi River] to the Raccoon Fork 
[present day Des Moines, Iowa].”345  Congress further provided that the composition of 
the saleable lands be,  
“one equal moiety, in alternate sections, of public lands, (remaining unsold, and 
not otherwise disposed of, encumbered, or appropriated), in a strip five miles in 
width on each side of said river; to be selected within said Territory by an agent or 
agents to be appointed by the governor thereof, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.”346   
 
Upon the conveyance of the lands from the public domain, the responsibility fell to Iowa 
to sell the lands and thus fund the construction of locks, dams, and canal sections 
necessary to make the Des Moines River navigable.   
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In creating the land grant, Congress added provisions, listed in four sections, 
which forced the Territory of Iowa to follow a specific process, thus assuring proper 
conveyance of the lands.  While Congress intended the selling of the land conveyed under 
the grant to offset the cost of the construction projects, it also established a process with 
which Iowa chose the conveyed lands.  Congress offered alternating sections of land on 
each side of the Des Moines River, extending outward five miles in both directions from 
the river.  In an effort to minimize multiple title claims to the same sections of land, 
Congress reserved from the grant lands already claimed or conveyed under other 
grants.347  
Congress also established the certification process to which Iowa adhered.  The 
selection of alternating sections fell to agents appointed by the governor.  Further, upon 
completion of land selections, certification required federal government approval, 
specifically from the Secretary of the Treasury.  In 1846, the General Land Office and 
stewardship of the public domain fell under the jurisdiction of the federal Department of 
the Treasury.348  
Under the second section of the grant, Congress restrictedthe  land conveyance 
and disposal power of Iowa.  The grant tightly limited Iowa’s ability to freely convey the 
chosen lands needed to complete the improvement project.  The legislation allowed Iowa 
to initially sell lands up to the value of thirty thousand dollars.  Upon reaching the thirty 
thousand dollar level, Congress required certification to the President of the United States 
by the governor of the Territory that expenditures on the River project reached one-half, 
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or fifteen thousand dollars, of the thirty thousand dollars obtained from land conveyance.  
Successful completion of the initial certification in turn allowed Iowa to the sell 
additional land until it again reached the thirty thousand dollar plateau.  Congress 
intended the process to be repeated each time the sale of lands reached the plateau, 
thereby triggering recertification, until all the lands were exhausted and the project was 
completed.349  
In expressing the federal government’s policy to assist national economic 
development through transportation infrastructure projects, Congress declared the Des 
Moines River a public highway.  The declaration ensured that the river “shall be and 
forever remain a public highway for the use of the government of the United States, free 
of any toll or other charge whatever for any property of the United States, or persons in 
their service passing through or along.”350  The declaration restricted the ability of private 
entities to limit movement of people, goods, and services through the nation’s 
transportation network.  The establishment of tolls or other restrictions on transportation 
systems such as canals, ferries, railroads, and wagon roads raised the cost of transporting 
people and goods to and from markets and undermined the federal government’s policy 
encouraging western expansion and the emergence of a national economy.  Allowance of 
tolls and other charges by the federal government served only to hinder people with 
limited capital who were moving into the region. 
Congress restricted the amount of money, however, that the Territory could charge 
per acre for the disposal of the granted lands.  Section three of the grant “provided 
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always, that it shall not be competent for the said Territory or future State of Iowa to 
dispose of said lands, or any of them, at a price lower than, for the time being, shall be the 
minimum price of other public lands.”351  The federal government’s pricing restrictions 
allowed Iowa to sell land to aid construction of the improvement project and assist 
settlement of the region but at the same time not create an unfair advantage over other 
territories and states vying for settlers to purchase their lands.      
Congress constructed section four of the River Lands Grant in an effort to remove 
any foreseeable complications or controversy arising from admission to statehood by the 
Iowa Territory.  Section four enacted, “That whenever the Territory of Iowa shall be 
admitted into the Union as a State, the lands hereby granted for the above purpose shall 
be and become the property of said State, for the purpose contemplated in this act, and no 
other.”352  Concluding the grant, Congress required that the Iowa legislature accept the 
grant for its intended purpose only.   
 
 
Failure at the State Level 
 
Upon completion and passage of the grant by Congress on August 8, 1846, the 
grant transferred into the hands of the territorial legislature.  The early years of the project 
consisted of legislative struggles to establish mechanisms for the disposal of the granted 
lands, and coordination of work on the Des Moines River.  On December 28, 1846, 
before the Iowa Territory legislature acted on the grant, the federal government admitted 
Iowa into the Union.  On January 9, 1847, in a joint resolution of the newly established 
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Iowa Legislature, the state accepted the grant with the official selection of the odd 
numbered sections.353  
With the transfer of the grant to the Iowa General Assembly, attention turned to 
devising a means to oversee all facets of the improvement project.  Construction of 
twenty-eight dams and nine locks began in earnest to ensure that the two hundred and 
four mile distance of the Des Moines River from the Raccoon River fork (Des Moines) to 
the Mississippi River became navigable.  An engineering survey determined the precise 
placement of each dam ensuring the proper pool depth upriver at the location of the next 
dam.  The plan also called for the construction of three canal sections with the hope of 
shortening the route.354  The details of the survey encouraged the chief engineer Samuel 
Curtis.  In referring to Curtis’ optimism historian Jacob Swisher wrote, “Taking all things 
into consideration he said it was ‘mathematically certain’ that the Des Moines River 
could be made a great thoroughfare for the transportation of mid-western produce.”355  
Despite this initial optimism, the project only completed the first seven sets of dams and 
locks reaching upriver from the Mississippi River.  Dams eight and nine remained 
incomplete and construction on the remaining locks and dams never began.  Additionally, 
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the litigation wrought by the Des Moines River Improvement Project remained in the 
courts through the 1890s.356 
The Des Moines River improvement did not occur in a vacuum; rather the project 
in Iowa represented only one of numerous projects during the nineteenth century, each 
with its own distinct challenges.  Other improvement projects, such as the Erie Canal, 
offered the Iowa Legislature examples of how to administer the grant lands and oversee 
day-to-day improvement project activity.  Although most funding for the Erie Canal came 
from state and private sources rather than federal land grants, the Erie Canal and the Des 
Moines River Improvement Project presented a comparison of two improvement projects’ 
administrative structures.  While other factors undoubtedly contributed to the successes 
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and failures of the two projects, the relative effectiveness of managing the projects greatly 
contributed to the respective outcomes.  Begun in early nineteenth century and not 
completed until 1862, the Erie Canal project encountered many of its own controversies 
and complications, but served as a model for many other internal improvement 
projects.357  While there is no indication that Iowa specifically utilized the experiences of 
the Erie Canal to inform the Des Moines River project, many administrative similarities 
existed.  
Upon acceptance of the River Lands Grant, the Iowa legislature established the 
process by which the state would oversee the improvement project.  Much like the Erie 
Canal Board established in 1826, the Iowa General Assembly passed legislation on 
February 24, 1847 that enabled the Board of Public Works to oversee sales of the granted 
lands, application of the revenue, and construction of the improvement project on the Des 
Moines River.  Five appointed commissioners comprised The Erie Canal Board, while the 
Board of Public Works consisted of the elected positions of president, secretary, and 
treasurer.  Although the officers on each board held different titles, their responsibilities 
remained similar.358  Additionally, the Iowa General Assembly’s legislation gave the 
Board of Public Works power to appoint a chief engineer and various other assistants as 
deemed necessary, and strongly encouraged an industrious effort to secure the completion 
of the improvement project as quickly as possible.359  Historian Conduce Gatch wrote,  
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The first meeting of the Board was held September 22, 1847, and provision was 
then made for raising funds, with which to defray the expense of visiting other 
states for inspection of [similar] works… for the employment of a chief engineer, 
and for the purchase of necessary instruments and material to begin the 
prosecution of the work.360     
 
In 1848, the state delegates supplemented the previous year’s legislation that 
created the Public Works Board.  The additional legislation presented a legal process to 
dispose of the lands and handle possible claims of preemption encompassed within the 
Des Moines River Lands Grant boundaries.361  While the legislature acknowledged the 
rights of settlers under the federal acts of preemption established in 1838 and 1841, they 
expanded the process of legal certification.  Passed into law on January 1, 1847, the 
original act provided the legal owner of lands granted by the federal government to the 
river improvement project, with the “privilege of pre-emption and [the ability to enter] 
three hundred and twenty acres” of land.362  The legislature defined a legal owner broadly 
as any person who was either over twenty-one years of age or the head of a family.  
Additionally, the initial act established a legal process for dealing with trespassing on the 
granted lands.  While the act recognized the preemption rights of settlers, anyone entering 
onto those lands or in possession of those lands outside the certification requirements 
became the subject to legal recourse.  The legislature declared anyone found guilty of 
trespassing on the lands “liable for such trespass or waste in double the value of such 
trespass or waste.”363  The legislature further gave the Public Works Board the power to 
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collect the fine by appearing before a court, and it directed the Board to apply such 
collected fines towards the improvement project’s completion.   
The ensuing act in 1848 authorized the Board of Public Works to place granted 
lands on the market with several provisions.  “The Board, after having given public 
notice, and reasonable time for pre-empting, which shall be at least two months, offer the 
residue of said lands at public sale in such parcels, and at such times as they may find 
necessary and convenient in the prosecution of the work.”364  The act further established 
that a person purchasing any of the granted lands within a year after the official public 
notice, that contained improvements upon the land by another individual, must pay that 
individual [usually recognized as a squatter] “reasonable compensation” for the 
improvements, while paying no less than two dollars an acre for the lands.365     
As early as 1850, however, the General Assembly believed that the project had 
stalled and passed a series of bills to “secure a more vigorous prosecution, and early 
completion” of the project.366  Iowa and the Board of Public Works could not sell lands 
fast enough, or for enough money to keep pace with the expenses of surveys and 
construction.  The state legislature introduced several proposals considering the issuance 
of bonds to secure money but no legislation materialized.  Referring to the efforts of the 
General Assembly in securing the completion of the project, historian Jacob Swisher 
wrote, “casting about for a way out, the Board called the attention of the General 
Assembly to the fact that the States of Indiana and Illinois had undertaken similar 
improvement projects, and had given them over to companies of capitalists to 
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complete.”367  Unlike the Board of Public Works, the Erie Canal Board had the authority 
to find other methods of funding the project.368  Under the Iowa General Assembly’s 
legislation, the Board of Public Works’ only option for funding arose from land sales.  
The existing acts greatly limited the ability of the Board and exposed the project’s success 
to the demand for specific parcels of land and the fortunes of a market economy.  
As a result, the Iowa General Assembly addressed the situation again in February 
1851.  In an effort to “secure a more vigorous prosecution and early completion of the 
Des Moines River improvement,” the legislature amended the provisions of the 1847 act 
that established a Board of Public Works.369  The 1851 amendment abolished the Board 
of Public Works and its offices of president, secretary, and treasurer.  In return, the 
legislature bestowed authority upon  the individual holding a new position, the 
commissioner.  The act called for appointment of the commissioner by the governor, 
“with the consent of the Senate.”370  The commissioner of the Des Moines River 
improvement held office for two years, from the first day of February in the year 
appointed.  In an effort to hold the commissioner responsible for keeping the 
improvement project on a reasonable time schedule, the General Assembly required the 
commissioner take the oath,  
I _____ do solemnly swear that I will to the best of my ability, honestly and 
faithfully, discharge the duties imposed upon me as commissioner of the Des 
Moines River improvement, and to the utmost of my exertions, strive to promote 
the vigorous prosecution, and secure the early and economical completion of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
366
 Swisher, “The Des Moines River Improvement,” 143-144. 
367
 Swisher, “The Des Moines River Improvement Project,” 156-158. 
368
 Sheriff, The Artificial River, 81-85. 
369
 Iowa, Des Moines River Improvement, Laws of Iowa (1851), Vol. 3, Ch. 58: 131-138. 
370
 Ibid. 
223 
 
said work; and that I will give my constant and unremitting personal attention 
thereto.371 
 
 Further emphasizing the legislature’s resolve to see the improvement project 
carried out in the most industrious manner, provisions of the act required the 
commissioner to secure a bond of thirty thousand dollars, indicating the commissioner’s 
vested interest, and present it to the governor and secretary of the State.  With the 
appointment made by the governor, the oath taken and the bond secured, the General 
Assembly then authorized the commissioner to undertake his work.372 
The commissioner’s responsibilities began immediately upon confirmation by the 
senate.  Similar to that of the Erie Canal Board, the commissioner’s responsibilities 
included “oversight and control of the improvement as it progresses; - examining each 
and every part thereof as often as practicable; - to do all things properly devolving upon 
such an officer.”373  Additionally, responsibility fell to the commissioner to “take charge 
of all books, papers, plans, and other matters of whatever kind…now in the possession of 
the board of public works” and settle all outstanding matters with contractors resulting 
from contracts entered into with the Board of Public Works.374 
 In addition to the commissioner, the legislature created the position of register of 
the Des Moines River improvement.  Like the commissioner, the legislature required the 
register to take an oath swearing to promote the speedy completion of the river project 
and secure a bond.  However, the Legislature required an increased bond of fifty thousand 
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dollars for the register.375  The legislation does not explain the larger sum, although the 
register’s relatively sensitive position opened itself to bribery and falsification.  The 
General Assembly authorized the register to take over the responsibilities of the treasurer 
and secretary of the Public Works Board.  Those responsibilities included sale of granted 
lands, recording of land sales, and all other related issues arising from the disposal of 
lands.   
 The state legislature also granted to the commissioner and register the authority to 
enter into contracts between Iowa and private companies to complete various construction 
projects on the river below Keosauqua, Iowa.  Additionally, the General Assembly broke 
with the previous federal stance authorizing both officers to exchange land and water 
rents and tolls along the river below Keosauqua with private companies in lieu of 
payment for their construction efforts.  However, the General Assembly provided that 
lands exchanged be no less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre (the same rate 
that the federal government charged for other public lands).  The legislature left the 
negotiations of water rents and tolls partially at the discretion of the commissioner and 
register.  The responsibility to determine the length of contracts for the water rents and 
tolls fell upon the two elected officials, while the legislature restricted the value of the 
rents and tolls. 376  The General Assembly wrote in section eight of the act, “the tolls shall 
not exceed in their average rate those now charged on the Monongahela River, in the 
State of Pennsylvania, nor shall the water power thus to be surrendered include the water 
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power needed for the purpose of lockage.”377  The General Assembly extended similar 
provision, as below Keosauqua, to the stretch of river between Keosauqua and the 
Raccoon Fork to fund the improvement project.  Despite the authority granted to the 
commissioner and register by the act, the legislature required all contracts entered into by 
the officers of the river improvement to contain the approval and signature of the 
Governor of Iowa.378 
  Over the next three years, the General Assembly enacted several supplemental 
acts pertaining to the commissioner, register, and the Des Moines River improvement 
project while it wrapped up outstanding issues involving the former Board of Public 
Works.  In 1851, the state legislature allowed payment of fees, in the form of grant lands, 
owed to the former secretary of the Board of Public Works.  The land presented in lieu of 
payment consisted solely of the river grant lands.  The legislature directed the extension 
of payment in land at an exchange rate of no less than one dollar and twenty-five cents 
per acre.379 
 In 1853, with the improvement project advancing toward completion at a rate 
slower than anticipated, the General Assembly further amended the 1851 legislation that 
had created the offices of commissioner and register.  The legislation contained three key 
changes to the management structure of the river improvement project.  The first change 
focused on abolishing the appointment process by which the commissioner and register 
took office.  In its place, the legislature established the right of “qualified citizens” of 
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Iowa to vote for the officers.380  Those in the positions still held office for two years 
before reelections occurred and then followed the course of other elected state officials.  
The transition to popular elections for the commissioner and register echoed a similar 
transition of the Erie Canal Board.  In 1844, the legislature overseeing the Canal Board 
passed a law requiring the election of commissioners.  In part, they envisioned that 
electing officials would provide more accountability.381 
 The amendment also abolished the security bond required of both officers.  While 
the legislature intended that the bonds tie the officers personally to the successful 
completion of the improvement project, the state of the project in 1853 proved otherwise.  
Although subletting of construction occurred, companies entrusted with the work fell 
behind schedule due to various environmental challenges such as excessively rainy 
seasons and episodes of cholera.382  The finances of the project also fell behind, as lands 
sales could not keep pace with the costs of the project, and the commissioner struggled to 
find the resources to pay outstanding debts resulting from the Board of Public Works.  
The abolition of the security bond and the implementation of voting for the offices 
effectively removed any political liability that was present under the appointment process.  
Outwardly then, the new election process provided the possibility to limit corruption that 
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existed under the appointment method and created a sense of accountability to the general 
population. 383 
In an effort to assist the overburdened officers of the improvement project, the 
General Assembly extended authority to the officers to appoint assistants.  The legislation 
specifically named the first two assistants, Uriah Biggs of Wapello County and George G. 
Wright of Van Buren County, and bestowed upon them powers equivalent to the 
commissioner.  In essence, the legislature doubled the management personnel of the 
improvement project by extending the authority of contract negotiations and daily 
operation decisions to the assistants. 
To further influence the completion of the project, the legislature established a 
mechanism that forced the officers into action.  The General Assembly, in an effort to 
distribute the responsibility of the project, directed the commissioner and assistants to 
enter into contracts only if the other party undertook significant responsibility, 
specifically forcing the other party into extending no less than $1,300,000 in expenses 
and payment of outstanding improvement debts.  To ensure pursuance of contracts 
meeting the requirements, the legislature threatened refusal of payment to the officers if 
no such contracts materialized by September 1853.  This act severely limited the number 
of parties willing and financially able to enter into contracts, and pressured the officers 
into making questionable decisions.384    
                                                          
383
 Iowa, Des Moines River Improvement, Laws of Iowa (1853), Vol. 4, Joint Resolution No. 8: 
204-205; Colonel C. H. Gatch,  “The Des Moines River Land Grant,” 362-364. 
384
 Iowa, Des Moines River Improvement, Laws of Iowa (1853), Vol. 4, Joint Resolution No. 8: 
204-205. 
228 
 
 Aside from the settling of outstanding debt to the Board members, affirming the 
right of the citizens to vote for the commissioner and register, and expanding the offices 
overseeing the project, other legislation proved more important.  Enacted during the same 
1851 term, the General Assembly authorized the commissioner and register to “transfer, 
or convey in fee simple…any portion or all of said lands” to a company or companies as 
needed to secure the completion of the improvement project.385  Although the act did not 
provide the commissioner and assistants with as many other funding options as those 
involved with the Erie Canal, it still offered more options than the previous provisions.  
The act signaled the State’s gradual withdrawal from overseeing the daily progress of the 
project. 
Although the legislature extended the legal authority to contract work in exchange 
for any or all lands, the previous restrictions left the officers with few willing parties.  
The amendments governing the improvement contracts established by the legislature 
restricted the ability of the commissioner and assistants to find parties willing to carry out 
the project’s construction and accept its financial constraints.  With few small companies 
or individuals finding the terms financially viable, the commissioner and assistants turned 
to more financially capable investors.  Similar to other Midwestern states such as Illinois 
and Indiana, the officers of the improvement project looked toward eastern capitalists to 
create an influx of monetary resources.  The act established the legal means by which the 
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commissioner and assistants conveyed the grant lands in large parcels to Eastern investors 
and land speculators.386   
In December 1853, the state entered into a contract with Henry O’Reilly, an 
eastern capitalist, in the hope of reestablishing a more reasonable timetable for the 
project’s completion.  In effect, this contract marked the beginning the privatization of the 
river improvement project.  Upon returning to New York, Henry O’Reilly recruited 
several eastern investors.  Together they incorporated the Des Moines River Navigation 
and Railroad Company under Iowa laws and entered into a contract with the 
commissioner to oversee the improvement project.387  
The contract agreed upon between the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad 
Company and the improvement commissioner outlined several key concessions in 
exchange for parcels of the granted lands.  The Navigation Company agreed to complete 
all construction on the Des Moines River to the Raccoon Fork, as outlined in the original 
plans, no later than July 1, 1858.  Additionally, the company agreed to complete one-
fourth of the construction project each year by the first day of July.  Further, the company 
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accepted all responsibility relating to outstanding debt.  As a result, the contract stipulated 
the Navigation Company pay all debts against the improvement project ninety days from 
the contract’s approval date.  Attached to the payment of debts, the contract required the 
Navigation Company to settle and pay all damages against the State arising from the 
improvement project, including loss of income to mills along the river.  Finally removing 
all other financial burdens from the State, the contract required the Navigation Company 
pay all salaries and expenses of the officers and employees associated with the project.388   
In exchange for the acceptance of the provisions in the contract, the contract 
provided the Navigation Company with all the remaining unsold lands conveyed under 
the River Lands Grant and the right of collecting water rents and tolls for forty years 
along the length of the project on the Des Moines River.  The contract stipulated that 
upon the conclusion of the forty years, all rights reverted to the State of Iowa.389   
With the contracts approved, general sentiment seemed positive.  However, 
historian Jacob Swisher contended that the project quickly mired down again.  
Misunderstandings and disagreements soon developed among the members of the 
company resulting in charges of mismanagement and fraud and dashed the hopes of 
citizens of Iowa.390  Continuing allegations of mismanagement and fraudulent accounting 
practices and little visible advancement of the improvement project captured the attention 
of the General Assembly.  In December 1856, the General Assembly established a joint 
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committee charged with the responsibility of investigating the allegations of waste and 
fraud waged against the Navigation Company.391   
The joint committee ruled that because the original contract between the State and 
the Navigation Company did not get the approval of the Governor by obtaining his 
signature, the contract never legally existed.  Additionally, in the event that the contract 
did legally exist, the one-fourth-completion clause remained uncompleted within the 
prescribed time.  With that conclusion, the joint committee argued the company forfeited 
the contact anyway.392  
By the following year, in 1857, the Iowa General Assembly again turned its 
attention toward the Navigation Company’s affairs.  Responding to the continuing 
allegations, the legislature passed an act establishing an appointed commissioner to 
oversee the investigation.393  The General Assembly authorized the appointed 
commissioner, in conjunction with the elected improvement commissioner, to again 
contract out the remaining improvement work.  Additionally, the legislature indicated by 
the passage of the act, that the State of Iowa considered all contracts with the Navigation 
Company ended. 394 
Although the legislature considered the contract void, the Navigation Company 
thought otherwise.  In hopes of finally ending the relationship with the Navigation 
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Company, the General Assembly again addressed the matter in 1858.  With a Joint 
Resolution, the legislature agreed to convey all unsold lands under the 1846 grant to the 
Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company in exchange for ceasing all operations by 
the company pertaining to the improvement project.  Further, all rights to water rents and 
tolls returned to the State of Iowa.395 
Unlike the management of the Erie Canal project, the state of Iowa relinquished 
all oversight in the project to The Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company.  
Although the Erie Canal Board contracted out the project and allowed private capital 
investment in the canal, the Board never relinquished ownership rights.  Maintaining 
ownership provided the Canal Board with a vested interest in the project as well as 
oversight in all decisions.  The Des Moines Improvement Commissioner and assistants 
maintained only the decision-making authority over construction specifics on the river 
improvement.396 
In 1858, upon relieving the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company of its 
outstanding contractual obligations Iowa found itself with an incomplete river 
improvement project.  The region still lacked a transportation system just as it had in 
1846.  With the advancement of railroads into the Mississippi River corridor, the State’s 
attention turned toward facilitating the growth of railroads in the state.  Although bound 
by the provisions of the original 1846 River Lands grant that limited the disposal of the 
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lands only to aid the river improvement project, the General Assembly passed legislation 
on March 22, 1858 that transferred the lands to aid the development of railroads.  The 
legislature conveyed the River Grant Lands not claimed by the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company to the Keokuk, Fort Des Moines, and Minnesota 
Railroad Company.  In exchange for the lands, the General Assembly charged the railroad 
company with the responsibility of constructing a railroad from Keokuk, along the Des 
Moines River Valley, through Des Moines, and to the northern state line.  The General 
Assembly hoped that the construction of a railroad along the Des Moines River Valley 
would replace the river improvement project.397   
The State of Iowa called upon Congress to amend the provision of the 1846 grant, 
allowing the state to transfer the lands to the development of railroad transportation.  Not 
until 1862, however did Congress finally act upon the request.  The Thirty-Seventh 
Congress passed “An Act Confirming a Land Claim in the State of Iowa, and for Other 
Purposes.”398  The Congress extended all previous rights of the 1846 River Lands Grant 
but amended the specified purpose to “aid in the construction of the Keokuk, Fort Des 
Moines, and Minnesota Railroad.”399  The 1862 act effectively ended the State of Iowa’s 
great river improvement project and opened the door for the advancement of railroads 
through Iowa to the Great Plains.400  Although in 1846, construction of twenty-eight dams 
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and nine locks began in earnest by 1860 the project had come to a complete stop with 
little actually achieved.401  The project only saw the completion of the first seven dams 
and locks reaching upriver from the Mississippi River.  Dams eight and nine remained 
incomplete and construction on the remaining locks and dams never began.402    
The Des Moines River Lands Grant brought together two great issues of 
antebellum politics: land grants and improvement projects.  The federal government 
experimented with methods of facilitating economic growth in the expanding nation.  In 
doing so, Congress conveyed parcels of land from the public domain to territories and 
states in hopes of constructing improvement projects.  The enormity of such projects 
presented unforeseeable circumstances that required legislative experimentation and 
action.  State and territorial governments faced difficulties in developing effective 
administrative and financial hierarchies.  Insufficient land sales, cost overruns, 
mismanagement, and changing technologies of economic development forced the Iowa 
General Assembly to gradually loosen its control and subsequently contributed to the 
failures of the Des Moines River Improvement project.  In an effort to oversee all the 
complex facets of the land grants and improvement projects, they created land offices, 
sought out alternative sources of financing, and explored various methods to oversee 
construction and a timely completion of the projects.   
While some projects such as the Erie Canal remained under the close supervision 
of legislatures, Iowa chose to relinquish its oversight of daily administration and turned to 
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private entrepreneurs to further provide funding and oversee the project’s completion.  
Privatization added to the complexity of improvement projects and pitted state and 
federal government’s agendas of serving the public good against each other and those of 
economically driven private companies.  Because the state relinquished the title to much 
of the granted lands as well as the daily oversight of the project to a private company, 
Iowa found itself without a truly navigable river and consumed by numerous 
controversies.  Iowa could not resolve the controversies on its own and subsequently 
turned to the federal government for assistance. 
 
The Federal Government’s Struggle for Authority 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal government struggled to define its 
role as a facilitator in the development of a national economy.  Although the government 
aided the construction of improvement projects that in turn strengthened the national 
economy, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government 
labored in defining their precise authority.  Western expansion not only opened new 
territory for settlement but also aided in the development of a national economy.  To 
strengthen the national economy, new regions required transportation infrastructure 
development, connecting regional markets to national markets.  Citizens called upon state 
and federal governments to assist construction of internal improvement projects that 
linked growers and buyers to each other.  Acting in the name of public good, 
governmental conveyance of such grants proved contentious and issues emerged that 
helped define the role of the federal government’s branches.  The decision of the federal 
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government to facilitate economic growth through land grants raised questions as to who 
had the authority to interpret, enforce, and amend the grants.  The Des Moines River 
Improvement Land Grant presented one example of such controversy in determining 
federal authority between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches within the 
context of party politics. 
 
The Rise of Executive Authority 
 
Situated within the struggles of nineteenth-century American political parties, the 
Des Moines River Improvement boundary controversy encompassed the dispute between 
the State of Iowa and the national government about the land grant boundaries.  The 
definition of the River Lands Grant boundary created several major dilemmas, chief 
among them the quantity of land available to the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad 
Company.  More area contained in the land grant made it possible for the Company to 
reap greater profits in land speculation.  Titleholders also held great interest in the 
resolution of the boundary dispute.  The validity of land claims purchased or conveyed 
under the River Lands Grant varied greatly depending on the interpretation of the grant’s 
boundaries.  Under conflicting land titles, multiple settlers claimed the same lands.  Court 
cases exemplified complaints filed by settlers who obtained title under the Federal Land 
Office and called into question the legality of title held by the Des Moines Navigation and 
Railroad Company and its assigned landholders.  However, the boundary dispute 
ultimately became an issue between the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad 
Company and the national government.  Although situated within the context of the 
boundary and title controversy, the River Lands Grant epitomized the struggle of the 
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federal government within itself to determine the authority to create, interpret, and 
enforce laws.  
Within a year of the 1846 River Lands Grant from Congress, controversy arose 
over the lands available for sale under the grant.  The dispute stemmed from two differing 
interpretations of the geographical area encompassed by the 1846 land grant.  The basis 
for the arguments lay within the ambiguity of the grant.  Although the creators of the land 
grant explicitly indicated that the improvement effort was to proceed from the mouth of 
the Des Moines River to the Raccoon Fork, they did not precisely define the boundaries 
of the saleable lands.  Congress ordered that the land sold be made up of every other 
section of land within five miles of the river, however, it did not give a point of origin or 
a terminus.  Out of this ambiguity arose the first controversy between the State of Iowa 
and the national government.403  
The first decision regarding the boundaries of the land granted for sale came from 
the United States Commissioner of Public Lands based on an 1846 interpretation by 
Augustus C. Dodge, Delegate from the Territory of Iowa.  Born in St. Genevieve, located 
in the Louisiana Territory, Dodge lived the life of a frontier General’s son.  Historian 
Benjamin Gue wrote, “Augustus grew up amid the stirring events of frontier life and 
while a youth joined a military expedition against the Indians.”404  During the Blackhawk 
War, Dodge gained the position of lieutenant of a military company under his father, 
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General Henry Dodge.  After the Blackhawk War ended, he accepted appointment as 
Register of the United States General Land Office and relocated to Burlington in the Iowa 
Territory.  In 1839, Dodge accepted the nomination of the Democratic Party and 
represented the Iowa Territory as a delegate to Congress.  He later won election to the 
Senate to represent the new state of Iowa in 1846.405       
In a report to the Committee on Public Lands reporting the quantity of saleable 
land comprised by the grant, Dodge stated the amount to be 261,000 acres, expressly 
assuming that the range of land proposed under the grant was limited to the line “from its 
mouth to the Raccoon Fork.”406  The Committee concluded that since the delegate from  
Iowa interpreted the reach of the boundaries to include lands only to the Raccoon Fork 
and because Congress subsequently approved that interpretation, the only possible 
decision indicated that the initial grant provided lands only to the Raccoon Fork.407   
Dodge’s narrow interpretation of the River Lands Grant boundaries exemplified 
his political ideology.  His political beliefs echoed those of national Democrats who 
supported the ideas of state sovereignty and tried to limit the federal government’s 
involvement in what they perceived as state matters, in this case aiding construction of 
internal improvements.  “During the long conflict over slavery, General A. C. Dodge 
supported the ‘compromise of 1850,’ and followed the lead of Stephen A. Douglas in 
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voting for the famous doctrine of "Squatter Sovereignty."408  In 1855 the party lost control 
of the State and like many other Northern democrats, Dodge lost his seat to Free Soil 
candidate James Harlan.409 
In June 1848, with the presumed understanding that the River Land Grant did not 
extend above the Raccoon Fork, President James K. Polk issued a proclamation that 
opened lands above the Raccoon Fork for settlement through the national government’s 
land office.  By the time Iowa obtained statehood in 1846, a clearly defined process of 
state admission to the Union emerged.  The process, established in 1841 by the admission 
of Tennessee as the first of the public land states, required the petitioning territory 
recognize that the lands not specifically conveyed as conditions of statehood remained the 
possession of the federal government.  Iowa achieved statehood similarly.410  With the 
ruling that the River Lands Grant did not include the lands north of the Raccoon River 
Fork and therefore remained part of the federally owned public domain, Polk proclaimed 
the lands open for settlement.  While some of the lands included areas along the Des 
Moines River, he contended they remained separate from the River Land Grant.  The 
proclamation signified the beginning conflict in the emerging second controversy over 
property rights, which the United States Supreme Court finally settled in 1892.411 
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President Polk’s 1848 proclamation placing the disputed lands on the market 
combined both Whig and Democratic Party principles by supporting western expansion 
as well as refusing federal funding for internal improvement projects.  On December 2, 
1845, President Polk argued that the United States needed to aggressively expand 
westward to the Pacific Ocean.  Supporting Polk’s assertions, editor of the New York 
Times and the Democratic Review John O’Sullivan wrote, “it was the nation’s manifest 
destiny to overspread and possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given 
us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self government 
entrusted to us.”412  The procurement of Mexican territory and Texas, and acquisition of 
California and Oregon factored amongst his expansionist accomplishments that shaped 
the geographic identity of the United States during his tenure in office.413    
In contrast, Polk viewed the federal endorsement and support of internal 
improvements as “a proposition to plunder the treasury.”414  He argued that paying off the 
national debt required the strongest of federal government efforts rather than plunging the 
government deeper in debt by funding internal improvements.  In a bill similar to the 
River Lands Grant, Congress provided federal economic support for the improvement of 
the Savannah River.  Although the bill provided monetary funding of the project instead 
of land grants, Polk declared strong opposition to the bill and adamantly declared a 
presidential veto awaited it.415 
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  The second ruling on the boundaries came only three years after the first decision 
in 1849.  Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, a Democrat, overturned former 
President Polk’s ruling, insisting, “that the grant extends on both sides of the river from 
its source to its mouth, but not including the lands on the river in the State of 
Missouri.”416  Walker’s decision supported the broader boundary interpretation that 
encompassed more land.  The inclusion of all lands to the source, or headwaters, of the 
Des Moines River, underwent revision with the creation of the Minnesota Territory in 
1849.  Because of the Iowa- Minnesota border, Iowa lost possession of the lands outside 
of its own borders.  Secretary Walker ruled that the authority to render a decision on the 
boundary dispute resulted from the fact that the General Land Office resided under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury and therefore President Polk had not had 
the authority to decide the matter. 
Secretary Walker’s decision supporting the broader interpretation of the River 
Lands Grant reflected his overall philosophy of the role of government in the 
development of the economy.  Born in Northumberland, Pennsylvania in 1801, he 
attended the University of Pennsylvania and gained admittance to the bar in 1821.  After 
turning down a position on the state Supreme Court, Walker won election to the United 
States Senate and served from 1835 to 1845, when President Polk appointed him as 
Secretary of the Treasury.  Several key accomplishments assisted in defining the role of 
government in the economy.  Establishment of an independent treasury system to deal 
with public funds figured among Walker’s most prominent achievements.  He also 
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supported free trade and financing of the Mexican War.  His private business matters 
focused on entrepreneurial endeavors that included land speculation in Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Wisconsin, while also selling securities for the Illinois Central Railroad in 
England.417 
In early 1850, the appointment of Whig Thomas Ewing as the Secretary of the 
Interior in the Taylor administration brought a reversal in the federal government’s 
official stance and reestablished the original boundary to the Raccoon Fork.  
Reorganization of the federal government’s executive branch transferred control of the 
General Land Office from the Department of the Treasury under Secretary Walker’s 
control to the Department of the Interior.  With newly established authority over matters 
before the General Land Office, Secretary Ewing defended the validity of his 
interpretation, arguing that Secretary Walker never certified the previous judgment and 
therefore it merely constituted a suggestion, not a binding decision.  In addition to his 
ruling limiting the boundaries of the grant, Secretary Ewing suspended sales of the 
disputed lands placed on the market by the national government under President Polk’s 
proclamation.418 
Secretary Ewing’s decision to adhere to the stricter boundary interpretation 
seemingly contradicted his other efforts and political philosophies, which he 
demonstrated in congruence with to the Taylor administration’s policies.  Born near 
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Liberty, Virginia, Ewing’s early claim to fame included his adoption of William 
Tecumseh Sherman in 1829 and managing his subsequent appointment to West Point in 
1836.  After admittance to the bar in 1816 and several years in private practice, Ewing ran 
for the state legislature unsuccessfully.  He later won election to the United States Senate 
and served from 1831 until 1837.  In 1841, President William H. Harrison appointed 
Ewing as Secretary of the Treasury, and he continued the position under the Tyler 
administration.  During his service as Secretary of Treasury, “his most important 
contribution involved helping draft bills to re-charter the National Bank.”419  Frustrated 
over two separate vetoes of re-charter bills, Ewing resigned from the Tyler administration 
in 1841.  His appointment as Secretary of the Interior lasted little more than a year as he 
again resigned.420  Ewing’s strict interpretation of the River Lands Grant boundary, and 
limitation of land sales, stand in contrast to his other contributions during his appointment 
to the Department of the Interior.  He actively supported the expansion and privatization 
of capitalistic endeavors.  His support manifested itself by his encouragement of the 
development of a mint near the gold fields of California that further established the 
validity of expansion westward.  Additionally, he promoted the idea of the construction of 
a railroad to the Pacific coast undertaken by private investors.421   
Secretary Ewing’s hasty resignation explains his seemingly contradictory decision 
involving the River Grant Lands.  President Taylor, although nominated and elected as a 
Whig, adhered to many principles of Democrats.  Taylor, a slaveholder, promoted a 
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policy that encouraged settlers in California to skip the normal process of achieving 
statehood by way of achieving territorial status.  While assuring the state’s ability to enter 
as a free state, the policy supported the ideas of state sovereignty and limited the role of 
the federal government in the affairs of the state, effectively allowing the Taylor 
administration to tread the turbulent political waters.422  Although the policy established 
by the Taylor administration served the specific purpose of limiting the expansion of 
slavery, the administration’s policies elsewhere promoted state sovereignty and checked 
the expansion of federal authority.  The decision handed down by Secretary Ewing in the 
River Lands Grant boundary dispute reflected the administration’s policy of checking the 
expansion of federal authority by increasing the total land acreage contained in the River 
Lands Grant.  The strict interpretation of the 1846 grant boundaries limited the federal 
government’s ability to amend internal improvement projects that would in turn expand 
the federal government’s role in offering economic assistance in the form of public lands.  
It in no way restricted, however, the construction of internal improvement projects with 
state or private funding, thus maintaining the principle of state sovereignty.  
The April 1850 decision by Secretary Ewing resulted in an appeal from the State 
of Iowa to President Taylor.  Keeping the decision within the executive branch, Taylor 
referred the controversy to Attorney General Reverdy Johnson.  Taylor’s choice for 
Attorney General suggested that the executive branch was now embracing the idea of a 
legal resolution to the matter.  Johnson’s decision resulted in the reinstatement of the 
boundaries to include land north of the Raccoon Fork.  In discussing the construction of 
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the River Land Grant, Attorney General Johnson focused on contract language.  He 
argued the purpose and the extent of the grant represented two distinct and separate 
issues.  “It is the assumption of combining both the purpose and extent that led to the 
limited construction interpretation previously and incorrectly held.”423  He further argued 
that to support the Raccoon Fork boundary interpretation, one must add the phrase “to the 
Raccoon Fork” equally to both the extent portion of the grant and the purpose portion of 
the grant.424  While the first portion did not explicitly include such language, the latter 
explicitly indicated the Raccoon Fork as the branch.  He concluded that since the grant of 
1846 lacked specific language, interpretation after the matter could not happen.  Johnson 
also stated that any improvement done on any part of the river, above the Raccoon Fork 
and below, enhanced all the lands along the river.  “The whole river, therefore, 
participates in the advantage of the work, and it is fair to presume that the lands granted 
were limited by the whole river and not by a part of it.”425  
Although nothing reviewed during his tenure as the Attorney General indicated 
support for federally funded internal improvements, Johnson’s political life indicated he 
firmly supported the emergence of a strong federal government.  Born in Annapolis, 
Maryland in 1796, he studied law at St. John’s College and graduated in 1811.  Johnson 
spent one year as a deputy attorney general of Maryland before election to the state 
legislature.  A firm Whig during the party’s existence, he briefly affiliated himself with 
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the Democratic Party to support President Polk’s strong expansionist policies on matters 
pertaining to the Mexican War.426   
Despite his affiliation with the Democratic Party, Johnson’s term as a member of 
the Peace Convention of 1861 provided the best example of his stance on a strong federal 
government, specifically the executive branch.  While he helped the delegates at the 
convention forge a compromise to stop the looming Civil War, “he [also] upheld 
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus,” thereby supporting the authority of the 
federal government to act in the best interest of the people of the nation.427  He further 
supported the expansion of federal authority of the executive branch by voting for the 
Emancipation Proclamation as well as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.428   
After a review of the boundary dispute decision made by Attorney General Johnson, 
Iowa’s Commissioner of Public Lands submitted an inquiry to President Taylor for 
clarification.  The Commissioner sought not only a clarification on the Attorney 
General’s decision but also an explanation of why the Attorney General had the 
authority to make such a decision.  The sudden death of Taylor, however, stalled the 
decision until President Millard Fillmore officially took office. 
Attorney General John J. Crittenden, having accepted a position in Fillmore’s 
restructured administration of 1850, became the next government official to render his 
opinion on the improvement project.  In late 1850, Crittenden refused to rule on the 
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improvement grant controversy and instead referred it back to the Secretary of the 
Interior, with whom he believed the jurisdiction lay.  Since the Department of the Interior 
oversaw matters of the public lands, Crittenden contented that the interpretation of the 
grant boundaries also fell to the department.  “It would appear from this conclusion that 
Mr. Crittenden did not become aware that the matter was regularly before the President 
on appeal from the decision of the Secretary of the Interior.”429  After seemingly sorting 
out the matter, the Department of the Interior again referred the issue back to Attorney 
General Crittenden for his opinion.430 
In June 1851, Attorney General Crittenden released an opinion that again reversed 
the previous interpretation of the boundary controversy.  He contended that,  
 
… the letter of Mr. Walker [Secretary of the Treasury that previously ruled on the 
improvement grant] was not an act done, but an opinion expressed, and, therefore, 
had no binding effect on his successors; that the opinion of Attorney General 
Johnson was but advisory, having no compulsory effect on the Secretary to whom 
it was addressed; and that the grant, in his judgment, was limited to the lands 
below the Raccoon Fork.431 
 
The opinions previously offered by various governmental agencies under this 
interpretation were merely advisory; no “law gives them any technical, specific, or 
official consequence or effect,” thus procedure alone allowed Crittenden to offer the 
official opinion of the Attorney General.432  After presenting his case for authority to 
officially determine the true intent of the grant, Crittenden presented his decision on the 
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grant’s construction.  Drawing again from the original discussions of Augustus C. Dodge 
and the Committee of Public Lands, Crittenden agreed with the decision established by 
Secretary of the Interior Ewing.433  Upon rendering this interpretation, Attorney General 
Crittenden became the first United States Attorney General to officially render an opinion 
on the Des Moines River Improvement land grant and returned the northern boundary to 
the Raccoon River fork.  In closing his judgment of the boundary dispute, Crittenden 
indicated that even Congress had not passed any explanatory acts in favor of a larger 
interpretation and that no representatives from Iowa had called upon Congress to offer 
any relief on the matter.434 
During the Presidency of Democrat Franklin Pierce, Attorney General Caleb 
Cushing did not rule on the River Land Grant boundary dispute, his only contribution to 
the controversy included official recommitment to the stance posed by Crittenden.  
During Cushing’s term of service between 1853 and 1857, however, the Des Moines 
Navigation and Railroad Company came under investigation for illegal business practices 
pertaining to the Des Moines River Improvement project.435     
 The appointment of Jeremiah S. Black as Attorney General by President James 
Buchanan in 1857 signaled the last executive branch involvement in the Des Moines 
River Improvement Land Grant controversy and the further evolution of Crittenden’s 
suggestion that the issue ultimately required settlement outside the authority of the 
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executive branch.  Black argued that only the original creator of the act knew the true 
intent of the boundary in contention.  He wrote, “a person whose faculties are sharpened 
by an interest in the claim can see it extending to the headwaters of the Des Moines 
plainly enough, while an advocate of the other side might perceive with equal clearness 
the construction which stops at the Raccoon Fork.”436  While he conceded that it appeared 
neither the writer of the grant nor Congress construed the act to include land north of the 
Raccoon Fork, Attorney General Black pointed out no rule or law guided or restricted the 
interpretation of the Congressional Act.  In short, the ambiguity of the contract’s language 
provided justification for either interpretation.   
Attorney General Black was no stranger to issues involving federal government 
authority over western expansion.  After spending his early professional years serving 
various positions including deputy attorney of Summerset County, Pennsylvania, 
president judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the 16th Judicial District, and Justice of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Black accepted appointment to President Buchanan’s 
Cabinet as Attorney General in 1857.  During his tenure as Attorney General of the 
United States, he “successfully handled many of the problems involved in land claims in 
California, uncovering many that were fraudulent.”437  His knowledge of contracts, such 
as the land claims in California, and their intended purposes reflected his official opinion 
of the River Lands Grant.  His opinion supported the need for the legislative branch to 
clarify the original River Lands Grant of 1846, and the authority of the judicial branch to 
interpret the grant.   
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Attorney General Black also “attacked squatter sovereignty basing his arguments 
on the ground that territorial legislatures could not make laws violating the Fifth 
Amendment” although states legally could.438  The doctrine of squatter sovereignty 
centered on the idea that the people in a state or territory had the right to enact laws to 
shape their social institutions as they saw fit.  Black argued that this directly conflicted 
with the Fifth Amendment that declared, “no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of the law, nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation.”439  Although Black remedied the situations under the 
authority of the executive branch, he ultimately contributed to the expansion of judicial 
authority by enforcing judicial decisions involving Constitutional law.  Additionally, 
Black’s opinions expanded the authority of the legislative branch by citing the power of 
Congress to create laws for the good of the nation’s people.  Although Black greatly aided 
the defining efforts of the federal government, his decision did little to change the 
boundary, leaving the northern boundary at the Raccoon River fork.       
 
The Emergence of Judicial Authority  
 
Attorney General Black’s resolution of the boundary dispute marked a shift away 
from executive control and towards a struggle for authority between the legislative and 
judicial branches.  The Iowa legislature turned to Congress and repeated calls to resolve 
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the matter in a just and practicable manner.  Despite these petitions, the federal judicial 
branch acted first by means of the Supreme Court decision in Dubuque and Pacific 
Railroad Company v. Edwin Litchfield (1860).440 
By 1859, numerous settlers claimed adversarial titles to land contained in the 
disputed territory north of the Raccoon Fork.  Since property titles north of the Raccoon 
Fork remained unresolved, settlers found themselves with their land titles in jeopardy.  
With the completed transfer of the 1846 River Lands Grant to railroad development, both 
construction and navigation on the Des Moines River came to a stop by 1860.  The 
transfer caused the boundary issue to become important in determining the legal validity 
of land titles in the area above the Raccoon Fork.441 
Among the disputed claimants for lands located above the Raccoon Fork was the 
Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company.  Under a grant from Congress in 1856, the 
Dubuque and Pacific Railroad obtained lands across the state from Dubuque, Iowa on the 
Mississippi River to the Missouri River near Sioux City, Iowa.  The 1856 Railroad Grant 
included tracts of land along the Des Moines River Valley and thus included lands within 
the disputed area north of the Raccoon Fork.  Competing claims arose as both the Des 
Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad 
Company held legal titles conveyed by the federal and state governments to lands in the 
Des Moines River Valley.  Because of the adversarial title claims, the opportunity to 
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obtain a judicial ruling on the boundaries of the River Lands Grant and settle the 
competing land claims became apparent.  
On April 9, 1860, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company v. Edwin C. Litchfield 
came before the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error from the Iowa District 
Court of the United States in order to determine the adversarial claims.  The District 
Court of Iowa previously had decided in favor of the Edwin Litchfield, an assignee of the 
Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, as the holder of land title granted by the 
state of Iowa in lieu of payment for the Des Moines River improvement project 
construction. 
The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Taney presiding, reversed the lower 
court’s ruling and entered judgment in favor of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad 
Company.  In doing so, the Supreme Court re-established the boundary of the River Land 
Grant of 1846 back to the Raccoon Fork.  The opinion of the Court again turned to the 
original report of Representative Dodge to the Committee of Public Lands during the 
formulation of the improvement grant, in which Representative Dodge offered his 
understanding of the area of land included in the grant.  The Court also stressed that no 
contemporary authorities from the State of Iowa had objected to the construction of the 
grant language and subsequently went about selecting lands within the originally 
interpreted boundary.  The Supreme Court suggested,  
 
… parties seeking grants for private purposes usually draw the bills making them.  
If they do not make the language sufficiently explicit and clear to pass everything 
                                                                                                                                                                             
441
 Iowa, Joint Resolution Instructing Governor to Enjoin the Des Moines River Navigation and 
Railroad Company, Laws of Iowa (1858), Vol. 7, Joint Resolution No. 7: 430.   
 
254 
 
that is intended to be passed, it is their own fault; while on the other hand, such a 
construction has a tendency to prevent parties from inserting ambiguous language 
for the purpose of taking, by ingenious interpretation and insinuation, that which 
cannot be obtained by plain and express terms.442 
 
In addition to ruling on the intent behind the grant’s construction, the Supreme 
Court stated that Congress had granted no authority to the executive branch in the 
administration of the public lands to do any more than make partition between the State 
of Iowa and the United States government.  That is to say, the executive branch could do 
little else than to help facilitate the transfer of lands, and it subsequently but could not 
interpret or alter the grant.443 
Chief Justice Taney’s economically inspired jurisprudence influenced the outcome 
of the River Lands Grant on two occasions.  On the role of the Taney Court, Historian 
Paul Finkelman wrote, “from 1837 to 1862, the Democratic-Jacksonian majority 
[including Taney] crafted opinions that were generally supportive of states’ rights…and 
skeptical of national power.  In areas of contract and commerce, Taney led a partial 
retreat from Chief Justice Marshall’s more nationalist jurisprudence.”444  The 1848 case 
West River Bridge v. Dix exemplified how Taney’s economic views informed and shaped 
his jurisprudence.  While previous Court rulings, including Charles River Bridge 
Company v. Warren Bridge Company (1837), supported the ability of the states to offer 
contracts that reflected the best interest of the people of the states, West River Bridge v. 
Dix illustrated the Taney Court’s further expansion of states’ rights doctrine.  In support 
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of the doctrine, the High Court ruled that the states had the right, under the doctrine of 
eminent domain, to seize corporate property for the good of the state and its people.445    
The Taney Court reinforced the doctrine of state sovereignty only to a limit, while 
it also expanded the authority of the federal government in other economic matters.  
Although Justice Story wrote the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion, Swift v. Tyson 
(1842) illustrated Chief Justice Taney’s willingness to expand the authority of the federal 
government while limiting the states’ authority if it contributed to the interests of the 
United States citizens.  In Swift v. Tyson, the Court ruled the federal government had the 
right to develop a uniform law to dictate commercial proceedings.  The decision 
supported the emerging nineteenth-century American doctrine of legal formalism in that 
it “allowed those engaged in interstate business to rely on general rules of commercial 
law” that “limited the power of the states to create unique rules which might burden out-
of-state litigants.”446     
Finkelman argued Taney’s decisions “which enhanced federal power, were 
imperative for the emerging national economy, and did not significantly hamper the 
ability of the states to control their own economic affairs.”447  Taney’s decision in 
Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company v. Edwin C. Litchfield (1860) also reflected his 
economic jurisprudence.  The Taney Court carefully weighed the implications of the 
judicial branch offering a decision on the disputed boundaries controversy.  In supporting 
the state’s right platform, the Court’s decision placed the right and responsibility of 
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clarifying the boundary under the original 1846 grant with the State of Iowa at the time of 
grant construction.   
Additionally, the Taney Court’s decision supported the federal government’s 
authority to influence the economy for the good of the nation.  In ruling in favor of the 
Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, the High Court’s decision echoed the shift in 
federal government economic support policies from conveyance of land grants to public 
entities to conveyance to private entities.  Because of the policy change, from the 1860 
onward, the federal government conveyed land grants almost entirely to private 
companies, such as railroads, to build a transportation network.  The decision helped 
establish a precedent that defined the role of the government in influencing the nation’s 
economy, but also limited the authority of the federal government by declaring that the 
language of the land grant contained no clauses that allowed the executive branch to 
interpret the 1846 grant.    
 
Congress exerts its Authority 
 
 In response to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in 1860 and further calls 
from the Iowa General Assembly, Congress passed legislation amending the original Des 
Moines River land grant of 1846.  Congress passed a joint resolution on March 2, 1861 
that relinquished all title of lands held by the United States north of the Raccoon Fork 
along the Des Moines River to Iowa, further stating that the Department of the Interior 
improperly conveyed the area under the 1846 grant.448  In 1862, Congress passed an act 
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confirming the broad River Land Grant claim further reinforcing the joint resolution 
approved the previous year.  The act provided for the addition of the land north of the 
Raccoon Fork along the Des Moines River to the State of Iowa under the selected 
conditions of the original 1846 act.  The act also provided that if any claim of land under 
the original act proved to be sold, invalid, or otherwise disposed of, additional land within 
the State of Iowa would be offered to remedy the title claim.449    
In addition to the claims by the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, 
individual settlers called for indemnity for their land claims in the Des Moines River 
Valley, north of the Raccoon Fork.450  As early as 1854 settlers filtered into the region 
with the understanding that the land was open for settlement, under the premise of the 
1841 Preemption Act of the United States.  Because of Congressional amendments in 
1861 and 1862 to the original Des Moines River land grant of 1846, the settlers believed 
their land title claims became erroneously invalid.  Because of their claims, the issues 
remained unresolved until the 1880s.   
In an attempt to assist an expanding national economy to develop a transportation 
network, Congress conveyed the Des Moines River Improvement Land Grant.  The 
boundary dispute over internal improvement grant provided a stage for the nineteenth-
century struggle for federal governmental authority in the economy.  Opinions of what 
was in the best interest of society varied greatly and the River Lands Grant boundary 
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dispute provided one of numerous illustrations of the government’s struggle in defining 
its authority.  The boundary dispute specifically assisted in shaping the jurisdiction of 
each of the branches of the federal government.  While the dispute established the 
authority of Congress to convey grants and the executive branch to enforce them, the 
authority of the judiciary to interpret the grants remained in question. 
Controversy over the boundaries of the 1846 Des Moines River Lands Grant 
illustrated a struggle for power between political parties and branches of the federal 
government.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal government underwent many 
changes.  Individuals with differing political ideologies struggled to obtain the authority 
to define the federal government’s role in an emerging national economy.  Each political 
party fought to have its policies implemented, while the River Lands Grant provided an 
opportunity to define the roles and authority of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the federal government.  
 The executive branch seized the initial opportunity under the Des Moines River 
Lands Grant to define the federal government’s role in interpreting the land grant.  While 
the executive branch struggled to assert authority, it also struggled within itself as 
reorganization of the executive cabinets brought ever-changing political parties into 
power.  Each party had its own ideology as to the specific role of the federal government 
in the emerging national economy.   
Although Congress’ role in creating legislation never seemed in doubt, the 
boundary dispute reaffirmed the role of Congress in amending legislation.  The 
introduction of litigation over adversarial claims between the Des Moines River 
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Navigation and Railroad Company and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad provided the 
judicial branch with an opportunity to assert its authority.  Although Dubuque and Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Litchfield set the stage for the emergence of the judiciary in the 
controversies of the Des Moines River Lands Grant, not until 1892 did it finally assert its 
full authority and ultimately resolved the political and legal issues raised by the initial 
desire to open the Des Moines River to steamboat traffic. 
 
Improvement through Law 
 
The controversies over the Des Moines River Land Grant echoed similar national 
struggles in the transformation of the legal system.  While the numerous cases clearly 
helped to settle controversy arising from the conflicting land grants, they exemplified the 
struggles in defining nineteenth-century American law.  Internal improvement projects 
manifested public and private goals of developing markets and establishing connections 
between markets, producers, and consumers.  The efforts of a government to support such 
economically advantageous activities also presented new challenges to the legal system. 
The combination of public promotion of internal improvements and private 
enterprise altered the physical environment and presented new challenges to the 
American legal system.  As the relationships brought individuals closer together, disputes 
and conflicts over property (specifically land) became acute.  Land ownership, settlement 
of disputes, jurisdictional issues, and the use of precedent to address new circumstances 
included just a few of the challenges to the nineteenth-century legal system.451  The 
nineteenth-century legal system resolved such controversies surrounding the Des Moines 
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River Lands Grant.  The challenges aided the transformation of the legal system into a 
distinct body based on the doctrine of legal formalism.  Legal scholars define legal 
formalism as the idea that judges or other public officials should be restricted to reading 
and administering the law as written and intended by its author(s).452  This practice 
provided for predictable interpretations of the law and facilitated property transactions.   
The transformation of a distinct legal system did not occur smoothly or without 
setbacks.  Although judicial decisions echoed the beginnings of transformation, not all 
justices or courts followed suit at the same pace; some adopted the emerging principles 
while others hesitated.  Some concluded that the emerging system lacked the 
completeness to offer total justice and therefore gradually and hesitantly embraced the 
changes.  The conflicting grants of land along the Des Moines River provided great 
friction and an opportunity to test the legal system’s readiness to address the changing 
environment.     
Historian James Willard Hurst contended the American legal system became 
instrumental in shaping laws that facilitated the development of frontiers.  Despite the 
outward appearance of lawlessness during the formation of the frontier communities, 
those communities provided the context in which a distinct legal system developed.  
Individuals used the legal system to promote the release of creative energy.  This 
instrumental approach included the responsibility of creating law to protect the release of 
individual creative energy and to mobilize community resources to aid in shaping the 
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environment.  Laws that allowed or aided the release of creative energy contributed to 
enterprises that stimulated economic growth and other issues that benefited the greater 
public good.  While eventually forming a regional and national commonality, each 
frontier developed distinct laws, at different rates and periods of time, which promoted 
the unique development of the region.  New frontiers emerged as settlement moved 
westward, in which the individuals who formed the communities adopted laws that 
worked for their specific circumstances and created or adapted other laws where 
necessary.453    
The frontier of the Upper Midwest offered settlers abundant land and fertile soil in 
which to establish a farm and make a living.  The laws that allowed the construction of 
the Des Moines River Improvement project aided settlers with a means of realizing the 
release of their individual creative energy, by enabling the settlement of the region, 
farming, and connecting sellers to markets.  The controversies of the Des Moines River 
Improvement land grant arose within the Midwestern frontier, specifically Iowa, during 
the middle and later nineteenth century.   
 
Into the Courts 
 
On November 1, 1887, plaintiffs John Stryker, Richard Chapman, William Wells, 
and Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Litchfield, and defendant Edward Goodnow appeared before the 
United States Supreme Court in five cases that typified challenges faced by the 
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nineteenth-century legal system.454  The concurrent cases asked the United States 
Supreme Court questions arising from the same fundamental issue of adversarial title 
claims.  Although the cases outwardly questioned state authority of taxation, the United 
States Supreme Court rendered a decision based on federal judicial review authority over 
state judgments and statutes, jurisdiction, and judicial precedent.  These cases and their 
proceeding judicial history exemplified the doctrine of legal formalism that evolved 
during the nineteenth century in America.455    
 The controversy over taxation of the River Grant lands, the commonly used term 
for the Des Moines River Improvement Land Grant, first surfaced in 1859 with Des 
Moines Navigation and Railroad Company v. The County of Polk argued before the 
Supreme Court of Iowa.  At question was the issue of property tax collection for the years 
1857 through 1858 for land held by the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, 
by way of the original Congressional land grant of 1846, within Polk County, Iowa.  In 
reversing the lower court’s decision, the State Supreme Court reviewed the case history of 
the Des Moines River Improvement Land Grant boundary controversy to aid their ruling 
in favor of the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company.456   
 In 1838, the Iowa Territory adopted almost verbatim the taxation policies that 
applied to the region while part of the Michigan Territory.  The taxation policies 
implemented “such elements as the general property tax, license taxes, and county 
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assessment” and included the limitation that “no tax shall be imposed upon the property 
of the United States.”457  In the Iowa territory, the responsibility of property tax 
assessment and collection fell to the counties.  The 1846 Iowa Constitution, under which 
the Territory entered statehood, contained little on the topic of taxation.  Among the 
scarce references was the requirement that “all laws of a general shall have a uniform 
operation."458  Minor revisions continued throughout the nineteenth century as the state 
sought to create a uniform taxation system that formed the basis of the Iowa Code.459  
While the context of Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company v. The 
County of Polk (1859) hinged upon the collection of property tax revenue, the larger legal 
debate revolved around the struggle to develop a strict legal doctrine, separate from 
politics. The emergence of legal formalism offered justices the ability to render 
predictable decisions for individuals and private companies seeking legal clarity, thereby 
eliminating legal risks in various enterprises.460  The Polk County District Court 
previously ruled in favor of Polk County’s tax collection process for the years 1857 and 
1858.  Under the June 7, 1854 contract entered into between the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company and the State of Iowa, the responsibility for the 
assessed property taxes fell to the Company even though the lands remained uncertified 
by the State Land Office.  District Court justices ruled that although the contract 
requirements remained unmet, implied ownership existed with the Railroad Company 
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because the company previously attempted to legitimize its ownership through the 
acceptance of land title, commencement of work, and the further sale and distribution of 
conveyed lands.  The Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company appealed to 
the Iowa Supreme Court and argued that a review of state statutes should render a 
different decision.461  
 Both parties agreed that the Governor of Iowa had refused to execute a patent for 
the land in question until May 3, 1858 and the State Register subsequently received the 
patent on June 10, 1858.  The Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company 
argued that because the Governor refused to certify the Company’s title to the land until 
1858, it did not hold legal title to the land and thus did not have the responsibility to pay 
the taxes assessed against it.462   
 The opinion rendered by William G. Woodward of the Iowa Supreme Court 
stressed the importance of the language of a contract and state statutes in determining the 
appropriate outcome.  The Court ruled that the prior claims of the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company to title of land were immaterial.  The contract between 
Iowa and the Company remained unmet and therefore conveyance of the land title could 
not be complete.  In this reading, the fulfillment of the contract was most important and 
legally binding.  Because the binding language required all issuance of land patents from 
the State land office, signed by the Governor, and recorded by the State Register, the 
contract remained incomplete until June 10, 1858.  The Court suggested that the legally 
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binding nature of the contract was of more importance than the implied interpretation of 
ownership and possession that could provide The Des Moines Navigation and Railroad 
Company with an equitable title.  The State of Iowa failed to complete the required three-
step certification process before June 10, 1858, and therefore had no legal right to collect 
taxes from the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company for the year 1857 or 
prior.   
 Further, the Court ruled that according to the Iowa statute it could not enforce the 
collection of taxes for the land in question.  Due to the incomplete certification process 
still outstanding at the end of 1857, the lands remained in the legal possession of Iowa, 
not the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company.  The Court ruled that 
because of the 1851 Iowa code, section 455 that stated the following exemptions from 
taxation “the properties of the United States and that of this State,” a rendered decision 
must restrict the collection of property taxes by Iowa or any county within the State.463  
 Because each individual yearly assessment and collection of taxes indicated a new 
and distinct transaction, the Court additionally ruled on the assessment of taxes for the 
year 1858.  In its decision pertaining to the taxes of 1858, the Iowa Supreme Court again 
turned to the Iowa codes to enforce a predictable interpretation of the law.  A codified 
system of tax assessment provided the courts with a set of guidelines by which to 
adjudicate legal matters in a manner easily replicated.  It thereby assured a predictable 
administration of the law.  A review of the statute of 1858, chapter 152, indicated that the 
assessment of taxes for the year must conclude by the second Monday of April each year.  
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Since the final certification by the Register was not until June 10, 1858, almost two 
months after the April deadline for the given year, neither the State nor any county could 
impose taxes for the year of 1858 on the lands in question.464 
 Justice Woodward’s decision supported the emergence of legal formalism.  
Despite Woodward’s decision pertaining to the Des Moines River Lands, he was best 
known because his father was defendant in the famous 1819 Dartmouth College case 
argued by constitutional lawyer Daniel Webster before the United State Supreme Court.  
Chief Justice Marshal ruled that despite William H. Woodward and the New Hampshire 
legislature’s effort to convert Dartmouth College into a public institution, a contract 
between private parties involving individual property rights did not include matters of 
“political relations between the government and its citizens.”465  While William H. 
Woodward, father, argued for state authority to convert Dartmouth College into a public 
institution despite the original intent of the contract, forty years later Justice William G. 
Woodward, son, upheld the legal system’s adherence to the importance of the contract 
established under Chief Justice Marshal.466  
 Despite the obvious economic benefit of tax collection for both the State and the 
counties involved in the Des Moines River Grant Lands taxation dispute, a predictable 
legal interpretation emerged under the State Supreme Court Justices.  Under traditional 
common law principles, it would not be unreasonable to expect to hold the Des Moines 
River Navigation and Railroad Company responsible for the taxes as the district court had 
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decided.  Sir William Blackstone wrote about the English common law that rights of 
matters such as title by grants occurred immediately upon receipt.  He wrote that a “true 
and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with delivery of possession, and takes 
effect immediately.”467  Instead, State justices handed down a strict interpretation based 
on Iowa codes and the original contract that allowed them to rule against the collection in 
equity from the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company.   
 Despite this initial resolution, taxation of the River Grant lands continued to be a 
point of contention.  After Congress enacted legislation in 1861 and 1862 that amended 
the original 1846 River Grant to include lands north of the Raccoon Fork along the Des 
Moines River, the Iowa courts again weighed in on the issues.  Like the previous taxation 
cases, the courts emphasized the importance of state statutes and the contract in 
determining a predictable outcome. 
 In 1867 and 1874, two cases appeared before the Supreme Court of Iowa 
involving the taxation dispute on River Grant lands.  The first of these, Stryker v. Polk 
County and Tiffin, Treasurer (1867) centered on John Stryker’s claim to land above the 
Raccoon Fork, located in Polk County.468  Specifically, it called into question Polk 
County’s ability to assess taxes to the land for the years 1858 to 1862.  The opinion of the 
Court delivered by Justice Wright centered on two specific periods, before and after 1861.  
In determining the taxability of the land for the years in question, the Court required the 
absolute title for the years 1858 to 1862 be determined. 
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In Dubuque and Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield (1860), the federal Supreme Court 
ruled, on a strict interpretation of the River Grant boundary dispute and placed the 
northern boundary limit at the Raccoon Fork. 469  According to the Iowa Supreme Court, 
the decision by the federal Supreme Court to situate the northern terminus at the Raccoon 
Fork placed John Stryker’s claim of bona fide title in jeopardy.  The land claimed by 
Stryker and conveyed from the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company to 
him fell above the Raccoon Fork.  Thus according to Dubuque and Pacific Railroad v. 
Litchfield, his land fell outside the boundaries of the Des Moines River Improvement 
Land and therefore placed his land title in doubt.   
In an effort to remedy the status of the settlers with land titles in jeopardy, such as 
Stryker, the United States Congress passed two resolutions in 1861 and 1862 that 
extended the River Grant boundaries to the northern limits of the State.470  Construction 
of the original 1846 grant contained a reserved right that allowed Congress to amend the 
grant as needed.  The reserved right clause allowed Stryker and other titleholders to 
regain prominent title to their lands.  As the acts passed into law, and the titles 
legitimized, the State and counties then claimed the power of taxation over the lands in 
dispute. 
 In its ruling pertaining to taxation for the period before 1861, the Iowa Supreme 
Court wavered from its emerging legal formalist stance.  While it retraced the course of 
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the land grant legislation, the Court ruled that intent of title had the same legal standing as 
bona fide title.  Justice George G. Wright wrote in the decision of the court that although 
the federal Supreme Court had ruled in Dubuque and Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield that 
the northern boundary terminated at the Raccoon Fork, and thus voiding Stryker’s title to 
land, his intentions to secure legal title satisfied the Court.471  Further, since certification 
and registration of the land by the State took place, an implied legal recognition occurred 
effectively establishing an equitable title.  The Court contended that, “the technical legal 
title may have remained in the United States; but [the] plaintiff certainly had a right 
which had been recognized by the concurrent action of the authorities.”472   
 In 1874, the Iowa Supreme Court again followed this line of logic in Litchfield v. 
The County of Hamilton, et al; while involving different litigants, the issues remained, for 
the most part, identical.473  In addition to the previous taxation cases, Litchfield v. The 
County of Hamilton, et al. included legal resolution to penalty and interest imposed on the 
nonpayment of land taxes.  Edwin Litchfield, however, who had acquired his title from 
the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company, argued that because the 
prominent title was in doubt prior to 1861 due to the Court’s ruling in Dubuque and 
Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, that placed the northern boundary at the Raccoon Fork and 
thus located his property outside the boundaries of the Des Moines Grant Lands, he 
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should not be liable for the interest and penalties accrued from nonpayment of taxes for 
the years 1859 to 1860.  Although Congress amended the 1846 grant in 1861 and 1862, it 
did not allow for the recovery of property taxes for the years disputed, 1861 and before.   
The Iowa Supreme Court with Justice Joseph M. Beck writing the opinion ruled, 
“mere irregularities [the issue of disputed title] in the assessment or levy of taxes will not 
justify the interference of equity to stay their collection.”474  Although the title was in 
dispute, due in part to the fault of the County or State, it did not “discharge the party of 
public burdens which they ought justly share.”475  Above all, tax payment responsibility 
fell to the party, even if the claim was in dispute, and the court “could not relieve them of 
the interest and penalties prescribed by statute for delinquent taxes.  In essence, the 
taxation of the Des Moines River lands dispute provided the Supreme Court of Iowa with 
an embryonic platform in which to echo the larger nineteenth-century emergence of the 
legal formalism doctrine in American law.  Legal formalism restricted the ability of 
justices to allow equity but adhere to codified legislative statutes instead, in this instance 
relief from interest and penalty caused by delay of tax payment, when the statutes of the 
State did not specifically allow. 
While the Iowa Supreme Court weighed in on the taxation issue, it also appeared 
in 1879 before the federal Supreme Court with Chief Justice Morrison Waite presiding.  
The Waite Court gained the reputation of being industrious and rendering rulings that 
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solidified the growth of the American legal system throughout the nineteenth century.476  
Litchfield v. County of Webster (1879) again focused on the same basic taxation question 
for the years 1859 to 1866, this time pertaining to land located above the Raccoon Fork in 
Webster County, Iowa.477  Chief Justice Waite’s Court ruled in favor of Litchfield while 
focusing on two specific areas for the Court’s opinion.  While Chief Justice Morrison 
Waite, who wrote the opinion of the Court, contended that although Litchfield was 
responsible for the assessed property taxes after the 1862 amendment to the River Grant 
confirmed his title, he was not responsible for the taxes prior to that date.  Even though 
Litchfield, and before that the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, had laid 
claim to the land he did not hold legal title.  Before the legislation of 1861 and 1862 that 
conveyed the lands north of the Raccoon Fork to Iowa, and subsequently became the 
possession of Litchfield, the lands remained in the legal possession of the United States. 
Justice Waite contended that despite the Iowa Supreme Court rulings in Dubuque and 
Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield and Litchfield v. The County of Hamilton, et al., that 
possession was implied based on equitable title before the 1861 and 1862 amendments to 
the River Grant, the contract was the legally binding issue.  Since the land was not legally 
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or properly certified, nor transferred to the State, transfer to the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company or its grantee Litchfield also remained impossible.  By 
the strict construction of the River Grant and contract with Iowa, legal possession 
Litchfield could not obtain legal possession prior to 1862.  Based on that reasoning 
Justice Waite found that Iowa, and through it Webster County, could not impose taxes, 
interest, nor penalties upon Litchfield.478 
 The second issue addressed by the Waite Court, and written by Chief Justice 
Waite himself, pertained to equity.  To the high court, the issue of equity denied by the 
State Supreme Court was in partial error.  Justice Waite concluded that releasing 
Litchfield from the responsibility of interest and other penalties was of “an elementary 
principle in equity jurisprudence.”479  In the Court’s opinion, Justice Waite wrote: 
That if money is lying dead to meet an obligation, and delay in its payment is 
caused by the fault of him to whom it is to be paid, interest during the delay is not 
recoverable.  Here the delay was caused by the improper interference of the State 
and the United States with the title.  Litchfield has been guilty of no fraud or 
willful default.480   
 
Since legal title to the disputed land was not conveyed until after the 1861 property taxes 
were assessed, it was through no fault of Litchfield that taxes were not paid in the manner 
indicated by the statutes of Iowa and therefore the Webster County could not enforce 
collection of interest and other penalties for the years prior to 1862.  In the opinion, 
Justice Waite also made note that after 1862, when Litchfield achieved legal recognition 
as the bona fide titleholder, taxes with interest and penalty then became possible.  While 
                                                                                                                                                                             
477
 Litchfield v. County of Webster; County of Webster v. Litchfield, 101 U.S. 773; 25 L. Ed. 925 
(1879). 
478
 Ibid. 
273 
 
the Court considered interest and penalties as a matter of equity prior to 1862, Justice 
Waite drew a distinction.  The collection of interest and other penalties for delinquent 
taxes underwent codification within the State of Iowa with the hopes of eliminating the 
need for courts of equity.  Codification allowed for a universal, systematic, and 
predictable distribution of law while it also limited a party’s ability to seek equity outside 
the codified laws.  If the courts allowed flexible interpretations that assisted equitable 
recovery in instances where the codified law failed, the predictability and repeatability of 
legal formalism ultimately would have failed.481 
 While one might argue that the Taney Court’s most famous decision is Dred v. 
Scott (1857), his Court played an active role in the emergence of a distinct legal system 
through rulings on economic issues involving the Bank of the United States, and federal-
state relations.  Although decided during Taney’s first term as Chief Justice, Charles 
River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co. (1837) illustrated his stance.  The Charles River 
Bridge Company sued the Warren Bridge Company after the State of Massachusetts 
extended a charter to the Warren Bridge Company to build a bridge over the Charles 
River.  The plaintiff contended the charter of the defendant violated the monopoly 
established by the original offer given to the Charles River Bridge Company.  In 
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illustrating the point, Urofsky wrote, “speaking for the Court, Taney concluded that ‘any 
ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers 
[stockholders] and in favor of the public.”482   
The Waite Court ruling in Litchfield v. County of Webster followed the same 
fundamental argument as the Taney Court’s ruling in Charles Bridge Co. v. Warren 
Bridge Co.  The Taney Court supported economic development while also maintaining a 
need to protect the good of the public.  Summarizing Taney’s stance, Urofsky pointed 
out, “the Taney Court followed the spirit of Charles River Bridge in subsequent cases-
allowing states great flexibility in issuing corporate charters, but always reading those 
charters narrowly in order to protect the public good and the states.”483  Because the State 
of Iowa statutes did not allow for recovery but indicated a clear process of legal validity 
of ownership, the court had no option but to rule in favor of Litchfield.   
   Although the Waite Court decision upheld the principles of the legal formalism 
doctrine, the taxation debate continued.  Despite the Court’s ruling that released 
Litchfield from paying interest and penalties in the years of disputed land title, another 
ruling, Wolsey v. Chapman (1879), decided by the United States high court in 1879, 
established Litchfield, with title by way of the River land grant, as the bona-fide 
titleholder.484  During the period, the legal and legislative system worked to remedy the 
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land ownership dispute, the Homestead Company willingly paid the property taxes on the 
disputed lands and brought litigation calling for recovery of those taxes.485   
  
Legal Disputes in Private Matters 
 
With the introduction of litigation by the Homestead Company in 1872, the 
taxation controversy shifted from a legal matter involving private and public parties to 
one involving private parties only.  The emphasis of a legal system supporting economic 
development by way of the Des Moines River Improvement Land Grant ended.  Because 
both litigating parties, as the controversy moved forward, represented private economic 
interests, the legal system looked to establish a manner to settle disputes between private 
individuals.  The judicial system presented formalized procedures that allowed legal 
clarification pertaining to matters of uncertainty.   
The Homestead Company acquired lands north of the Raccoon River Fork along 
the Des Moines River as part of a Congressional railroad land grant given to the Dubuque 
and Pacific Railroad Company in 1856.486  The conflicting land claim appeared before the 
Supreme Court of the United States, as The Homestead Company v. Valley Railroad, with 
Chief Justice Salmon Chase writing the opinion in 1872.487  The Supreme Court, 
following the Taney Court’s stance on ambiguous contract interpretation, agreed that due 
to the uncertainty of the northern terminus under the River Grant of 1846, the Dubuque 
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and Pacific Railroad’s title claim was uncertain.  However, because Congress had 
reserved the right to amend the legislation, and did so in 1861 and 1862, the River 
Grant’s claim to the land preempted that of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad and 
subsequently that of the Homestead Company.  Further, the Court reasoned that the 
legislative language of the 1856 railroad grant allowed a railroad company the ability to 
choose land that was not reserved from the market by any prior grant or federal and state 
notice.  The high court inferred that under the 1856 grant, the Dubuque and Pacific 
Railroad Company had in fact chosen land that was restricted for sale, due to the 
boundary debate over the River Grant.  Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the Des 
Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company and its assignees.488     
By late 1864, when President Lincoln nominated Chase as Chief Justice to replace 
the deceased Roger Taney, the nation’s battle weary attention began shifting away from 
divisive issues of the Civil War.  Instead, Reconstruction, economics, and other social 
matters drew interest.  The issues “reflected the nation’s transformation from an agrarian 
to an industrial power.”489  From 1864 to 1873, “the Chase Court…embodied past and 
future approaches to politics and constitutional law.”490  The Civil War brought 
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individual and minority rights to light while it also “spurred the creation of a national 
market and raised constitutional questions about the role of state legislatures in the 
regulation of business and interstate commerce.”491  Among those considering roles, 
“legal theorists increasingly promoted formalism…as a means of protecting many kinds 
of individual rights from legislative interference, including property rights of the 
corporation.”492 
Chief among the decisions that influenced future United States Supreme Court 
litigation pertaining to the Des Moines River Improvement controversies was the stance 
of upholding national judicial review power over a state’s decisions.  “In Gelpcke v. 
Dubuque (1864), the Court greatly expanded its review power over state court judgments 
by requiring Iowa to honor municipal bonds that the Iowa Supreme Court had held to be 
invalid.”493  Although the Chase Court’s rulings were in large part a response to check 
aggressive states’ efforts to justify federal judicial restraints on state excesses that arose 
during Reconstruction, they influenced the manner in which the Court responded to the 
River Grant taxation controversy and followed the judicial precedent established by the 
Marshal Court in Cohens v. Virginia (1821).  In a case involving the sale of lottery tickets 
in Virginia where they were illegal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
Cohens brothers were guilty of selling.  In order to rule on the case, the high court under 
the direction of Chief Justice John Marshal laid the groundwork for judicial review.  He 
argued that the high court had the constitutional authority to review state court rulings.  
Marshal contended that independent of the identity of an individual, the high court was 
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required to review cases that involved constitutional questions.  The high court’s job was 
to determine if the case was in violation of the national constitution and therefore invalid.  
The power to review a state court decision and hold a state court to a federal judicial 
decision allowed the Supreme Court of the United States to review and rule on Iowa 
judicial decisions in the Des Moines River Improvement controversies.494  
With the title legally in the possession of the Des Moines River Navigation and 
Railroad Company and its assignees, litigation arrived at the courts to determine the issue 
of property taxes as Edward Goodnow, an assignee of the Homestead Company, sought 
equity for taxes paid to the lands under disputed title.  Between 1882 and 1887, Goodnow 
brought four cases pertaining to the tax reimbursement issue before the State Supreme 
Court.  While involving different defendants, all assignees of the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company’s land title, the Goodnow cases addressed the same 
taxation questions: the ability of the Homestead Company and Goodnow to recover taxes, 
penalty, and interest paid on the disputed lands.495  Goodnow contended that denied his 
claim to title, he deserved reimbursement for the money paid out in property taxes for the 
disputed land.  
 In 1882, Goodenow v. Litchfield et al. reached the Supreme Court of Iowa on 
appeal from the Webster County Circuit Court.  Again, Litchfield and the other assignees 
returned to court as Goodnow argued that the lower court ruled erroneously in favor of 
Litchfield and others that obtained title under the River Grant.  Goodnow called upon the 
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Court for “an action in equity to recover money paid by the Homestead Company, the 
plaintiff’s assignor, on account of taxes” for the disputed lands.496  Goodnow contended 
that he paid the taxes on the disputed lands, with the knowledge of Litchfield and the Des 
Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company, and continued doing so in pursuance of 
a statutory obligation resting upon the Homestead Company of which he was the assignee 
while the matter again worked its way to the federal Supreme Court.  However, this time 
a private party sought reimbursement for taxes paid on many of the same lands as the 
various Iowa counties had previously sought reimbursement.  Litchfield and the other 
assignees of the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company turned to Conduce 
Gatch as legal counsel.497  
Conduce Gatch played a prominent role in the closing years of the Des Moines 
River Land Grant controversy from the time of his hire as legal counsel in 1882 until the 
controversy’s conclusion in 1892.  After completion of law studies in Xenia, Ohio and 
admittance to the bar, political involvement followed.  He settled at Kenton, won election 
as a prosecuting attorney, held a seat in the State Senate, and became a delegate to the 
first Republican National Convention.  He staunchly supported Lincoln’s stance on the 
issue of secession and raised a company for the Ohio Infantry ultimately reaching 
lieutenant colonel.498   
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The conclusion of the Civil War brought about change and Gatch moved to Iowa 
in 1866 and began practicing law.  By 1882, Gatch made a name for himself in Iowa and 
the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company and its assignees hired him as 
counsel.499  Taking a strict constructionist stance on behalf of Litchfield and the other 
assignees of the River Grant, Gatch argued that the payment of taxes was voluntary and 
that the Homestead Company’s assignor was fully aware of the questionable titles.  In 
addition, he argued the statute of limitations legally barred the claim for compensation.  
Gatch further purported that right to recover the taxes ended with prior adjudication.  
Most importantly, however, he argued that Litchfield and the other assignees had no 
obligation to pay the taxes during the time in which the Homestead Company paid them.  
Gatch reasoned that because of the conflicting claims to the land, set up by 
misinterpretation and confusion by the State of Iowa and the United States, it was not the 
responsibility of Litchfield and the assignees to pay taxes on land.500 
In rendering its decision, the State Supreme Court reasoned that the case revolved 
around two main points.  The first addressed the payment in good faith contention.  In the 
Court’s decision, Chief Justice William H. Seevers maintained that a legal process 
existed by which to test the validity of the claim and to determine the responsibility of 
either company to pay taxes.  He wrote that Goodnow made good faith payment “under 
the belief that the Homestead Company owned the land and was therefore legally bound 
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to pay the taxes.”501  However, in order to recover the taxes paid on good faith, “such 
facts should have been alleged and established.”502  Because neither the Homestead 
Company nor Goodnow brought forth a question as to the legal status of the good faith 
payments, Chief Justice Seevers found that the payments were voluntary and did not call 
for recovery.503 
The second point focused on the legal doctrine of estoppel.504  Gatch argued that 
the decision handed down by the Waite Court in the Litchfield v. County of Webster, 
created a bar that estopped recovery of taxes for the lands with disputed title.  “Counsel 
for the plaintiff [Goodnow] insisted each payment of taxes for each year constitute a 
separate and distinct transaction or cause of action, and therefore an adjudication as to the 
taxes paid in one year cannot estop or have any bearing upon the right to recover taxes 
paid in a subsequent year.”505  Goodnow argued that this issue was most important 
because each payment “may be predicated on different and distinct rights,” as the statutes 
of the State may have changed for each year.  The importance of settling the estoppel 
issue was not lost on the Court as Chief Justice Seevers wrote, “Counsel on both sides 
have cited a large number of cases as bearing upon the question as to what constitutes an 
adjudication that will estop the parties from again litigating the question determined in 
another action.”506 
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Chief Justice Seevers suggested that all the cases cited by both parties were 
essentially correct; however, they did not help define the status of the current action.  The 
Court contended that determining the power of estoppel between two actions centered on 
“the issue in both actions and the matter on which the estoppel depends must be the same 
or substantially so.”507  Upon examining the details of the prior United States Supreme 
Court ruling and the action before Chief Justice Seevers, the Court conceded that the 
federal Court ruled against recovery by Webster County of taxes paid before 1868 and by 
the same reasoning it followed that Goodnow could not recover voluntarily paid taxes 
either.  In essence, the Court ruled that the litigation brought before the Court by 
Goodnow was indeed governed by estoppel since the issue of recovery for taxes centered 
on the same litigants and facts as that ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States.508 
Justice Seevers’ ruling illustrated his strong stance on a codified system of law.  
Before serving on the Iowa Supreme Court, Seevers served in the Iowa House of 
Representatives of the Seventh General Assembly.  While there, he was an instrumental 
code commissioner in establishing the State Code of 1873.509 
While the Iowa Supreme Court ruling focused on the statutes and recovery of 
taxes paid under those statutes, the transition to legal formalism and strict interpretation 
of contract remained flawed.  Although the decision favored of Litchfield and the other 
Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad assignees, the Court lacked unity in 
forbidding an equitable solution to Goodnow and the Homestead Company.  Justices 
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Austin Adams and James G. Day of the Iowa Supreme Court filed the only dissenting 
opinion during the entire Des Moines River Land Grant controversy.  
In their dissenting opinion, the Justices reasoned that the majority opinion of the 
Court misinterpreted the ability of Goodnow and the Homestead Company to seek legal 
remedy on the action they brought forth.  If the Court’s decision was to be one of strict 
legal interpretation of statutes, each payment of taxes for each year must represent a 
distinct action with distinctly applied statutes and considerations.  Therefore, the prior 
decision that denied reimbursement did not apply to the action brought forth in Goodnow 
v. Litchfield et al.  Further, they suggested that “the great learning and ability of the 
Supreme Court of the United States entitle its decisions to great weight and authority, but 
the effect of one of its decisions as prior adjudication cannot be extended a hairs breath 
beyond that of a like decision made by the lowest court known to the law.”510  The 
Justices’ dissention questioned the Supreme Court of the United States’ jurisdictional 
authority to review and interpret state statutes, and its ability to effect prior state court 
adjudication on like matters.511 
Justice James G. Day’s tem on the Iowa Supreme Court lasted thirteen years but 
ended in controversy a year after the dissention in Goodnow v. Litchfield et al.  His 
maverick attitude towards the State’s Prohibition amendment when public sentiment 
strongly supported it ultimately cost him reelection to the Supreme Court in 1884.  That 
same maverick spirit, however, aided him in registering the only dissent in the Des 
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Moines River Improvement’s legal history.512  The other author of the dissent, Justice 
Austin Adams, sat on the Court as more of an intellectual.  From the same family as 
Revolutionary War figure Samuel Adams, Adams attended Dartmouth College and 
Harvard Law School.  “He had been for some years a professor before coming to the 
bar…and constantly engaged in educational work” including serving as a regent for the 
State University of Iowa.513  The 1882 dissention of Justices Adams and Day shifted the 
Court’s standing and by 1885 when two more cases, Goodnow v. Wells et al. and 
Goodnow v. Litchfield, appeared before the Iowa Supreme Court an equitable decision 
appeared on the horizon.  It would directly influence the 1887 Supreme Court of the 
United States decision in Stryker v. Goodnow’s Administrator, Chapman v. Same, Wells 
v. Same, Litchfield v. Same, Litchfield v. Same (1887).514 
In 1885, Goodnow v. Wells et al. appeared before the Supreme Court of Iowa.  
Wells, who held legal title by way of the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad 
claim, filed an appeal to the decision of the Webster County Circuit Court.  The circuit 
court decided in favor of Goodnow and the Homestead Company.  Wells called upon the 
Court to decide upon their claim to an action in chancery that raised many of the 
previously heard arguments in the taxation controversy.  Ruling against the previous legal 
decisions on similar matters, the lower court contended that Wells, who had legal title by 
way of the River Grant, indeed was responsible for reimbursement to Goodnow for taxes 
paid on the disputed lands. 
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The lower court argued, and the Supreme Court of Iowa agreed in the appeal, that 
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled incorrectly in Litchfield v. County of 
Webster.515  Both the circuit court and the State Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ interpretation of the statutes of the State in deciding 
the point at which legal title transferred to the hands of the Des Moines River Navigation 
and Railroad Company and its assignees.  While the high court ruled that the legal 
recognition of title occurred only after locating and entering the land by the land office 
and the governor, the circuit court and the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the practice 
of locating and entering to certify land title did not apply based on the statutes of Iowa at 
the time.  In Chief Justice Beck’s written opinion, he purported “it is a familiar rule that 
congressional grants of land of the character of the one under which defendants 
claim…pass the title without conveyances or other assurances.”516  He continued, “it 
cannot be said that the lands of the defendant were ‘entered’ or ‘located.’  They were in 
fact conveyed by a congressional grant.”517  Since the lands were not subject to the 
“enter” and “locate” provisions, they were taxable from the time of purchase from the 
State.  The Court contended that, “the lands were not purchased from the state in 1861, 
but in 1858, and the legislation and patent of the state conveyed the state’s interest in the 
land; and the interest afterwards acquired by the state inured to the purchaser, and his 
title, by relation, ran back to the grant by the state.”518 
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Continuing the argument presented by Justice Adams in his dissenting opinion of 
Goodenow v. Litchfield et al., Chief Justice Beck and the Supreme Court of Iowa further 
questioned the jurisdictional role of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
interpreting state statutes.  In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Beck wrote: 
“It is a rule nowhere disputed that the decisions of the Supreme Court of a state, 
interpreting a statute of such state, must be followed by the federal courts; and 
where the Supreme Court of the United States, upon mistaken view of the purport 
and effect of the decisions of the supreme court of the state in such a case, renders 
a decision in conflict therewith, such decision is not binding on the state court.”519 
 
In 1885, familiar litigants again appeared before the Supreme Court of Iowa.  In 
Goodnow v. Litchfield, the Plaintiff argued before the Court similar grounds as to those in 
Goodnow v. Wells, with the Court again ruling similarly, while also reversing its 1882 
decision in Goodenow v. Litchfield et al.  However, the decision rendered in Goodnow v. 
Litchfield echoed the national transformation away from the common law and towards a 
more distinct American Law.  For the first time in the River Grant controversy, the Court 
rewarded Goodnow with recovery of interest, in addition to equitable recovery of taxes 
paid on the disputed land.520 
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Two years removed from the Supreme Court of Iowa’s decision of 1885, the 
litigants appeared before the Supreme Court of the United States.  On November 1, 1887 
with Chief Justice Waite presiding, Gatch and Goodnow’s administrator argued nine 
cases pertaining to the taxation controversy.521  Due to the similarity in questions asked, 
Chief Justice Waite and the Court combined cases and rendered four opinions.  Chief 
among the written opinions, the Court addressed questions pertaining to judicial 
jurisdiction and power, limits of estoppel, and the use of judicial precedent.522 
Chief Justice Waite addressed the power of the federal judicial system to decide 
matters of a state and its limits.  In responding to the taxation debate and the ability of the 
federal Supreme Court to render a binding decision, Chief Justice Waite wrote,  
Whether the lands were taxable within a year after the title passed out of the 
United States is not a Federal question.  There was nothing in the act of Congress 
admitting Iowa into the Union, or in any other act of Congress to which our 
attention has been directed, which in any manner interfered with the power of the 
state to tax lands as soon as they ceased to be the property of the United States.  
The only prohibition was against the taxation whilst the United States were the 
owners.523   
 
Waite further suggested that the question asked by the litigants was a question of state 
statute construction.  Therefore, since the state statute did not conflict in any way with the 
Constitution or other laws of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States 
did not have the authority to review the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court.  
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While the Supreme Court of Iowa under Chief Justice Seevers already offered a 
sound definition of an estoppel in 1882 with Goodenow v. Litchfield et al., the Waite 
Court also offered a clear picture of the difference between a precedent and an estoppel.  
Chief Justice Waite reasoned that although the assignees of the Des Moines River 
Navigation and Railroad Company Grant land contended that Wolcott v. Des Moines 
Company established a bar of recovery that acted as an estoppel, they were in error.  
Waite wrote, “The legal operation and effect of the judgment as an estoppel was 
confirmed to the title of the river lands and as to other parties, it stood…only as ‘an 
authoritative exposition’ of the views of the court.”524  Wolcott v. Des Moines Company 
settled the question of title in favor of the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company 
and its assignees, with legal title, but the Court stated that the case formed an estoppel 
only in determining the proper title of the parties listed in the litigation.  Because the 
litigants in Wolcott v. Des Moines Company varied from those before him, Justice Waite 
contended that the use of the case in litigation was limited to only a precedent and no 
effective argument existed to form an estoppel. 
Again, the Waite Court’s stance on the taxation controversy confirmed previous 
legal thought.  Much like Waite’s term as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, neither the 
other justices nor the written opinion offered any radical or emerging philosophies to the 
decision.  Instead, Chief Justice Waite’s opinion on the taxation controversy followed the 
trend of the Waite Court in reaffirming the transformation and emergence of a distinct 
American legal system and a doctrine of legal formalism.525  The United States Supreme 
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Court under Chief Justice Waite sought to consolidate and reaffirm the nineteenth-century 
transformations that occurred within the legal system. 
The 1887 legal decision by the Waite Court settled the long outstanding taxation 
controversy but also assisted in the emergence of a distinct legal system.  The taxation 
controversy served as an agent in addressing the role of state and federal legal systems.  
The initial cases focused on the legal rights of the State of Iowa and its counties to collect 
property taxes on lands under the Des Moines River Lands Grant.  Although not all 
branches of the legal system transformed at the same rate, the judicial systems gradually 
accepted the doctrine of legal formalism.  The legal system saw the changes becoming 
deeply entrenched by 1872 as justices rendered decisions based on strict interpretations of 
state codes and federal laws. 
By 1872, Congress amended the boundaries of the River Lands Grant and 
established the Des Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company with valid title to 
the lands involved in the taxation controversy.  The legal recognition of title signaled a 
new phase of litigation, between private companies.  Through a conflicting claim under 
the 1856 Railroad Land Grant, the Homestead Company acquired duplicate title to lands 
along the Des Moines River.  The Homestead Company paid property taxes on the 
disputed lands.  As a result, the Homestead Company sought legal remedy from the Des 
Moines River Navigation and Railroad Company for payment of property taxes.  The 
courts faced with finding an equitable decision between two private companies.  Instead, 
the courts further strengthened the doctrine of legal formalism by strictly adhering to state 
codes and statutes. 
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The legal system also used the taxation controversy to further define its own 
authority.  The taxation controversy provided the legal system with a means of asserting 
its authority to interpret legislation.  The litigation provided the courts with the 
opportunity to assert the doctrine of judicial review.  Not only did the taxation 
controversy need settlement, but the state’s justices also questioned the federal courtt’s 
authority of judicial review.  Calling on precedents to support the doctrine of judicial 
review, the federal court system further defined its authority in matters of the state. 
Although the taxation litigation aided the emergence of a distinct legal system, the 
River Lands Grant controversies remained unresolved.  The rights of squatters and the 
final boundary determination remained outstanding.  The boundary and taxation 
controversies assisted in the creation of mechanisms that guided those issues to 
finality.526 
The Des Moines River Improvement land grant of 1846 grew out of a nineteenth 
century “Spirit of Improvement” that swept up in the idea of changing the individual, 
society, and the natural environment.  The Des Moines River Lands Grant was not the 
first of its kind in American history, rather it resulted from an emerging national 
awareness and focus on internal improvements.  The growth and expansion of American 
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society brought national debates on the issue of internal improvements.  While some 
called for internal improvements in order to provide a defensive infrastructure and 
facilitate access to economic markets, others argued the national government had no role 
in these efforts as it only pitted one state against another.  The Des Moines River Lands 
Grant and improvement project provided a mechanism for change and transformation that 
proved to be central in the formation of law and politics in the State of Iowa. 
The Iowa Territory held great promise as an agricultural region needing access to 
markets.  The value of a reliable transportation route to the interior of the state made the 
idea of an internal improvement project, via the Des Moines River offered too much to 
simply pass over.  With the Des Moines River Improvement land grant in 1846 came 
much promise, but also almost a half-century of controversy and no lasting improvements 
in the navigation of the Des Moines River. 
Although previous scholars called the River Lands Grant and improvement 
project a failure, it served as an agent for change.  The Iowa General Assembly 
experimented with administrative hierarchies while pursuing the vigorous completion of 
the project.  Although Congress conveyed the River Lands Grant during the formative 
years of the State of Iowa, the project did not exist in a vacuum, uninfluenced by the rest 
of the country.  Numerous internal improvement projects were underway or completed by 
the time of Iowa’s grant and served as a template for the Des Moines River improvement 
project.  However, each project presented its own unique challenges that required 
attention and greatly contributed to the outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
through nineteenth-century development, illustrated an enduring shift in political development and the 
responsibilities of institutionalized governance at work.   
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The Des Moines River Lands Grant illustrated the federal government’s struggle 
for authority over improvement projects.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the federal 
government underwent many changes.  Individuals with differing political ideologies 
struggled to define the federal government’s role in an emerging national economy.  
Controversy over the boundaries of the 1846 Des Moines River Lands Grant illustrated a 
struggle for power between political parties and branches of the federal government.  
Each political party fought to have its policies implemented, while the River Lands Grant 
provided an opportunity to define the roles and authority of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of the federal government. 
The Des Moines River Lands Grant litigation assisted in the transformation of the 
American legal system.  Although the legal cases arose involving the boundary and 
property tax assessment disputes, they served as a means of distinguishing the jurisdiction 
of the federal and state governments in assessing fees.  Additionally, the Des Moines 
River Lands Grant provided the courts with a means of addressing legal jurisdictions and 
judicial review. 
The Des Moines River Lands Grant and improvement project served as a 
mechanism in forming and defining the role of local, state, and regional internal 
improvement projects in defining the relationships between individuals, corporations, and 
governments in nineteenth-century America.  While internal improvements served to 
connect markets and aid the development of a national economy, the projects presented 
new obstacles for individuals, challenged previous business practices, and helped redefine 
the roles of state and federal governments. 
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Conclusion 
Defining the Legacy of Water and Society 
 
Water assisted the rise of empires, the organization of societies and nations, and 
contributed to their collapse.  The efforts of individuals and societies to control access to 
water and convert water into a tool of development define the pivotal and transformative 
role of the natural resource.  In turn, great societies emerged from harnessing the waters 
of the planet’s oceans, seas, lakes, and rivers.  While not all efforts at transforming the 
resource resulted in smooth and durable change, the lessons learned provided durable 
change to society. 
In many ways, the young American nation’s focus became synonymous with 
improvement.  The national government conveyed land grants to states as assistance in 
internal improvement development.  Nationalists argued that federally funded 
improvement projects needed to be limited to those that were truly of national interest and 
to the benefit of all states, such as those for national defense.  Sectionalists, in contrast, 
focused on the economic aspects of the infrastructure projects.  While they were not 
directly arguing against the benefits of internal improvements, Sectionalists contended 
that no state should expend its resources, economic or otherwise, to support a project in 
another state if it did not enhance both states.  In order to facilitate settlement and market 
development in expanding the western United States, the federal government initiated a 
policy of granting lands for projects that aided the general public good.  Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the federal government conveyed just over one hundred land grants 
for such improvement projects as canals, wagon roads, river improvements, and railroads. 
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Statistical analysis of the century’s land grants provides detail about the level of 
widespread national involvement in internal improvements.  The national government 
focused on assisting four types of projects that included railroads, wagon roads, canals, 
and river improvements.  Geographic and topological variances and sectional attitudes 
influenced the adoption of the various types of projects.  Economic resources and 
boosterism played a prominent role in national government’s conveyance of economic 
help.  As the century progressed, the national government shifted from offering individual 
states smaller land grants to offering private companies larger tracts for larger scale 
projects.  Additionally, the purpose such land grants transitioned from roads, canals, and 
river improvements to railroad development as the century passed.  While governmental 
strategies of initiating and bringing to completion internal improvements changed 
dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century, statistical analysis only answers 
where governmental efforts went, but does little to explain exactly how it occurred or to 
what level such efforts succeeded.    
As settlers pushed into the Ohio River Valley region, the Valley’s populace lacked 
necessary and efficient means of transportation.  Environmentally blessed with the Ohio 
River and its tributaries, the region’s settlers turned to the waterways as viable means of 
transportation.  The growth of populations and emergence of market-oriented production 
increased demands upon the region’s waterways, straining them.  Geographic 
happenstance created natural barriers like those forming the Falls of the Ohio and 
hindered further development of the region.  Lacking capital but needing improvements 
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to provide more efficient and safe water-based transportation, citizens, boosters, and 
government sought means of improving nature for their use. 
State and regional governments lacked finances for large-scale improvement 
efforts and resulted in using their authority to secure the needed works through the 
chartering of private companies.  Governments conveyed ownership and operation 
oversight of the projects upon completion to the private companies in exchange for 
overseeing the construction of the improvements.  In turn, the private companies sought 
investment from both local and national interests to secure the future of their companies.  
With the legal authority to charge usage fees such as tolls, the companies stood to realize 
significant financial gains.  However, the companies balanced profits with repairs, 
upgrades, and necessary public support. 
The implementation of tolls and other charges by private companies centralized 
power while creating new economic barriers for citizens and commercial user of canals 
and other improvement projects.  As the region and the nation underwent a shift in views 
over privately held improvement projects, the national government retreated from 
supporting them financially.  Investors, with much to lose in the wake of the national 
effort to convert private improvement companies to public entities, struggled to transfer 
power to the national government while protecting their financial investments.   
While, undoubtedly, numerous private and public improvement projects failed, 
others such as the Louisville and Portland Canal Company succeeded in significant part 
due to timing of social and political shifts.  Although the private canal company struggled 
with securing necessary financial assistance for providing a canal serviceable for the 
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area’s needs, it greatly benefited from the national post-war shift towards expansion, 
reconstruction, and a revival of the improvement movement.  While the private canal 
company provided the business structure and plan for construction and operation, neither 
the canal nor the canal company seemed likely to succeed without the positive 
intervention of government.   
Centuries of travelers noted the near perfect water route that connected the Great 
Lakes with the Mississippi River System.  The geographic oddity served as an 
environmental barrier for societal development.  While pre-European inhabitants of the 
region portaged the distance with relative ease, advances in water transportation found the 
portage increasingly limiting.  As French explorers entered the region, they immediately 
recognized the importance of the portage in the region’s migratory routes.  Subsequently, 
a quest for control of the area occupied much of the era of French presence in the region.  
Despite French control of the region, alteration of the landscape to provide the missing 
water link never materialized.  Although the interior fur trade proved immensely lucrative 
for the French, the region still lacked the necessary capital, labor, and technological 
ability to overcome the physical barrier. 
In the wake of the American Revolution, the region fell into the hands of the 
United States of America.  Due largely to its more interior location, settlement lagged 
behind that of points to the east.  For the few inhabitants, the construction of a canal held 
great promise.  The construction of the canal would fortify the importance of the region 
within the growing nation.  Farmers and settlers stood to gain economically with the 
development of a major transportation network slicing through their region.  The 
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likelihood of outside investment in the region increased dramatically with the increase in 
commercial transportation through the canal. 
  Despite the promise of prosperity the canal held, the region’s quest for the canal 
teetered on the verge of collapse throughout the antebellum era.  Stymied by the young 
nations’ financial panic, a lack of skilled labor, material resources, and capital, the 
government sought out means of seeing the project through to completion.  Seizing upon 
favorable shifts in public and political opinions, Illinois weathered the storm and emerged 
from tremendous debt and criticism with a completed canal.  Albeit substantially revised, 
the opening of the canal secured the importance of the region within the national 
economy.    
   Improvement of the Des Moines River held the potential of opening up the 
prairie soils west of the Mississippi River for development.  The congressional 
conveyance of the Des Moines River Lands Grant and the Iowa General Assembly’s 
experimentation with administrative hierarchies highlighted the social and governmental 
resolve to secure completion of the project.  Although Congress conveyed the River 
Lands Grant during the formative years of the State of Iowa, the project did not exist 
isolated from and uninfluenced by the rest of the country.  Numerous internal 
improvement projects were underway or completed by the time of Iowa’s grant and 
served as a template for the Des Moines River improvement project.  However, each 
project presented its own unique challenges that required experimentation and greatly 
contributed to the outcome. 
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 The federal government’s struggle for authority over the project is of great 
importance.  Individuals with differing political ideologies labored to define the federal 
government’s role in an emerging national economy.  Controversy over the boundaries of 
the 1846 Des Moines River Lands Grant illustrated a battle for power between political 
parties and branches of the federal government.  Each political party fought to have its 
policies implemented, while the River Lands Grant provided an opportunity to define the 
roles and authority of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal 
government. 
 The Des Moines River Lands Grant assists in the transformation of the American 
legal system.  Although the legal cases involve property tax assessment, they served as a 
means of distinguishing the jurisdiction of the federal and state governments in assessing 
fees.  Additionally, the Des Moines River Lands Grant provided the courts with a means 
of addressing legal jurisdictions and judicial review. 
 
Defining Roles 
 
As the population increased and settlement expanded westward in nineteenth-
century America, the need for internal improvements became more obvious.  While some 
individuals claimed the need for more comprehensive and reliable infrastructural 
developments, others fought against them.  Despite the growing population and 
expanding nation, internal improvements became a contentious topic in American politics 
as territory, state, and national governments struggled to create effective laws and 
mechanisms of development.   
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The battles waged over waterway transportation projects assisted in defining the 
role of territory, state, and national governments.  Citizens in the territories and western 
states often lacked the capital required for the massive water-based improvement projects.  
Caught in a cycle of needing development to fund the projects and needing the projects to 
spur development, citizens looked to their government to provide solutions.  In turn, state 
and territory governments experimented with legislation to provide the needed water 
route.  While success proved difficult to achieve, defining the role of the government as 
responsive to its citizens’ needs emerged in the process.    
When state and territorial legislatures failed to spur development, they turned to 
the national government to provide the remedy.  In response, the national government 
assisted efforts to construct transportation systems that met national objectives.  Internal 
improvements provided the expanding nation a defensive transportation infrastructure 
through which to ship military personnel and supplies, opened frontier regions for 
settlement, and facilitated connections between consumers, suppliers, and their markets.   
The national government provided economic support by way of land grants.  In 
turn, the conveyance of lands for the purpose of improvement projects presented 
challenges for states and territories.  They faced difficulties in developing effective 
administrative and financial hierarchies.  Legislatures experimented by trial and error in 
finding the best means of managing the diverse projects.  In an effort to oversee all the 
complex facets of the land grants and improvement projects, states and territories created 
land offices, sought out additional sources of financing, and explored various methods to 
supervise construction and a timely completion of the projects.  While some states turned 
300 
 
the improvements into great state run projects, others states turned to private 
entrepreneurs for further funding and to oversee the project’s completion.  Through 
struggles to transfer the projects into private company hands, state government 
experimented with creating positive legislation and established the possibility of a 
cooperative environment between private and public entities.   
Not all privatization resulted in positive relations.  As a result, privatization added 
to the complexity of improvement projects and pitted state and federal government’s 
agendas of serving the public good against those of economically driven private 
companies.  Saddled with the difficulty of constructing and maintaining operable 
improvements, private companies often turned back to the government.  With a nation 
reliant upon the improvement projects for development, the government became 
obligated to find strategies to maintain and operate the project for the benefit of all. 
Conflict over contractual obligations and interpretations often spilled into the 
courts of the states and nation.  There, in the courts, a concerted effort to remedy contract 
language and solidify the obligation of all parties resulted in legislation that was more 
decisive.  Courts refined the boundaries of the branches of the federal government, further 
delineated between the roles of state and federal governments, and called attention to the 
need for more precise and comprehensive legislative language.  Clearer responsibilities of 
government and more comprehensive legislation language created more effective 
development tools for the nation.   
Resulting from the struggles, water improvement in the nineteenth century 
provided Americans with a formative tool that assisted the reorganization of the nation.  
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The resource served as a mechanism for negotiating a social contract between citizens, 
private business, and their government.  In turn, the government experienced with 
strategies to provide the nation with tools of development.  In the process, the struggles of 
harnessing the natural resource provided the platform for durable political, economic, and 
social change.  Although not without incident, the struggles of the canal and river 
improvement era paved the way for such future development projects as railroads, 
telegraph, telephone, electricity, hydroelectric power, and the interstate highway system.       
 
Applying the Lessons Learned 
The era of canal and river improvement projects served a vital role in negotiating 
a new social contract in the new nation.  Expansion and westward migration required 
development of effective transportation methods.  With an interior filled with an 
abundance of untapped natural resources, Americans looked to improve upon the 
continent.  Facilitating the expansion of the nation, water-based transportation connected 
the resources of the interior with society.    
Often ill equipped to handle the challenges of empowering its society, national, 
territory, and state governments struggled providing effective and efficient means 
necessary for overseeing great public works.  The nation’s water resources provided the 
proving grounds as the nation developed a blueprint that converted ideology into 
application and empowered its society.  The transformation of society in the era of 
waterway improvement established a defining legacy.  
As the era of water-based improvement gave way to the newer and more versatile 
technologies of rail development, the lessons learned from the canal and river 
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improvement era provided a blueprint for legislative decision-making, economic 
development, and societal development.  Undoubtedly, the era of railroad development 
held its own unique challenges.  However, the idea of transportation development as an 
aid to economic development and social benefit is rooted in the debates over the canal 
and river improvement projects that preceded them.527   
Although begun in the early years of the nineteenth century, early investment in 
Samuel B. Morse’s telegraph invention languished behind what the nation needed.  
However, the nation’s interest in the communication development grew.  Together, as the 
nation expanded westward, the need for more effective means of communication exposed 
the potential of the telegraph system.  Utilizing the mechanism of creating great public 
works established in the improvement era, the installation of the telegraph across the 
American West became synonymous with railroads and western development.  The 
government established contracts and conveyed grants to companies willing and able to 
construct the nation’s telegraph communications infrastructure.528   
The advent of telephones and electricity sparked a renegotiation of the social 
contract that resulted in a new opportunity.  While the integration went neither smoothly 
nor rapidly, the integration of both technologies brought great change to the organization 
of society and fostered a culture of governmental assistance in implementing the new 
technologies.  Drawing upon the facilitation of the great improvement projects of the 
nineteenth century, the national government put forth a bold initiative to provide the rural 
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countryside with electricity that brought the possibility of investing in such new home 
innovations as the telephone, refrigeration, lighting, electric heat, and washers and 
dryers.529    
A significant component of the bold initiative included revisiting the nation’s 
waterways.  A coordinated national plan for the nation’s waterways focused on flood 
control and harnessing the water’s potential for hydroelectric power.  Combined, the plan 
stabilized flooding concerns and converted water into a tool of societal improvement.  
Coordination of local, state, and national government to successfully reach the desired 
outcome drew heavily upon the governmental and legal lessons learned in the early 
nineteenth century.  Drawing upon public and private resources, the nation witnessed the 
successful creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Hoover Dam.530  The 
coordinated efforts at capturing the potential of the nation’s waterways, common national 
vision, and economic development resulted in great agricultural irrigation projects of the 
arid and semi-arid west, while also providing potable water sources to such biomes as Los 
Angeles that lacked immediate access to the precious resource.531  
 Regional specialization in agriculture and manufactured goods increased the 
nation’s dependence on effective means of transportation.  As the nation increasingly 
grew reliant on the automobile, a renegotiation of the nation’s transportation systems 
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occurred.  Assisting commercial and individual desires for a more effective means of 
transportation, the government developed a national highway transportation system.  
Federal legislative and economic support provided the impetus for further development of 
a common transportation system that linked local, regional, and national markets.  In 
many way overlaying the nation with a great transportation infrastructure originally 
sought with canal and river improvement projects in the nineteenth century.     
 
 
The Continued Centrality of Water in Society Development 
 
 Early analysis of the economic downturn the nation, and the global community, 
currently faces in 2008 and 2009 points toward a new social contract emerging.  
However, early responses to the downturn suggest that the legacy of the canal and river 
improvement era remains alive and foundational.  Wide-ranging economic stimulus plans 
focus on improving the nation’s power grid, constructing and improving the nation’s 
transportation systems, investing heavily in such new forms of harnessing nature’s 
resources as wind and hydroelectric power, and installation of such new communication 
technologies as high-speed data lines.  A clear understanding of the lessons learned from 
the canal and river improvement projects of the nineteenth century, and subsequent eras, 
will undoubtedly go a long way in determining the success or failure of these current 
projects.   
On the global stage, in the early years of the twenty-first century, the United States 
and the world community face challenges of securing access to potable water sources.  In 
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the growing face of suitable water shortages, experimentation and legislation aimed at 
securing and providing the resource to those in need highlights the centrality of water as a 
defining characteristic of societies.  The apocalyptical possibilities of surrounding a lack 
of sustainable and viable water sources point toward grave social consequences.  With the 
lack of sustainable water sources, the world community stands to witness increases in 
famine, diseases, conflict, and disorder.  The resulting events will require a renegotiation 
of the social contracts, provide new opportunities for positive government to respond to 
its citizens needs.  In the end, such complications further underscore the stabilizing 
contributions that come with the positive utilization of water.  The challenge of society 
remains developing a social contract that finds ways to harness nature in a sustainable 
manner that continues to assist in the development of a durable social contract, and a 
sustainable balance between environmental resource preservation and human utilization. 
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